389. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer)0
SUBJECT
- Logistical Planning for Possible Intervention in Laos
I am increasingly concerned over the possible logistical limitations on any action we may decide to take in Laos, and particularly on our capacity to support in combat operations forces of the magnitude now envisaged in both Admiral Felt’s and General Harkins’ estimates.
Mr. Bundy has gone over the present estimates of air, rail, and road supply into Laos, which conclude that the normal ceiling would be approximately 2,000 tons a day, as against a possible requirement, at least in the initial period, of as much as 25–2,600 tons a day. Moreover, this calculation assumes full use of the rail facility at least up to Nong Khai. While the vulnerability of this rail line to sabotage and interdiction is a matter on which judgments may differ, I am absolutely sure that we cannot persuade the President of the wisdom of this operation unless we have available carefully thought-out and detailed plans to supply our forces in Laos without dependencies on it.
Another crucial matter is the timing of the effort. I believe that existing plans rely heavily on the use of Bangkok and the rail lines. From a timing standpoint alone this will impose major drawbacks in bringing our power to bear rapidly before the DRV can commit full-scale reinforcements or we encounter mounting political difficulties in the UN and elsewhere. Therefore, I urge that logistic planning for possible intervention be immediately centered in Honolulu and Bangkok, and that a team from the Joint Staff go at once to complete a detailed plan for logistic supply. This should cover the detailed timetable by day of each step of the operation and precise analysis of the airlift requirements, which I am sure will be a substantial chunk of our worldwide airlift capabilities. If the analysis indicated that anticipatory movements on a large scale are required, I would look favorably on recommendations to do these at once.
While planning for this study should perhaps center in Honolulu, General Harkins should be informed at once and arrangements made for full liaison between his planning staff and Admiral Felt’s. The final plans must be consistent with the agreed judgment of General Harkins [Page 827] and Admiral Felt as to the full extent of the force requirement. As I understand it, we can indicate in theory how we would lift the required tonnage into Laos, but I repeat that we must be able to demonstrate to the President just how we would in fact do this, and with what timing and assets.