390. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0
SUBJECT
- Laos Planning
Bill Bundy called to say that Secretary McNamara wanted a change in the joint State-Defense recommendations on Laos.1 He wants to emphasize more the disadvantages of step 2, “Occupation of the Mekong River Areas” and stress the likelihood of having to move very quickly to stage 4, “Offensive Operations.”
I have learned informally that the logistics people in JCS are not happy with stage 4 from a logistic point of view. They feel that the 20,000 to 25,000 U.S. force estimate is too low. Double the number would be required in view of the lack of supply and transport facilities in North Thailand. They are inclined to think that the whole operation is impractical. General Taylor’s staff is onto this and will question Defense carefully on the basis for the estimate contained in the memorandum.
Both these developments emphasize, it seems to me, a growing tendency for Defense to argue itself into position from which the only conclusion [Page 828] is that we should take no action at all. This has been done by refusing to examine lesser steps on the grounds that all lesser steps lead inevitably to a major conventional ground engagement in Laos which is not practical.
Is there not a point which has been overlooked? It seems to me that before either side runs the risk of a massive confrontation in Laos, there would be a call for a reconvocation of the Geneva Conference. If this is true, should we not take some of the lesser steps such as a small-scale occupation of the cease-fire area, realizing that in the event of a strong enemy reaction, we might be forced to consider more direct measures against the DRV while at the same time calling for negotiations.
In other words, if stage 2 does not work, the President might consider stages 3, 5 and 6 but skip stage 4. At the present time all we really should reach a decision on is stage 1. More thinking is needed on the rest.
My main concern is that if the PL/VM move, we will have not taken any step to convince the enemy that we will not see Laos collapse—we will only have indicated a serious intention to defend Thailand. But stage 4 seems the worst way of doing the unnecessary.
I am also enclosing an addendum to SNIE 58–5–62 which deals with the estimated Communist reaction to stages 3 to 6.2 They are quite severe.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 6/6/62–6/12/62. Top Secret.↩
- McNamara wanted a change in Tab A to Document 387; see also Document 386.↩
- In this addendum, June 6, the first course of action would be U.S. air attacks against Communist supply bases in Laos and supply routes from North Vietnam in Laos to be taken in conjunction with, or subsequent to, occupation of the major Mekong River cities by 8,000 to 10,000 U.S. troops supported by the Thais. The Communist response would be to move anti-aircraft units from North Vietnam and introduce fighter aircraft with Soviet and Chinese pilots. On the ground, Communist forces, reinforced by additional North Vietnamese troops, would confine and harass U.S. forces. The second course of action would be U.S. air attacks against North Vietnam supply routes to Laos, but not population centers. This attack would be met with Chinese and Soviet air support to protect North Vietnam, possible introduction of Chinese troops into Laos, but not North Vietnam, and possible attacks on South Vietnam, Thailand, and even U.S. carriers at sea. The final course of action would be an amphibious operation against North Vietnam, which would involve a full-scale regional war, with China providing ground forces as needed. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 6/6/62–6/12/62)↩