Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

329. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, April 17, 1962.

Congressional Briefing on Laos¹

The purpose of this briefing is:

(a) to bring the Congressional leadership up to date on developments in Laos since their last briefing,² and

(b) to prepare them for a decision to apply a mild form of suspension of military assistance to General Phoumi.

A. Secretary Rusk, General Lemnitzer and Averell will be able to discuss recent events in Laos from a political and military point of view. You may wish to refer to your conversation with Foreign Minister Thanat,³ which was the major factor in bringing the Thais around to help us with Phoumi, and to your recent conversation with the Lao Ambassador.⁴

B. The preparation for a decision is more difficult to handle, since you have not yet been given a recommendation by Averell. You may decide to postpone discussion of any future action with the Congressional leaders until a further talk with Averell. In that event you may simply wish to say that you are still studying the next steps to be taken.

If he has the chance before the briefing, Averell will probably discuss with you his recommendation that we give the Thais until about May 7th to continue their efforts to bring Phoumi to negotiate with Souvanna.

If the Thais do not succeed (and the chances are not too good), then Averell will suggest that we withdraw those of our White Star teams which are attached to RLG units in the most forward field positions. About 7 or 8 (100 men) of the approximately 18 teams (450 men) would be withdrawn to the rear areas.

The political reasons for doing this are explained in the attached memorandum,⁵ and the reasons for the choice of this type of suspension may be summarized as follows:

(a) Such a withdrawal would not have a severe effect upon the strength of the FAR; and it does not deprive the FAR of the “sinews of war,” only of advisors whose advice is not always followed.

(b) Unlike the reduction of supplies, it does not commit us to go any further if Phoumi remains obdurate.

(c) It gets our own people out of an area where they might get hurt if Phoumi or the PL started new operations, and it avoids our intimate involvement in a likely defeat if such operations were started.

(d) Although such a withdrawal cannot be expected to hurt Phoumi enough to cause him to change his attitude, it may be enough to keep Souvanna and the Russians in play.

The military feel that such a withdrawal will leave us “blind” from an intelligence point of view. Averell feels that the intelligence which has been derived from the teams is probably not worth saving.

Although you may not have a chance to function on the decision today, Averell will probably ask you to do so before you leave on Thursday.⁶

C. Averell thinks that it is important during the briefing to discuss Vietnam as well as Laos. He feels that the more flexible policy in Laos is best understood in terms of our stronger strategic position in Vietnam. He will also be prepared to discuss with you our reaction to the pressures from various sources (principally Sihanouk) for an international conference on Vietnam. Averell is opposed to such a conference at this time.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 4/1/62–4/18/62. Secret. Drafted by Forrestal.
1. See footnote 2, Document 327.
2. See Document 297.
3. Kennedy met with Foreign Minister Thanat on March 5 and stressed that a “solution under Souvanna Phouma was the only acceptable choice.” The President stated he did not want “Phoumi to throw in the sponge, but rather support Souvanna and participate in the government.” (Department of State, Central Files, 792.13/3–562) The memorandum of conversation is included in volume XXIII.
4. See Document 326.
5. Not found.
6. The President left on Wednesday, April 18, for Palm Beach, Florida.