Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

297. Memorandum of Conference With President Kennedy³

Washington, February 21, 1962, 9:30 a.m.

[Here follows a list of 30 people, including the bipartisan Congressional Leadership, who attended the meeting with the President.]

The President opened the meeting with an outline of the briefers and the items he wanted them to cover. He indicated that Secretary Rusk would cover Berlin, including the Gromyko/Thompson talks, and the buzzing of our planes in the corridors. Secretary McNamara, who was just back from Hawaii, would discuss Viet-Nam and Laos, assisted by Mr. Harriman and General Lemnitzer.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

Senator Saltonstall asked for a discussion of the situation in Laos because it would seem to him that we were getting quite a ways along and that the situation in Laos may have some bearing in North Viet-Nam.

The President suggested that Secretary Rusk would make some introductory remarks and then Mr. Harriman would discuss the points that had been made in the negotiations. General Lemnitzer would comment briefly on the military situation.

Secretary Rusk stated that our objective was to get a government there that had a reasonable chance of remaining neutral and independent of either of the big power blocs. The international objective then is to get an agreement among the powers in Southeast Asia. If we can get these powers to agree on the neutralization of Laos and then to establish the machinery which can guarantee this neutrality, it can then keep Laos from being a base for action by the Communists against the other Southeast Asian nations. The international aspect of this has gone about as far as it can go short of establishing a government in Laos. Negotiations are now going on among the elements of government in Laos, including the Princes. We do not know whether the negotiations will succeed or not. We think that there is a fair chance that if the leadership can get together and establish a coalition government and the international machinery can be moved in to get all the non-Laotian forces out of there, including the North Vietnamese, the Laotians will be able to go on and run their country and protect it. The Laotians seem less inclined to battle much for themselves, especially against their brothers, but the intrusion of the North Vietnamese into the country has given the Pathet Lao a favorable position compared to the government forces, so that the effort to get the intruding forces out of there is a very important part of our objective. We do believe that the Soviet Union at this time wants a settlement in Laos and really hopes to prevent other outbreaks in Southeast Asia. The Soviets have had a number of occasions in the last several months in which, from their point of view, they could have stepped into the fighting or stepped up the effort. But they have gone to considerable trouble in trying to find ways to keep the negotiations going. This undoubtedly has some relationship to the tension between Moscow and Peiping.

Mr. Harriman reported from his viewpoint of dealing with the Soviets at Geneva that they had given several indications they really wanted a settlement. Pushkin had definitely said so and had made some concessions in the negotiations in spite of the pressure of the Chinese Reds. Ambassador Harriman reported his hope that if an agreement were signed they would do their best to take care of getting the provisions of the agreement carried out, including the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Laos, and even taking steps so that the country could not be used against neighboring countries. So far it looks as if the Soviets have tried to police their side of the agreement in which the British and the Soviets are co-chairmen of the ICC. As to negotiation, it is possible that Khrushchev is actually trying to make good on this subject—one on which he agreed with the President at Vienna. Mr. Harriman continued that we still have hope that some of these negotiations will pan out and that infiltration via Laos into South Viet-Nam will end. He pointed out, however, that a coalition government is very difficult to achieve, and that the three Princes had three separate forces. Souvanna is not a Communist and recently he has made it more clear that he wants to work with the two from Vientiane, but it is something that we cannot predict will happen with certainty.

The President then recalled the briefing of last April when the Pathet Lao groups were about to overrun Vientiane. They were only 60 miles from Vientiane and there was no question that they had military capabilities of overrunning the country. We talked about the possibility of an intervention, but instead we set out to follow the policy about which Mr. Harriman has talked, and which we pursue today. A cease-fire was brought about, and negotiations in Geneva, and in Laos, have been persistently pursued.

The President stated that our hopes are pinned on the present cease-fire and negotiations in Laos for a neutral government. He said the only alternative to this is the possible intervention by the U.S. and others. Therefore, he asked General Lemnitzer to describe SEATO Plan 5. The President said that in the last seven months the only thing that has prevented the military overrunning the Royal Laotian Government forces has been (1) the threat of U.S. intervention; and (2) for one political reason or another—and entirely different from their attitude on Berlin—the Soviets have demonstrated a desire for reaching an accord in this area. It is the opinion of the Chiefs of Staff that in a very short period of time the Pathet Lao and the others could overrun the country unless the U.S. and its allies intervene. This matter was not finally settled. General Lemnitzer would address himself to two points, the plans that have been in effect for some time for operations in this area, and second, he would address himself to the question raised by Senator Saltonstall of the intervention from North Viet-Nam.

General Lemnitzer described the situation in Laos, including the cease-fire line and where it runs, and the opposing forces. The SEATO plan, which is designed to stop the advance of Communist forces in Southeast Asia, has a basic concept of releasing the Laotians from the static forces along the Mekong River towns and letting them go out and clear the country of the opposing Communist forces, with the U.S. and its allies taking over the missions they now perform in the internal security of the major cities. As has been pointed out, the Pathet Lao have been helped by the Viet-Minh in any fighting of consequence and seem to have the capability of winning the decisions for the Communist forces. The forces of the RLG have improved considerably since the cease-fire, but the Pathet Lao do have, we have to admit, better equipment, especially in tanks and artillery. The holding of a line across the southern part of Laos (roughly around the 17th Parallel) won’t stop the infiltration from North Viet-Nam into South Viet-Nam. The forces would have to occupy all of southern Laos right up to the northernmost point of the North Viet-Nam border.

General Lemnitzer summarized the difficulties from the communications and logistics viewpoint of fighting in Laos. He stated that the first phase of SEATO Plan 5 would consist of 40,000 troops, about half of them Americans, holding five towns along the Mekong River, including the two major airport areas. He also stated there would be a contribution from Thailand and a contemplated contribution from the Commonwealth. Pakistani forces would take a considerable period of time to reach the area. If the other nations did not meet their commitments under the plan, it would be a question of additional U.S. forces or additional Thai forces to make up the difference.

Secretary McNamara then commented on how the Viet-Cong forces got into South Viet-Nam, pointing out that not all of them came through the routes that General Lemnitzer had discussed.

The President commented then that one of our difficulties is the unwillingness of the Phoumi/Boun Oum government to join with Souvanna. We doubt very much that if the negotiations broke down, a Commonwealth brigade would intervene. In addition, although last April there was convincing evidence that the Pakistanis would intervene, because of their problem in Kashmir they probably could not be relied upon at this time. Because the Indians won’t give them fly-over rights, the Pakistanis would have to come by sea, and it would take them two weeks to get there.

The third point is that SEATO Plan 5 is based on the premise that the intervening forces could free the RLG forces to go out and clean up the country, and it is the opinion that the Pathet Lao, with all the Viet-Minh support they need—now estimated to be from 9,000 to 10,000 Viet-Minh—could defeat the RLG forces if they went out into the country.

Secretary Rusk commented that the Laotians on both sides have not fought very hard against each other, and if we could succeed in getting them “left alone” and could exclude the intercession on the part of the Viet-Minh, they could probably run Laos. We have had indications that Souvanna has not really controlled the Pathet Lao and has had the same troubles on his side with Communist forces that we have experienced on the RLG side. We have had continuing intelligence of friction between his forces—the Kong Le forces and the Pathet Lao—and if we could get international machinery to see that these Viet-Minh are gotten out of there, the situation would be much more manageable than it is at the present time. If we put troops in there to get the job done, we cannot count on the Laotians to do the kind of job that the Greeks did in Greece, for example.

Senator Dirksen asked the question: Looking at the 300-mile border between Laos and Viet-Nam, if that border were to be policed, who would police it? Ambassador Harriman responded that there is no plan for the policing of that border so far. The Soviets have agreed that they would see to it that the North Vietnamese would stay behind their own border. The agreement does not provide that there would be troops along that border.

Secretary Rusk said that there is an agreement that there would be an International Control Commission to look into violations of the border.

Senator Smathers asked if we had any indications of how the differences between the Soviet Union and Red China are affecting the attitudes toward a settlement in Laos. Secretary Rusk responded that there were indications in the conversations in Geneva that the Soviet negotiator was having considerable difficulties in expressing his view-point because of the attitude of the Red Chinese who were present. We do think there is a significant difference between Moscow and the Red Chinese position on this whole matter, and Senator Smathers added that Peiping is much more aggressive on this matter. Secretary Rusk agreed.

Senator Russell asked about the source of the arms and the comparison between those furnished the Communists and those furnished the RLG. Secretary McNamara responded that much of the materiel available to the opposition, both in Laos and South Viet-Nam, is captured materiel from the Indo-China War. Only a small percentage of these reinforcements and supplies coming into South Viet-Nam is coming through these trails and roads in Laos.

Senator Mansfield asked if it is true that if SEATO Plan 5 were put into action, the U.S. would in the end have to bear the brunt of most of the execution of the plan. He said that if we get involved in Laos, it might be far worse than when we got involved in Korea, because we just haven’t the means of transportation and accessibility that we had in Korea, with the backup that we had in Japan. Senator Mansfield stated that he hoped we would be extremely careful in this matter of involvement in Laos. He said: “I think that the solution which the Administration, in concert with its allies, is trying to bring about is the only reasonable one. I think that Souvanna Phouma is the only hope of a coalition government that might succeed, and I think we ought to keep in mind that as far as Phoumi and Boun Oum are concerned, they have not been very cooperative, that Souvanna Phouma has difficulties with his half brother who controls the Pathet Lao, and that the main point of interest for us is South Viet-Nam—and they can say what they want about Diem. With his efforts to keep his country free, all things considered, he is our best bet. Our main concern is South Viet-Nam, and I would hope that we could not become involved in the morass of Laos.”

Senator Saltonstall said that he would like to put in a remark—“In the Appropriations Committee we have been putting approximately $40 million a year into Laos. Laos has been raising about $8 million and spending $16 million, while we have been putting in $40 million every year, and are holding up on the $3 million a month.”

Secretary Rusk responded that we have been holding up on the February allotment because we are trying to make it clear to the Laotian leaders that we want them to sit down and talk seriously.

Secretary Rusk then reviewed the point of disagreement among the three Princes. He also stated that our withholding at the moment is not interfering with RLG operations. They have some money in the bank to their credit, but it is a political persuasion method that we think is essential.

The President then commented about our difficulties with Phoumi and Souvanna Phouma, and our efforts to make sure that Phoumi does not collapse, but does talk seriously and will be in a position to help with the coalition government. Secretary Rusk commented additionally on the sources of strength for the coalition government.

Senator Russell asked again if Secretary Rusk had stated that the Soviets were more anxious than the Red Chinese to reach an accommodation, and inquired if the source of this difference wasn’t the fact that the Soviets were afraid that the Red Chinese would try to take over all of Southeast Asia. Secretary Rusk stated that this was probably correct and that it was as good a guess as any. We have indications that there are deep differences between the Red Chinese and the Soviets.

Senator Russell also commented that he agreed with the statement that he had heard expressed from time to time that the Soviet Union wasn’t really anxious to get the Red Chinese into the United Nations.

The Vice President then commented at length on the position he thought we needed to take from a bipartisan viewpoint in approaching this matter in the Congress and with the public. We are all together in this, he said. We were following the best course we could on the basis of conclusions of able and experienced advisers. Was there a better course? He hoped the leadership would offer any suggestion; they would be warmly welcomed. Senator Mansfield strongly supported these sentiments.

Senator Dirksen asked about the fleet activities. Secretary McNamara responded with a summary of what we were doing in patrolling the northern coast of South Viet-Nam; that U.S. ship riders were now on the command junks of each junk division and that they have been operating most effectively in the last 60 days. They had organized a fleet of 120 junks. There will be 600 in July. The shipbuilding in South Viet-Nam has exceeded expectations.

Senator Saltonstall inquired about the spirit in Thailand and their morale, and the Communist threat in Thailand. The President responded that in Thailand, at the moment, the morale was pretty good and the government was with us, but we could anticipate that we are going to have a problem. Sooner or later we will face the same kind of guerrilla action in Thailand that we faced elsewhere in Southeast Asia. He pointed out that there was already a threat in the most northern province of Thailand.

Congressman Arends then asked if the only activity anticipated now was an increase from 5,000 to 8,300, if this was all the action we contemplated, and if it was entirely on our own initiative for the South Viet-Nam area. The President confirmed this and then explained why these figures were not being announced.

Secretary Rusk said it should be pointed out—although it must be kept quiet—that other countries are coming into the South Viet-Nam action. British Malaya is sending some guerrilla warfare experts, numbering about 10 to 15 people. Some Malayans are coming in—again, only a handful. A few of the neutralists are showing interest and Australia, with some of their experience, is moving in to help. The Malayans are sending police officers and the neutralists are sending civilians to help in the villages.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

Senator Dirksen then commented about the drain on the economy in Viet-Nam. Secretary Rusk responded to this and said that our plan included economic assistance to stabilize this area, and pointed out that the military plan in South Viet-Nam is accompanied by a very strong civic action plan. Secretary Rusk added that there will be an increase in economic assistance throughout the period and Senator Dirksen said that this had not been budgeted yet. Secretary Rusk said that it had not.

Senator Fulbright then said that he had little to add to this discussion, but he certainly joined in the sentiment of Senator Mansfield with regard to Laos. Also, he said he was impressed by Senator Russell’s suggestion of the possibilities for covert operations, [2 lines of source text not declassified]. He stated that he went along with our stepping up our manpower, but he would certainly hope that it would be maintained on this informal basis, and that we would take steps to see that it did not lead to a formal operation and an open confrontation. He had been disturbed by comments in the press and from his colleagues about this matter, questioning the constitutionality of the action, and trying to force the Administration to come out in the open on this matter. He expressed the opinion that he was in no position to judge and would feel no objection whether it was 8,300 or 10,000 as long as it was kept on an informal basis, because he felt that we couldn’t withdraw if it gets too formal. He said: “I would not like to have us become formally involved.” He senses that the North Viet-Namese are keeping it on this same basis. They even deny that their people are infiltrating into South Viet-Nam, and we should strive to keep it on that same basis.

Senator Fulbright said: “I think the policy is correct that you are following.”

Senator Dirksen said that he felt that he should speak frankly in this conference and that, as we know, the Republican National Committee did get out a Battle Line publication in which they criticized the President for being less than candid in informing the people of the country, but, in essence, it was clear that the Republicans fully supported the President’s position.

Senator Dirksen said he would ask now, and he felt that it would help materially, if he could say to the policy luncheon that there is a point there that ought to be observed, and that there is a need to control what we say about this because of the possibility of getting into trouble with the ICC. The President then gave Senator Dirksen authority and some guidance on what he should say to his Republican colleagues to be helpful on this matter, without giving out exact figures. He asked Senator Dirksen to confirm the press reports, explaining why we couldn’t announce these figures publicly, and also to clarify the casualty figures as they had been presented at the meeting.

Congressman Halleck said to the President that if there should be an increase in the casualties, there was some danger in not conditioning our people to the receipt of that bad news. The President assured them that we would keep in touch, and if there was a change on the American involvement, we will call another meeting and go over the matter.

Speaker McCormack asked Secretary McNamara how our counter-guerrilla forces are being built up. Secretary McNamara outlined the increase from 2,000 to 5,000 (at Fort Bragg and elsewhere in our own U.S. forces) and told them about the two men per battalion in South Viet-Nam that were going to serve with the 90 South Vietnamese battalions on a rotational basis to bring experience to our junior officers.

Speaker McCormack said that he assumed that South Viet-Nam was very important to our own national security, but in Laos it was another story, and it would be disastrous to become committed in Laos. However, based on what Ambassador Harriman said, there are indications that the Soviets have a grave difference of opinion with the Chinese Communists and that if it were known that we were going to disengage ourselves, might that not be a good contribution to straightening out this matter? The President indicated that it would weaken our position to tell in advance about our plans in either place, and Speaker McCormack agreed with the President, but wanted to be sure he understood it clearly.

Senator Humphrey then asked for a comment on the Communist infiltration in North Thailand. Were the Thais at work on this? Were the Thais taking an active hand in guerrilla training, and do we have any training mission with the Thais at this stage to meet this threat before it becomes too difficult? Secretary Rusk responded that we have laid on a special program for Northeast Thailand involving both civic actions and increased security action.

There was then a discussion by Speaker McCormack and Secretary Rusk about the friendly and helpful attitudes of the Thais.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

3. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Chester V. Clifton Series, Conferences with the President, Vol. I, 1/25/61–12/27/62. Top Secret. The off-the-record meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room.