Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

328. Memorandum From the United Nations Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Sullivan) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)⁰

Washington, April 16, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Talking Paper on Laos

If it remains possible to execute the Geneva Agreements to regulate the situation in Laos, we should attempt to obtain full credit for such a result. If this is no longer possible, we should attempt to place full responsibility for such failure upon the Communists. Our current policy should be conducted in a manner which embraces the possibility of either contingency.

The primary, and only ostensible thrust of our policy at this time should be toward the execution of the Geneva Agreements. At the current moment, we are receiving full marks for such an effort from all objective observers. This is a valuable asset which we should not willfully waste. It not only earns us a great deal of merit with allies and neutrals, but also serves to help deter the Communists from any rash military action in Laos. We must therefore continue to mount prudent pressure toward the realization of this objective. We cannot afford to do nothing at this juncture.

At the same time, there are evidences that the Communists have lost interest in establishing the Geneva regime for Laos. We must act to probe these evidences more deeply, and if they prove dominant in Communist policy, we must rapidly exploit them to accomplish a tolerable standstill in Laos, with blame for the failure to achieve the Geneva objective fixed as clearly as possible upon them, rather than upon us. It would, in this event, become necessary to rehabilitate the international reputation of friendly forces in Laos in order to permit us to sustain the semblance of a stable anti-Communist base with which to work there.

I would therefore recommend the following courses of action:

(A) A major effort by the Thais to dissuade Phoumi and his colleagues from any action which would have the effect of revoking Souvanna’s mandate, and at the same time to persuade them to resume negotiations among the three forces on the basis of the following formula:

(1) Renunciation of their claim to exclusive control over Defense and Interior, provided:

(2) Troika committees are established in a Souvanna cabinet to regulate Defense and Interior affairs; and

(3) Souphanouvong gives assurances he will not attempt to improve his military position during the interim period. (This last theme should be hammered at all times.)

(B) A time limit on the Thai effort, which we can ascribe to Phoumi’s announced intention of action on or about May 11. I would suggest the date of May 7 as the date against which the Thais should be working. We will inform them that, if they do not succeed by that date, we will begin to impose military sanctions.

(C) Consultations with UK and France, in which we tell them that the Thais are being given time to act; that we have fixed a time limit for their success; and that, if they do not succeed by that time, we are prepared to impose certain military sanctions. However, stressing Souphanouvong’s refusal to give satisfactory assurances in the military field, we will advise them confidentially that the military sanctions we are prepared to impose will, for the time being, be limited to the withdrawal of White Star Teams from the forward field units. In order to engage our allies, and particularly the British, with some responsibility in this field, we will ask:

(D) An active British effort (perhaps using Malcolm MacDonald) to obtain from Souphanouvong concrete assurances that he will remain militarily quiescent. The purpose of this effort would be partly to probe Communist intentions, partly to relieve allied pressure on us, and partly to lead, if indications warrant, toward a bilateral meeting between Souphanouvong and Phoumi designed to stabilize the military situation along a cease-fire line to be mutually agreed.

(E) Consultations, either here or in Moscow (preferably here) to seek agreement on the level of military equipment the Soviets and we are delivering to our respective clients in Laos. While somewhat unorthodox, this might be worth attempting partly as a probe of Soviet intentions and partly as a genuine effort to avoid escalation.

I believe all the foregoing actions should be put into motion before Easter. This would give us the appearance of continuing constant attention to the problem and would retain the initiative in our hands, a factor which I consider most important. The net results of these actions should give us a somewhat clearer picture of the immediate future prior to May 7.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4–1662. Secret. Drafted by Sullivan. A handwritten note on the source text by Harriman reads: “To Sec. State. W.A.H.”