Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

327. Memorandum From the United Nations Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Sullivan) to the Secretary of State’s Assistant (Cutler)⁰

Washington, April 16, 1962.

As Governor Harriman informed you last evening, the Secretary is expected to join the President and others for a briefing of Congressional leaders this morning on the subject of Laos and Viet-Nam. As I understand it, the Congressional leaders will arrive at 10:00 a.m.¹ However, the President wishes the Secretary and his group to be present in the Oval Room of the Executive Mansion at 20 minutes before 10 for a skull session.²

The Governor has asked me to see that the attached paper gets in the Secretary’s hands prior to the briefing. It is not a talking paper for the Congressional briefing but contains subject matter which could possibly arise in the discussions with the President. As you will note, the original copy has been endorsed over to the Secretary by Governor Harriman. An additional copy is attached for distribution to Under Secretary Johnson, with whom I have discussed the subject matter. If more copies are required, I believe one or two others are available here in the Bureau.

[Attachment]

³

Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

• Continuation of “Mild” Pressures on Phoumi: A Short-term Estimate

I. The Problem

A. We have been asked to estimate what will happen in the Laotian situation in the event that the US continues for a time the present general pattern of essentially mild sanctions designed to lead General Phoumi to participate in a coalition government.

B. We assume that the US would continue for the time being its diplomatic and political pressures on Phoumi directly, through Thailand, and through the Geneva Conference on Laos; its withholding of cash grants; its supply of project, logistic and military advisory support (at roughly the same level); and its contact with Souvanna and Souphanouvong.

II. Conclusions in Brief

A. Our judgment is that this course of essentially mild sanctions is not likely to force Phoumi to agree to participate in a coalition government. We also believe that the risks of this course are low and that the Communists are unlikely to increase their military pressures substantially. However, the present “nibbling” process will continue.

B. This analysis does not imply that policy decisions on our future course in Laos should not be made during the next two or three months; it says only that we have time—at moderate cost—for some reflection. The effect on the situation—beyond two or three months—of deliberately pausing in our approach is much less clear, since it entails cumulative and interlocking effects within Laos, on our allies, and on the Communists.

III. RLG Position

A. Neither US nor Thai efforts at persuasion nor the imposition by the US of economic sanctions has succeeded in convincing Phoumi that he should join a coalition government under Souvanna. The RLG has so far minimized the effects of the sanctions by borrowing from the National Bank for the payment of salaries and by using foreign exchange reserves to finance the importation of essential commodities. Phoumi has remained intransigent despite the fact that his military position relative to his adversaries has been shown to be extremely weak.

B. If the course of “mild” sanctions is continued, the fact that no additional sanctions were being brought to bear would probably confirm Phoumi in his belief that the US will not terminate all aid. (The Thais would probably come to the same conclusion and discontinue their present pressures on Phoumi.) Phoumi’s obduracy is based largely on his estimate that the US will not dare terminate all aid. He represents his position as one of conviction that a Souvanna government is tantamount to an eventual Communist takeover. Phoumi apparently calculates that by holding out he enhances the possibility of direct confrontation with the Communists that would force the US to support him fully because it could not afford a Communist takeover of Laos.

C. Withholding of cash grants may not, if the RLG manages its financial resources carefully, have any drastic effect for several months. Phoumi is not likely to be budged by prospective economic difficulties.

D. There is a slight possibility that Phoumi might join a coalition if he is in fact looking for a face-saving way out for himself and believes he has some chance to retain an influential position in the government. In this case he might use this period to initiate private negotiations with Souvanna and/or Souphanouvong, or, after a decent interval, accept the presently envisaged coalition formula or a slight variant. In either case he would present the ensuing agreement as a result of his initiative or of Thai persuasion rather than of US pressure. Only the Thais appear to believe this to be a real possibility, however, and the weight of the evidence available would seem to discount it.

IV. Souvanna’s Position

Souvanna might well conclude that his chances of becoming Prime Minister were nil and carry out his threats to renounce his mandate to form a government.

V. Communist Position

A. The ultimate Communist objective in Laos remains takeover of the entire country. Although there may be differences among Moscow, Peiping, and Hanoi as to tactics and timing, their common objective for the immediate future is to consolidate their hold over the areas now under their control while keeping open the prospect of further gains. Because of the situation in South Vietnam, the Communists have a special interest in strengthening their hold on the Tchepone corridor area.

B. The Communists are presently committed to seeking a political solution in Laos through the agreed mechanism of a coalition government under Souvanna. Because of the risk they also see in rupture of the ceasefire and resumption of large-scale hostilities, we do not believe they would embark on this course (except in response to military action initiated by Phoumi) as long as they believed an eventual coalition possible.

C. They have nothing to lose in this approach since, if it succeeds, Phoumi will be weakened and they will have a strong position in the new Laotian government; if it fails their present favorable position is not only not weakened, but probably improved.

D. A US failure to use all available economic and military aid sanctions against Phoumi would not, in our judgment, automatically result in a Communist effort at military takeover during the next few months (for which they undoubtedly have the capability). More probable would be increased Communist pressures aimed at achieving the political solution they prefer. Within Laos these would undoubtedly take the form of increased “mopping up” actions as well as deliberate but cautious expansion of territorial holdings. Because the Communists believe we are committed to gain Phoumi’s concurrence in the agreed arrangements, pressure would also be exerted on the US by actions such as a threat to withdraw from the Geneva Conference, thus raising fears of a renewal of hostilities.

E. Even if the Communists believed a coalition government impossible (as would probably be the case if Souvanna withdrew), the Soviets at least might well be prepared for reasons of their own to explore possibilities of some other international solution. However, the Chinese Communists and North Vietnamese under these circumstances would probably favor a more aggressive policy including a military solution. It is unlikely that the Soviets could restrain them from supporting the PL in seizing at least substantial additional territory.

VI. Conclusions

A. There is little likelihood that permitting the Laotian situation to simmer for two or three months would achieve effective progress toward the formation of a coalition government along the lines we now envisage. Mere continuation of pressures now being exerted on Phoumi is unlikely to induce him to participate in such a government.

B. At the same time we do not believe that the risks of this would be so great as to require an immediate decision on the adoption of strong sanctions against Phoumi or some alternative course:

1. It may be argued that the basis for agreement on the Laotian problem—a coalition government headed by Souvanna—might vanish with Souvanna’s disillusionment and withdrawal as Prime Minister designate. On balance we do not believe such behavior by Souvanna likely in the next two or three months, although there is a slight possibility that the King might force Souvanna’s hand by deciding himself at the Assembly in May to undertake the formation of a government.

2. It can also be argued that the Communists, if they became convinced that a coalition government under Souvanna was impossible, might decide on a military takeover of the whole country. We believe this is unlikely and that the Communists would continue to seek a political solution. They would, at the same time, make local military advances within Laos and step up their efforts to obtain more rigorous US sanctions against Phoumi.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4–1662. Secret. Drafted by Sullivan. A note on the source text indicates that the Secretary saw it. Sullivan’s title as U.N. Adviser did not adequately explain his job, which was assistant and adviser to Harriman on Laos.
1. The President’s meeting with the congressional leadership took place from 5:05 to 6:10 p.m., April 17. (Kennedy Library, President’s Appointment Book) See Document 329.
2. In a telephone conversation, April 14, Hilsman and Forrestal discussed the short session with the President prior to the congressional briefing. Hilsman described what he considered to be the basic problem: “to find some way in which the Pres. doesn’t have to choose about [between?] losing Laos or intervening with American troops.” Forrestal agreed and thought it would be useful to have “something other than stark alternatives.” (Kennedy Library, Hilsman Papers, Countries, Laos, 4/62)
3. Secret; Noforn.