Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

326. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, April 9, 1962, 5:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• H.R.H. Prince Khampan, Lao Ambassador
• M. Tianethone Chantharasy, First Secretary of the Lao Embassy
• Mr. Michael V. Forrestal, White House Staff
• Francoise G. Queneau, Lao Desk Officer

The Lao Ambassador called on the President today at his own request to deliver a message from the King.¹ In handing the royal letter to the President, Prince Khampan said he had been instructed to deliver it personally. When the President had quickly read it through he had the last few pages translated orally and then told the Ambassador that he would subsequently be addressing a reply to His Majesty.² In the meantime, he would set forth his view on the Lao problem.

It was obvious, he said, that the final decision was one that the King and the RLG would have to make. On the basis of our military estimates, however, we had felt since last May that if fighting were resumed in Laos, the RLG forces would be defeated. If the RLG believed they could win out against the PL, that was their decision, but they must not think that the U.S. would intervene. From the tactical standpoint, the problem was a very difficult one. We depended heavily upon the air and upon the sea. In that area airfields were limited in number and the few that existed could easily be knocked out. This was why we felt the best security for the future of Laos lay in the solution we had suggested. The American people would not support the sending of American troops to Laos on the other side of the world. We admired the stand taken by the RLG but did not think they could maintain it successfully.

The Ambassador said he would inform His Majesty and the RLG of the President’s views. He agreed that the terrain was indeed very difficult. He pointed out, however, that the RLG had been persuaded by the U.S. a long time ago that Laos should resist the Communists and believed that at that time the U.S. already knew the problems presented by the type of terrain. The RLG was, he added, fully aware of these problems and of the fact that Laos could not fight alone against the Communists. It needed the help and moral support of friendly countries.

The President replied that he was not speaking of aid or moral assistance. The Lao were receiving these from the U.S. But the situation changed early last year when the Communists had come very close to Luang Prabang and were only 60 miles from Vientiane. This was why we had felt that a cease-fire had to be achieved. We did not wish to see Laos in Communist hands; this would not be in our interest nor in that of the Free World. Our recommendations were designed expressly to avoid a Communist takeover. In our judgment, if fighting broke out again, the PL would win within a few days or a few weeks and Laos would be lost. This was why we advised the formation of a coalition government, the signing of new Accords and their implementation by stages so that we would be able to see whether the PL fulfilled their commitments. We would do everything on our part to help once the coalition government was formed.

The President repeated that the RLG should not entertain any illusions: we would not send American troops to help the RLG. Congress would not accept it, nor would the American people. It was hard enough for them to accept our intervention in the case of Korea where aggression was much more clear-cut. Furthermore, we felt that the more time passed, the less chance there was of avoiding renewed hostilities, but again the decision was up to the Lao. The President reminded the Ambassador that in Viet-Nam we were giving the same type of aid as to Laos in the form of materiel and advisers but were not providing troops. He hoped that the Lao would decide to accept the proposal we suggested and would form a coalition government; otherwise it would mean war. He understood that the Royal Government did not trust Souvanna. It was true, he said, that Souvanna could not hold out against the PL unless he enjoyed the full support of His Majesty and of the pres-ent RLG. The President added that he had the impression that the RLG felt it was being compelled to follow our counsel. This was not true. We simply felt that the only alternative was so much worse that it would be best for the Lao to adopt the course we proposed. We were not, however, forcing them to do so and we had been perfectly honest. Since last May we had been giving the RLG this same advice.

In replying to His Majesty, the President said he would express these same views. We wished there were another solution but we knew of none. What we were seeking was the preservation of Lao independence. Did the Ambassador see any other possible solution?

Prince Khampan replied that the RLG feared Souvanna would be incapable of controlling the PL in a coalition government. He thought they were justified in these fears because of the way that the PL and VM had violated the agreements resulting from the 1954 Geneva Conference. This time, if a coalition government were again formed and including the Communists, it would be difficult for the Lao to defend themselves against them.

The President remarked that we understood their fears but the fact was that the RLG was not trying to negotiate seriously with Souvanna. The Ambassador responded that the RLG did wish to negotiate with Souvanna but that the basic problem concerned the distribution of portfolios. The President emphasized that obviously Souvanna could not give Interior and Defense to Phoumi because then Souphanouvong would want one of those two posts. It would be fine if Souphanouvong would allow Phoumi to have both but this was hardly likely, especially as the PL were now so strong. The Ambassador said there were others besides Phoumi, people like Phoui Sananikone, who were not influenced by the PL.

The President then stated that he would sum up his views as follows:

1. First of all, we are profoundly interested in the preservation of the independence of Laos and look with sympathy upon the efforts of His Majesty, Boun Oum, Phoumi, Prince Khampan, and others to maintain it.

2. We feel, however, today that the PL are the stronger and that if the cease-fire were broken and hostilities were renewed, it would be the end of Laos.

3. We recognize the dangers of a coalition government just as the RLG does, but we feel it is the only solution that offers a chance of winning out against the Communists. If such a government is formed, the U.S. will do everything it can to help insure its success.

4. It is our opinion that the more time passes, the less chance there is of a Souvanna coalition government succeeding.

5. In the final analysis, the ultimate decision has to be made by the Lao themselves, but he must emphasize again that the U.S. will not intervene, will not send in American troops if hostilities are resumed.

The President concluded by saying he would have occasion to talk again with the Ambassador. He reiterated his appreciation of Lao fears but insisted that we believed a coalition government was the best solution for a very difficult situation. This was his considered judgment and he hoped that the Ambassador would not be angry with him, Governor Harriman or Mr. Johnson.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos; General, 4/1/62–4/18/62. Confidential. Drafted by Queneau on April 10. The meeting was held at the White House. The time is taken from the President’s Appointment Book. (Ibid.) Michael Forrestal prepared a brief, April 9, for this meeting. (Ibid., Meetings and Memos Series: Staff Memos, M.V. Forrestal, 1/62–5/62)
1. A translation of the King’s letter was attached. King Savang complained bitterly about the state of affairs in Laos and expressed disillusionment at U.S. efforts to force Laos to collaborate with communism. The King expressed disillusionment with the Geneva Conference and criticized the U.S. suspension of economic aid to Laos.
2. Text of the President’s response to King Savang is in telegram 905 to Vientiane, April 19. The letter regretted the “fundamental misunderstanding” over Laos policy and sought to explain the reasoning behind U.S. policy “in very much the same terms as I [the President] did April 9 to Your Ambassador.” (Department of State, Central Files, 611.51J/4–1962)