The following steps should be taken to lay the ground work here for an
eventual decision by the President to give stand by authority for
additional pressure on General Phoumi. The timing and selection of the
precise type of pressures to be used might best be left to the
Department and the field.
[Attachment]
Draft Memorandum to President Kennedy
Washington,
April 6,
1962.
SUBJECT
Our immediate objective is to bring about a coalition government
under Souvanna which will
have enough strength to preserve Lao neutrality and independence. In
order to achieve this we must transfer support from the Phoumi dominated government to a
Souvanna government which
has the approval of the King, without at the same time destroying
the right-wing political and military strength upon which Souvanna must rely against the
Communists. We have been unable to go forward towards this objective
because of Phoumi’s unwillingness to accept the Souvanna solution.
Our efforts to induce Phoumi to
accept the Souvanna solution
and negotiate realistically commenced in September and October of
1961, following the agreement to pursue the Souvanna solution reached by the
U.S., U.K., and French foreign
ministers in August. These efforts were confined to diplomatic
pressures (except for brief delays in making the September and
November payments for budgetary support) until February this year.
We stopped the February payment after Phoumi again demonstrated unwillingness to negotiate
on the basis of the agreements he had made in January with the other
two Lao leaders in Geneva. Payments have not been made for three
months and have begun to have a noticeably deteriorating effect on
the economy of Laos and on the morale of the Lao people, including
Phoumi’s supporters.
In March Governor Harriman
went to Thailand and Laos where he obtained the promise of active
support of the Thais, but was unable to move Phoumi who remains obdurate. The
Thais have counseled patience to give them time to work on Phoumi.
We are letting them take the lead in persuading Phoumi. There is no
way of telling whether the Thais will be successful or whether we
may be compelled in the pursuit of our objective to apply further
pressures on Phoumi, this time on the military side.
The following in summarized form are arguments for applying military
sanctions:
- 1.
- Withholding various categories of military support has
been regarded all along as offering the best means for
shaking Phoumi and
weakening his hold over his followers. Milder forms of
persuasion and pressure have been virtually exhausted.
Moreover, the effect of continuing to withhold financial
support would be to destroy the structure of
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the RLG, which we have tried
for so long to strengthen, with the result that the ability
of the RLG to compete politically with the PL in a coalition government
would be lost.
- 2.
-
Military sanctions would bring home immediately and
finally to Phoumi
and all other Lao leaders that the U.S. is determined on
the Souvanna
solution. Until we take this action Phoumi can never be
absolutely sure of our intentions. The history of our
past dealings with him and what he regards as the logic
of the situation would encourage him to hold out if
there is any question. Phoumi has recently indicated that his
policy has been to encourage Souvanna to abandon his mission in the
hope that we would come to Phoumi’s support if Souvanna were
eliminated from the scene. Whether military sanctions
combined with other pressures will be enough to bring
Phoumi around
is, of course, the great unknown. Many who have had
experience with Phoumi in the past believe that if he is
directly faced with incontrovertible evidence that the
U.S. is determined to have the Souvanna solution with
or without him, and if some face saving way out could be
devised, he will give in. His instincts will tell him to
try to live to fight again another day. At that point
the carrots we have already offered Phoumi would have their
greatest appeal.
In the event that Phoumi does not react favorably to this
technique, it will, nevertheless, tend to convince the
other leaders of the necessity of abandoning Phoumi. In
such a situation our efforts to bring forward other
political leaders would stand a far greater chance of
success.
- 3.
- The political effect of the present suspension of
financial assistance is necessarily slow. Military sanctions
would have an immediate psychological effect on Phoumi since they strike at
the source of his power.
- 4.
- Military sanctions can be applied in such a manner that
they would not significantly impair the combat capabilities
of the FAR for a period of
several weeks.
- 5.
- If we do balk at military sanctions and Phoumi remains intransigent,
Souvanna will
probably sooner or later throw in his hand. The Communist
side will also draw their own conclusions and the Soviets
may pull out leaving us in direct confrontation with the
PL/VM/ChiComs.
The arguments against authorizing military sanctions:
- 1.
- The PL/VM may take military advantage
of the weakened state of the FAR. In publicly urging that the U.S. withhold
military support from Phoumi, Souvanna has said that his side would not
profit from the weakness of the FAR if we did so. Souphanouvong has privately not gone as far,
but has told Sullivan
that the PL might engage in
some minor line straightening operations but would not seize
larger towns. Intelligence
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estimates are that the Communist side
will not push an attack as long as a negotiated settlement
is still possible.
- 2.
- Once we have embarked on the path of military sanctions we
would have to maintain them and perhaps even make them
complete if Phoumi
remained adamant and in power. However, up to a certain
point in the process, and depending upon developments, the
U.S. would still retain the choice of reversing our policy
and resuming support of the RLG. A reversal would, however,
mean the end of the Souvanna solution and the consequent
possibility that U.S. troops would be required to support
the RLG.
- 3.
- Phoumi may absorb the full force of all our sanctions but
manage to maintain control of the RLG. He would, however, be
left helpless against the PL/VM if they
chose in the end to follow up their advantage.
Recommendation:
In summary, as matters now stand, military sanctions are the next
logical step. The Thais are continuing their efforts to persuade
Phoumi and it is difficult
to predict when and if they may succeed. In the meantime the
economic structure of the country is deteriorating under the impact
of our economic pressures and this process can be expected to
accumulate but without producing the desired political result on
Phoumi.
It may soon be necessary, therefore, to request Presidential
authority to impose sanctions in the form of suspension of military
assistance. The nature, extent and timing of such suspension would
depend upon the progress of the Thai efforts, the judgment of the
field and developments within the RLG.
