322. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State0
1379. From Sullivan. Embtels 1372, 1373,1 1374, 1375.2
Following, which is last in series cables reporting my recent trip, contains certain general impressions and observations:3
Entire area has Hemingway flavor of guerrilla camp, peopled by hard eyed little soldiers wearing odd mixture, US, French, Soviet, and Chinese type uniforms, with variety businesslike weapons casually slung, but always at hand. Troops generally in small groups hardly ever exceeding half dozen men, vehicles moving singly rather than in convoy. Russian-built vehicles everywhere. Roads miserable, quarters crude, airstrips primitive. Kong Le forces predominate, but Pathet Lao evident in good numbers. Few Russians visible, none in anything resembling uniform. Handful of Chinese seen at Chinese “mission” in Phongsavan. Many North Vietnamese laborers working on road, dam, and building construction projects (Souvanna said approximately 700 DRV technicians there).
Souvanna and Souphanouvong living in austere conditions. However, both seem robust. Souvanna once or twice lapsed into some depression, but generally indicated determination persevere. Souphanouvong generally truculent and aggressive. Only at end our conversations did he relax and become most jovial.
Quinim somewhat reserved, rather subservient. Pheng Phong-savan most sympathetic of group. Singkapo and Kong Le both very friendly and frank. Nouhak and Phoumi Vongvichit sent their apologies “indisposed”. Russian Ambassador pleasant, made all correct sounds. Polish deputy commissioner gloomy, expects holocaust.
Souvanna, in rejecting invitation visit Washington, showed how carefully he is walking on eggs to avoid giving Communists impression he playing separate game with US. This in turn demonstrates that his long isolation in Khang Khay has given Communists chance sow seeds [Page 675] suspicion re US “two-faced” policy. On balance, therefore, I think it worthwhile he extricate himself from Khang Khay atmosphere and remain awhile in Paris. It not excluded that he will accept Washington invitation on return trip from Paris.
Although some rumors in Xieng Khouang that Kamsouk Keola would be in charge during Souvanna’s absence and although Addis gained impression Quinim might be senior man present Khang Khay, Souvanna told me that Pheng Phongsavan would be in charge. He would not be sent Geneva because there is nothing to do there.
Souvanna not convinced Thai acting in good faith. Says Thailand has always sought prevent Laos from actually becoming country for fear it would offer too great attraction to Lao residents northeast Thailand.
Difficult evaluate Communist intentions immediate future. Most optimistic estimate (expressed by French and Indians) that Commies are willing step aside, let US pressure Phoumi into negotiations while military situation remains quiet. Most pessimistic is that Souvanna and Abramov, being encouraged leave country in order remove them from responsibility for PL and Viet Minh freedom to launch “punitive” drive against Phoumi before rainy season begins. Souphanouvong said rainy season acted to his disadvantage because rains handicap his logistics.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4–1662. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok, London, Paris, Geneva for Fecon, CINCPAC for POLAD, New Delhi, and Moscow.↩
- Documents 320 and 321.↩
- Telegrams 1374 and 1375 from Vientiane, March 31, relate to Sullivan’s efforts in Khang Khay toward release of U.S. POWs held by the Pathet Lao. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.537-Bailey, Lawrence R.)↩
- Sullivan’s trip is reported in more detail in despatch 186 from Vientiane, April 6. (Ibid., 611.51J/4–2662)↩