Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

323. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State⁰

Vientiane, April 2, 1962, 6 p.m.

1382. Harriman from Sullivan. Reference: Deptel 851, 852.¹

Difficult make intelligent judgment three suggestions contained reftel without knowing full context in which they proposed. For example, are they to preface massive military sanctions or are they to constitute symbolic sanctions themselves? Are we proceeding in confidence we will have protracted period calm in which to operate or do we believe Souphanouvong’s blusters constitute threat to cease-fire? In order give reaction you have requested, I am making two assumptions, (a) these actions are intended as sanctions in themselves and (b) Souphanouvong will not attempt military solution. From these assumptions, I reached following conclusions:²

1) [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Current and future foreseeable US relationship with Phoumi will be cold and hard. This should be uniform across board. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] personal contact with Phoumi, while providing certain useful information, constitutes break in uniform US front which Phoumi will be tempted exploit. Our purpose should be force Phoumi recognize need deal directly with our Ambassador. Most intelligence we would lose by cutting [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] channel should be available from other contacts. I therefore concluded [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] should quietly disappear from Vientiane. His withdrawal should in no way be construed as any reflection on him personally. He has carried out his unique and difficult assignment as good soldier. His counsel should continue to be tapped in Washington.

2) Boyle. If we are planning any application military sanctions in near future, I consider it important Boyle be here at least for their initiation. He has not only the special judgment which he has developed from knowledge of local scene, but also an extraordinarily detached professional attitude towards the entire equivocal operation over which he presides. All MAAG units seem to have absolute confidence in Boyle’s command. I believe they would carry out whatever orders he gave them willingly, no matter what their personal feelings. If no military sanctions are planned for immediate future, I do not believe Boyle’s withdrawal within few weeks normal termination his tour of duty will have significant effect. Therefore, on balance, I believe Boyle should be held here until completion his tour which scheduled end May 1. Consideration could be given at that time to possibility holding up arrival his replacement for indefinite period.

3) Brown. Without having had benefit knowing Brown’s own views this subject, I think it would be mistake call Brown home for consultation unless result such consultation will be manifested in new sanctions. For Phoumi, Brown has since August 1960 been symbol of a policy of peaceful reconciliation in Laos, with special position for Souvanna. Although there have been wide divergencies and contradictions within US policy in the intervening period, Brown’s policies of August 1960 now represent unequivocal US position. Brown is therefore Phoumi’s albatross. We shouldn’t take him off Phoumi’s neck. Moreover, one of basic reasons for withdrawal Hasey would be force Phoumi do business with Brown and with policy which Brown symbolizes in Phoumi’s mind. Finally, believe it would be wise keep his hand on tiller during critical period here. Therefore, on balance, I would recommend against recalling Brown.

Creel

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.51J/4–262. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bangkok.
1. In these telegrams, March 30 and 31, Harriman asked Sullivan, Young, and Brown for their advice on how best to give Phoumi “the cold shoulder treatment.” Specifically should [text not declassified] be recalled, General Boyle relieved, or Brown recalled for consultations? (Ibid., 751J.00/3–3062)
2. In telegram 1544 from Bangkok, April 4, Brown, who was in Thailand, stated that he did not think any of the steps contemplated would have an appreciable effect on Phoumi, his colleagues, or the King, and, in fact, would have disadvantages. Without [text not declassified] there would be no way to communicate with Phoumi; Boyle was due to leave in May and replacing him now or withholding his replacement would have little effect on Phoumi; and recalling Brown would probably be interpreted by Phoumi as a positive step rather than a rebuke. (Ibid., 751J.00/4–462)