321. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State2
1373. From Sullivan. General attitude all hands Plaine des Jarres that US must take action in military support sector in order force Phoumi negotiate seriously. Souphanouvong, who most violent exponent this thesis, insists all US military support should be cut immediately. [Page 673] Abramov says “details up to US.” Souvanna suggests withdrawal MAAG teams with combat units, insisting he does not wish starve Phoumi troops or create wholesale mutinies.
When asked for assurances that their forces would not exploit resultant situation if we imposed sanctions in military sector, Souvanna was categoric that no attacks would take place from his side. Abramov said he thought “situation would stay quiet for two or three months.”
Souphanouvong however insisted that Phoumi had augmented his forces “behind PL lines” and that PL would have to “nettoyer ses zones” in order remove menace posed by this augmentation. He mentioned two or three places (such as Muong Houn and Ban Hat) which he definitely intended recapture from Phoumi on grounds they were held by PL on May 3. He and I had two long and rather explosive arguments on these matters, one March 30 and other March 31. During latter, Souvanna attempted intercede with explanation Souphanouvong really meant attack these places only if Phoumi used them offensively. When Souphanouvong contradicted him on this point, Souvanna stalked from the room.
Central substance our arguments was Souphanouvong insistence he had right attack any Phoumi position behind “line” which he has arbitrarily drawn to connect most forward positions which his units held on May 3. When I told him such line was “fictitious” and gross distortion military realities in Laos, we had real donnybrook. Issue was never satisfactorily settled between us, and I cannot give confident assessment his intentions.
Souvanna privately told me Souphanouvong was “defiant,” who became excited about military matters and who did not understand political affairs. In my own judgment, Souphanouvong understands political affairs very well, but is a cocky little scrapper who smells victory. Interesting to note, however, that after our two tangles, he was picture of solicitude and charm at our last lunch together, promised effusively look after American POW’s, and bade me very warm farewell.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3–3162. Secret; Niact. Repeated priority to Bangkok, London, Paris, Geneva for Fecon, CINCPAC for POLAD, and to New Delhi and Moscow.↩