Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

272. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nitze) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)⁰

I–14273/62

Washington, January 16, 1962.

SUBJECT

• U.S. Policy on Laos

1. A review of developments in Laos in the past year has convinced me that a change in the current U.S. objective in Laos is fully warranted—perhaps even mandatory—as a result of new factors, and that the increase in FAL capability cited by the SNIE and the JCS is only one of the five significant changes justifying an immediate reassessment. These factors are:

a. The incorporation of the provinces of Sam Neua, Phong Saly and much of Xieng Khouang into the Communist-controlled area of Asia. I am absolutely convinced from a study of intelligence reports that any non-Communist government will never again exercise de facto control of this area. These areas have been tied in with North Viet Nam and Communist China by means of the appointment of Communist administrators, the establishment of radio and wire communications, the building of roads, the establishment of air lines, the construction of a military logistics system, and the operation of Viet Minh combat units. This conclusion is, of course, subject to challenge, but should be the subject of an immediate authoritative estimate since it is a matter upon which we cannot afford to be in doubt. In my mind there is none.

b. The unlikelihood that a coalition government as presently proposed will have the strong right wing upon which the original policy was counting to give such a government the strength that would permit it to resist country-wide subversion. If the United States applies the full measure of pressure which may be necessary to get the RLG to give up the Ministries of Defense and Interior it appears that it will shatter the strong, cohesive right wing which might have had some chance of countering Pathet Lao pressures upon a neutralist government.

c. The likelihood that the United States will be forced into a position of supporting a military action to prevent a Pathet Lao takeover in Southern Laos. The probable outcome of the present impasse is, I believe, the resumption of guerrilla warfare under conditions which preclude an accurate assessment of responsibility for their initiation. Under such conditions, wherein the initial actions may be modest in scale, it is likely that the RLG will concentrate its maximum effort upon holding Southern Laos. If the Pathet Lao continue operations against this area as is likely, the United States will perforce have to support the non-Communists as a means of preserving vital U.S. interests in Thailand and South Viet Nam. The United States would thus be placed in the anomalous position of assisting a remnant RLG to defend one-third of the country after refusing to assist it to save one-half of the country.

d. The emergence of a proposal by the Country Team in Vientiane which offers a method of preserving our fundamental assets in Laos while not defaulting on our international commitment to support Souvanna as Prime Minister of a neutralist government. The essence of the proposal described in Vientiane 960 and 976,¹ is that the new government with Souvanna as Prime Minister should have its headquarters at Luang Prabang which would be the base of operations for “his” neutral cabinet members and for the “Vientiane neutral” cabinet members. Phoumi, as Deputy Prime Minister, and his two or three cabinet members would operate from an “administrative center” at Vientiane while Souphanouvong, also as Deputy Prime Minister, would operate with “his” cabinet members from the “administrative center” of Khang Khay. The objective of the government would be the gradual reintegration of the country into a cohesive whole. The advantages to the United States are obvious in the event the effort failed. It is also possible that such a compromise could be reached as a last resort because it is in general accord with the Zurich communique concept of leaving “organs of administration” temporarily in place, and because it recognizes power realities if the U.S. commits itself to such a solution. If it becomes apparent that Northern Laos is not genuinely subject to a neutral government or that Souvanna cannot contain Pathet Lao/Viet Minh subversion, the basis for a de facto partition has been laid in both a face-saving and asset-saving manner. Ambassador Young has indicated that this is one solution to which the Thais might become reconciled and it is understood that the Secretary of State has expressed interest in the proposal.

e. The improved capabilities and assets of the RLG and FAR. These factors have been pointed out recently by CINCPAC, CHMAAG, the U.S. Army Attache [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in Laos and reflected in SNIE 58–62.² (“It is not believed that either side [without reinforcement] has the capability to … take over and hold key territory in the hands of the other.”)³ The relatively improved position reflects increased FAR capabilities, a major expansion of U.S. capabilities to sustain the rate of increase, increased guerrilla potential, and the evidence of Pathet Lao unpopularity among the populace and among some Kong Le troops.

2. The total weight of the above considerations, with 1a probably being the most significant, leads me to the conclusion that the United States should immediately bend its effort toward securing a compromise solution of the type proposed by the Country Team. This solution while not ideal is probably the least unsatisfactory of the alternatives which may be open to the United States, and has the advantages of being:

a. Consistent with the basic U.S. objectives of preventing the fall of Laos and of not committing U.S. forces.

b. Consistent with our international commitment to seek a neutral government under Souvanna Phouma.

c. A method of reassuring our Asian Allies that we intend to live up to our commitments and not to allow communism a further advance to their borders.

d. A method of preserving a large portion of the expensive assets which we have built up in Laos.

3. Should the current talks in Geneva result in a continuation of the present impasse, the Country Team proposal offers the United States a better alternative than suspending all aid to the RLG, or of accepting a new government on Souvanna/PL terms without adequate representation from the present RLG. It is therefore recommended that you use this memorandum as a basis for discussion with the Secretary of Defense and appropriate officials of the Department of State with a view toward immediate U.S. acceptance of the Country Team proposal as an ostensible “retreat” solution to the Lao crisis.

0. Source: Department of State, EA/Laos Files: Lot 66 D 457, 300, Laos 1962, U.S. Government Attitudes and Actions. Secret.
1. Dated January 9 and 11. (Ibid., Central Files, 751J.00/1–962 and 751J.00/1–1162)
2. See Document 268.
3. Brackets and ellipsis in the source text.