Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

271. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State⁰

Geneva, January 16, 1962, 5 p.m.

Confe 1043. From Harriman.

In call on Souvanna this morning¹ I assured him our desire support him as Prime Minister of Govt which could keep Laos independent and neutral; that we supported the principle of Defense and Interior going to center and had so advised Phoumi, Boun Oum and Pushkin; that 4–5–5–4 plus Souvanna formula was satisfactory provided capable people included and no sensitive portfolios held by PL; that we had told Phoumi categorically that if he did not negotiate in good faith on formation govt he would lose US support; and that if he attacked, US military support would be withdrawn. I asked for ideas as to either carrot or stick to induce Boun Oum to negotiate, pointing out, however, disadvantages too drastic use sanctions. If Vtiane elements destroyed, this would impair balance of forces and be disadvantageous to him, as well as our objectives. He appeared agree. His only suggestions as to carrots or sticks were for US to deny logistic support to Phoumi. He insisted PL would not take advantage of this. He said that he had told his and PL commanders that if they attacked during his absence he would not return to Laos.

Souvanna said Boun Oum-Phoumi strategy was to force him to return his mandate to King, thus leaving Vtiane and PL in direct confrontation. Vtiane would then call for US help to fight Communists.

I urged Souvanna not to allow himself be discouraged. He agreed. I authorized him say US supported him in retention Defense and Interior for center. I asked him put forward definite proposal re composition govt on basis of which, if we approved, we could exert further pressure on Boun Oum. He agreed do so. I stressed importance of keeping sensitive Ministries from PL such as Min-Finance and Rural Development. These positions should be held by strong and capable personalities free from PL influence.²

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–1662. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to Vientiane, and to Paris, London, Bangkok, New Delhi, Ottawa, Saigon, and CINCPAC for POLAD.
1. A longer memorandum of conversation of this discussion, USMC/161, indicates that the meeting took place at the Hotel Beau-Rivage at 9:30 a.m. and that Brown and Anthony C. Swezey accompanied Harriman while Quinin Pholsena attended with Souvanna. (Ibid.)
2. In Confe 1049, January 17, Harriman reported that Souvanna returned the call on him on January 17. Souvanna informed Harriman that he had not been able to arrange a meeting with Boun Oum. Harriman and Souvanna discussed the problems of demobilization of private armies, the possibility that Phoumi was counting on Thai aid to replace American assistance, and ways to improve Thai relations with a neutral Laos. Harriman also reported that British Delegates MacDonald and Warner had spent hours arguing unsuccessfully with Boun Oum and Phoumi that a coalition under Souvanna was the only peaceful solution. (Ibid., 751J.00/1–1762)