Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

268. Brief Prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency⁰

Washington, January 12, 1962.

SNIE 58–62: RELATIVE MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF OPPOSING FORCES IN LAOS¹

This Special National Intelligence Estimate was approved by the United States Intelligence Board on 11 January 1962. Significant judgments of the Estimate are as follows:

Both government and antigovernment forces have increased their strength and improved their capabilities during the cease-fire, however, the government forces, which in May were defeated, demoralized, and near collapse, have made relatively greater improvement.

It is not believed that either side has the capability to destroy the other or even to take over and hold key territory in the hands of the other. If either side were to initiate a concentrated offensive, it could probably make considerable initial gains at almost any point it chose to attack. How long and how well it could sustain its advance or retain control of what it occupied would depend in large part upon the extent and the manner the opposing force chose to challenge it.

We believe that the government forces could make initial gains against antigovernment forces on the Tha Thom-Xieng Khouang perimeter or, with even greater effectiveness, in southern Laos. If defeated by sustained government attack, the Pathet Lao and Kong Le troops would quickly revert to guerrilla tactics of the type they have so successfully employed in the past and could continue to contest government authority over wide areas of the country. We believe that in this event the government forces could not establish firm control over presently-held Communist territory—particularly in such critical areas as the Plaine des Jarres, Mahaxay and Tchepone.

The government forces would have a light edge if fighting were resumed on a pattern comparable to that prior to the cease-fire but intensified as a consequence of the strengthening of both sides over the past several months.

This edge would be increased during ensuing months if the conditions of relative quiet which have prevailed since the cease-fire continue and if recent rates of improvement in the two sides were continued. We continue to estimate that the antigovernment forces have the greater capability for guerrilla warfare. We also believe that if the antigovernment position should be endangered or if areas considered critical by the Communists were threatened by the government forces, the antigovernment forces would be quickly and effectively reinforced from North Vietnam to the degree necessary to protect the threatened area.

0. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Laos 350.65–680.1, 1962. Secret. Sent to Secretary of Defense McNamara under cover of a memorandum from Brigadier General Linscott A. Hall, Assistant Director for Processing, Defense Intelligence Agency.
1. Not printed. (Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates) Text of SNIE 58–62 is published in Declassified Documents, 1978, 16C.