Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

269. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, January 12, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Reassessment of U.S. Policy in Laos (C)

In conformity with the National Security Action Memorandum No. 55¹ I wish to call to your specific attention a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff giving their views concerning the relative military balance in Laos and the implications for U.S. policy.

Without endorsing myself those parts of the JCS memorandum that deal primarily with political rather than military matters, I believe that it is significant to note that the JCS assessment of the military situation—that RLG capabilities are better relatively than they were at the time of the cease-fire—has been confirmed by the Special National Intelligence Estimate 58–62 completed on January 11.² My own conclusion from the new SNIE is that we can take advantage of time effectively to further improve the situation of the RLG forces, and that we can be reasonably confident that—in the absence of additional reinforcements from North Vietnam—the RLG forces could retain control of the major areas they now hold. It remains true, of course, that major intervention from North Vietnam could not be countered by the forces on the ground.

I am sending the views of the JCS to the Secretary of State with a note paralleling this memorandum.³

Roswell Gilpatric

[Enclosure]

Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara

JCSM–12–62

Washington, January 5, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Reassessment of US Policy in Laos (C)

1. Press reports coming out of Geneva may have created a public impression that an East-West agreement on a neutral Laos is not far away. Meanwhile, serious disagreement still exists on a number of key issues, such as the status and disposition of “private armies”. The fundamental principle of the Geneva Conference on Laos, to which all participants are fully committed, is that all documents of agreement form a single whole and that no part is finally agreed until all parts are agreed. Based on the record of communist performance at past and current bargaining tables, an acceptable agreement on a neutral Laos, one which will prevent a communist take-over, is not yet in hand, and may still be far away.

2. United States material and technical assistance, being introduced into Laos in considerable volume, is designed to maintain or strengthen the military and bargaining position of the Royal Lao Government, until such time as an acceptable agreement on a neutral Laos is achieved. Meanwhile, recent US political-diplomatic relationships with the Royal Lao Government have consisted primarily of the application of diplomatic restraints on military counteractions and political pressures on government leaders to make concessions to Prince Souvanna Phouma. These restraints and pressures, though well-intended, are having the effect of undermining the prestige, determination and effectiveness of the legal pro-Western government and its armed forces. If this trend continues, the legal government may soon have no tenable position from which to negotiate.

3. From the foregoing, it would appear that United States political-diplomatic efforts and military assistance efforts in Laos have been, and continue to be, at cross purposes in some respects. This probably stems from a basic difference in outlook between those responsible for political-diplomatic efforts in Laos and those responsible for the military security aspects of the problem. Our efforts to achieve a neutral, independent Laos seem to be directed entirely toward the formation of a coalition government under Souvanna Phouma, in the expectation that this government will produce the desired results. We have pressured General Phoumi to make concessions unacceptable to him and to the RLG. We have considered cutting off military aid as a form of pressure on Phoumi. Although the United States may not advocate unlimited concessions, it appears that our policy in Laos, as at the Geneva Conference, is to obtain the “best possible” negotiated settlement, making whatever concessions are necessary to this end.

4. There is no evidence to indicate that the communists have abandoned their goal of communist domination of Laos. There is considerable evidence that the cease-fire in Laos is being exploited as a cover to facilitate intensified communist military operations against South Vietnam and infiltration of Thailand and Cambodia. These operations appear to have been deliberately planned to take advantage of the cease-fire and the preoccupation with negotiations in Laos. One of the communist tactics in the present situation appears to be to continue negotiations over Laos until South Vietnam has been conquered, and the Royal Lao Government and pro-Western forces have become so demoralized and ineffective as to pose no significant obstacle to a communist take-over of Laos after a coalition agreement has been implemented.

5. The military position of the RLG is not such that we must seek a peaceful settlement at all costs. It is stronger now, vis-a-vis the PL/Souvanna forces, than it was at the beginning of the cease-fire and the RLG can, and should, negotiate from a position of strength.⁴ The new favorable power factors include:

a. FAR has been responding in the past few months in ways which indicate it is developing competence in its weapons, tactics, leaders, and ability to perform in combat. This increased capability places new limitations on PL/VM forces now deployed in Laos to take any decisive action without overt and considerably reinforced VM participation. This is the most significant change from estimates of spring of 1961.

b. In addition, there is evident willingness of many Lao, Meo, Kha, Tribal Thai and other minorities, if armed, to organize local defense against PL/KL/VM forces and to expand their resistance movement.

c. Furthermore, the next rainy season starting about mid-April can, like the last rainy season, be better exploited by RLG than by the enemy, because we have a larger and more flexible airlift and air landing capability and we can use Thai railroads for bulk shipment of FAL supplies throughout the rainy season.

6. By failing to exploit the shifting power balance, the United States is neglecting an effective alternative means of executing the existing policy of achieving a neutral and independent Laos. We, our Allies, the Neutralists, and the Communist Bloc are all applying pressure to the anti-Communist elements in Laos. There is no evidence that comparable pressure is being applied to Souvanna Phouma and Souphanouvong. To cut off US aid to anti-communist elements at this juncture would be self-defeating. To remove MAAG groups from Laos would set up an irreversible chain of events which would be disastrous to US interests and prestige. The world-wide effect of such moves would be counter-productive in such analogous situations as South Vietnam and the Congo.

7. The United States has a number of assets in Laos which can and should be utilized to better advantage. We can inconspicuously and gradually exploit the shifting power balance in a manner to strengthen the negotiating position of the RLG while simultaneously weakening that of the Souvanna Phouma-Souphanouvong group. Until such time as a genuine, satisfactory agreement on a neutral Laos has been concluded and placed in effect, the interests and prestige of the United States require that the Departments of State, Defense, and other agencies involved, combine their resources in a common effort to utilize those assets available to the United States and to maintain the prestige, popular support, determination and military effectiveness of the Royal Lao Government. Specifically, the United States should not attempt to persuade the representatives of the Royal Lao Government at current or future negotiations to make concessions merely for the sake of agreement. For example, the apportionment of the Defense and Interior Ministries in the proposed Government of National Union is now in question. The retention of these two key ministries by the present RLG in any Government headed by Souvanna Phouma has great importance for the preservation of the hard-won and very considerable American military assets in Laos. A so-called neutral Defense Minister would almost certainly bar Western-oriented Laotian officers from positions of high command. The diversion of American supplied weapons and military equipment from the present RLG forces to Kong Le and Pathet Lao troops also could be expected. The dangers of “neutral” Defense and Interior Ministers are clearly apparent to the present RLG, which is determined to stand fast on their retention in current negotiations. Notwithstanding the apparent community of interest of the two nations, the United States is exerting strong pressure on the RLG to yield on this point. Occasional restraint of the RLG undoubtedly is required, but encouragement and full assurance of continued US support are equally necessary to the attainment of US objectives in Laos.

8. It is recommended that the foregoing be used as a basis for the United States position to attain its objective of a truly independent, neutral, viable Laos.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L.L. Lemnitzer⁵

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 2/20/62–2/22/62. Top Secret.
1. In NSAM No. 55, “Relations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President in Cold War Operations,” June 28, the President outlined his views on the role of the JCS in the Cold War. Kennedy stated he regarded the JCS as his principal military advisers and expected their advice to come to him direct and unfiltered. The President looked to the JCS for “dynamic and imaginative leadership” in contributing to the success of military and paramilitary operations and expected their advice to be presented so that it could clearly be understood before a decision was made. (Ibid., Meetings and Memoranda, NSAM 55)
2. See Document 268.
3. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–1262)

4. In a memorandum to Rusk, January 13, Harriman noted CINCPAC and NIE assessments stressed increased FAR military capabilities. Harriman then wrote:

   “I want to record that we have taken no action in Geneva or in discussions regarding a government of national union based on the strength or weakness of the FAR. I mention this as, in connection with these reappraisals, there seems to be an implication that we are now in a better position to negotiate a settlement in Laos because of this change. This is not the case. Insofar as military strength has influenced negotiations, it is the threat of possible U.S. military intervention with or without SEATO. Other facts, however, have had a substantial influence.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Series, Laos: General, 2/20/62–2/22/62)

5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.