Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

267. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)⁰

Washington, January 11, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Negotiations on Laos at Geneva

1. Our present objective is the formation of a satisfactory government of national unity under Souvanna which will make it possible to complete our negotiations at Geneva for an international agreement on Laos.

The decision to seek a peaceful settlement was made when we first went to Geneva last Spring. It was reconfirmed, and the possibility of Souvanna as Prime Minister was accepted, in the Tripartite Agreement of August 7 at Paris. Both the good faith of the United States and the prospects for stability in Laos are thus involved.

The nearly completed agreement at Geneva is a good one. It provides that the co-chairmen will exercise supervision over its observance. Under this provision, the Soviets have undertaken to police the commitments made by the Communist signatories not to interfere in the internal affairs of Laos nor to use Laos as a corridor into South Viet-Nam.

For the first time, Souvanna has recently made an overall proposal on the composition of a government which provides a satisfactory basis for negotiation. He has suggested a 4–5–5–4 distribution of portfolios among the PL, Xieng Khouang neutrals, Vientiane neutrals and RLG respectively, with Souvanna as Prime Minister and with the Ministries of Defense and Interior going to the center. However, considerable negotiation is still required on the particular Ministries and Secretaries of State to be distributed to each group before we can be satisfied that the resulting government would provide a sufficiently strong basis for the non-Communist elements to deal with PL attempts to subvert a neutral Laos.

It is also essential to provide for the demobilization and integration of armed forces. Our proposed plan is that present RLG forces would be required to integrate only as the PL do likewise.

2. If it should not prove feasible to achieve agreement on the foregoing solution, I should be authorized to attempt to negotiate any reasonable modification or alternative to the Souvanna proposal which would make it possible to complete the Geneva Agreement and to establish a governmental arrangement in Laos such that we would avoid being faced with the choice between a Communist takeover and the interposition of United States forces with or without SEATO. Among proposals which might be considered is Ambassador Brown’s suggestion for the initial establishment of a central government at Luang Prabang under Souvanna with branch administrative centers at Khang Khay under Souphanouvong and at Vientiane under Phoumi.

3. We should be prepared to impose carefully selected sanctions on Phoumi if that should be necessary to achieve a peaceful settlement satisfactory to us, rather than be forced by Phoumi into U.S. military participation with or without some SEATO allies.

W.A.H.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 1/1/62–1/15/62. Secret. Sent to the White House under cover of a memorandum from Battle in which he explained that it was intended for a meeting among the President, the Secretary, and Harriman at 10:45 a.m., January 12. The President met with Rusk, Harriman, and McGeorge Bundy 10:55–11:07 a.m. The meeting was described as “Off the Record,” and no other record has been found. (Ibid., President’s Appointment Book)