Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

266. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Conference on Laos⁰

Washington, January 6, 1962, 8:03 p.m.

Fecon 685. Sullivan from Harriman.

Request you see Pushkin ASAP, stating that you have a personal message from me,¹ expressing in terms you consider most appropriate along following lines:

We are doing everything we can to induce Boun Oum/Phoumi negotiate in good faith and not obstruct settlement by unreasonable demands. To achieve our objective may require sanctions such as withholding aid, the effect of which could temporarily weaken RLG militarily and in bargaining for reasonable settlement government of national union. Under these circumstances, we will need assurances from Pushkin that Soviets will see to it that the PL do not undertake aggressive military action against FAR positions. You may tell him in your discretion that Phoumi has been told in no uncertain terms from the highest level, insisting that FAR undertake no provocative action, and that if he does, we will not support him and he will be responsible for disaster to his country. The above refers only to initiation of major military attack by either side. As a practical matter, we are not hopeful of getting any better observance of cease-fire than has currently existed. However, you may wish to tell Pushkin that if the PL should initiate a major attack, we will fully support RLG and imply that there will be no limit to such support in preventing PL takeover. Pushkin has probably noticed that Brown has withheld January financial assistance as a first sanction. However, if Boun Oum agrees to come to Three Princes meeting Geneva, January payment will be made and no further sanctions imposed unless some new situation develops in which we believe Boun Oum/Phoumi are blocking reasonable progress negotiations. By that time we hope to have received assurances from Pushkin as requested.

In your talk you may find it desirable to comment that it is not our policy to interfere in reasonable negotiations between Princes nor to dictate details of government, using Commie line of non-interference in Lao internal affairs.

You may wish to tell Pushkin that we view this question of such importance that I am prepared to come to Geneva any time that I am needed for personal discussion with him, but at the present time believe it is more important for me to remain here.

You authorized inform MacDonald substance your approach in confidence, but it should be most closely held.²

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–662. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Harriman; cleared by Rice, Usher, Cleveland, and Cross and in substance with John C. Guthrie, the Director of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs; and approved by Harriman. Repeated to Moscow and Vientiane.
1. In Confe 1011 from Geneva, January 7, Sullivan reported that, after consulting with MacDonald, he met Pushkin and delivered Harriman’s message. Sullivan believed that the message had been useful and understood in all its implications by Pushkin. Pushkin stated that Souvanna’s and the Pathet Lao’s policy was to refrain from attacks and only resort to force if attacked. Pushkin said he considered this “the correct policy.” After the meeting, Sullivan consulted with MacDonald who considered Pushkin’s statement on “correct policy” tentative assurance that no attacks would be launched. (Ibid., 751J.00/1–762)
2. In telegram 1012, January 8, Sullivan added a postscript to his report on the discussion with Pushkin. Sullivan quoted Pushkin as saying that if Boun Oum came to Geneva, he had better be “honestly ready to reach” an agreement or he might as well stay in Laos. Sullivan observed to Washington that this was the “last chance for peaceful settlement of issues” and should not be “thrown away.” (Ibid., 751J.00/1–862)