Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

273. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State⁰

Geneva, January 18, 1962, 8 p.m.

Confe 1055. Reference: Confe 1052.¹

Brown told Phoumi and Boun Oum morning Jan 16:² (A) President wished peaceful solution Lao problem, (B) only way this possible was through coalition govt under Souvanna, (C) only way get such govt was deny Defense and Interior to both extremes, (D) Phoumi and colleagues had useful role to play in such govt, (E) he should revise his position on Defense and Interior and get on with negotiations, which by his own admission should be relatively easy once this key question settled, (F) whether Defense and Interior went to Vtiane neutrals or Souvanna neutrals could be negotiated.

Phoumi said his position on the key portfolios was unchanged.

Brown then asked Phoumi whether he had fully considered consequences to people of Laos if US unable continue its support. His airplanes could not remain in the air, his troops could not be fed or supplied. It would be very hard on country.

Phoumi said Brown should not threaten. If we had difference of opinion we should discuss it. One should never threaten an Asian. He realized that without US aid Laos was dead. If we wanted to stop aid, that was our privilege. We should just do it and not threaten it. Brown replied he was not threatening but simply making sure that everyone fully understood consequences of decisions that might be made.

Brown then turned to Boun Oum and made warm plea to him to consider his heavy responsibilities to his people and not to cast away structure of international guarantees now available to his country nor to deny it US support. He must seize opportunity of presence three Princes in Geneva to agree on govt. It was almost unanimous opinion all concerned that Defense and Interior should go to center. He was completely isolated in terms world opinion. Phoumi then said this very difficult decision. He contended US had never before made its positions clear on these two posts. (Brown reminded him of previous conversations.) He said he must have time to think.

At three o’clock I called on Boun Oum.³ Phoumi was present. I addressed myself wholly to Boun Oum. I stressed fact that everyone now waiting for formation govt. This not purely internal question as he claimed. Formation govt was key to settling civil war which involved international elements. He ruled only half country. World was waiting for negotiations in good faith. I was disappointed that several days had passed without Princes even meeting. Officially and as friend of Laos, I urged him most earnestly get on with serious discussion, and if he had to go to funeral, leave Phoumi to continue on his behalf. We had helped Laos, but our aid had been given to Laos and not to Phoumi or any other individual. Now was time to cast aside all personal considerations. Phoumi interjected that he would stay if business not finished this afternoon. He said he would do his best to arrange matters to satisfaction of all concerned.

I urged Boun Oum again consider his responsibilities and negotiate sincerely.

Phoumi replied that there would be meeting with co-chairmen at four and meeting also in evening. He thought “something would come of this.” (This was first hint of any give in rigidity of position.)

I then addressed Phoumi for first time and said with emphasis “you are a Lao for whom we have great respect. We hope that you, yourself, have a good future as well as your country.” He was obviously relieved and gratified by this expression.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–1862. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to Bangkok, London, Moscow, New Delhi, Ottawa, Paris, Saigon, and Vientiane.
1. In Confe 1052, January 18, the Delegation reported that after 2 days of persuasion, mostly by MacDonald, Phoumi, and Boun Oum had agreed to a three Princes’ meeting that afternoon at the Palais des Nations under the auspices of the Geneva Co-Chairmen. In addition there would be a reception and dinner for the three Princes and their advisers. The conversation between Brown and Phoumi as reported above was, according to the U.S. Delegation, probably instrumental in persuading Phoumi to attend the three Princes’ meeting. (Ibid.)
2. The date is incorrect; the Brown-Phoumi meeting was on the morning of January 18. This is confirmed by the memorandum of conversation of their meeting, which took place at the RLG’s villa in Geneva at 9:30 a.m., January 18. (USMC/163; ibid.)
3. A memorandum of conversation of the Harriman-Boun Oum conversation, January 18 at 3 p.m., at the RLG’s villa is in USMC/165. (Ibid.)