Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

220. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)⁰

Washington, November 2, 1961.

SUBJECT

• The Geneva Negotiations

The attached telegrams were the subject of a very hotly fought argument between Harriman and the Department.¹ The Department view was that the proposed concessions went too far. Even before I learned of the continuing argument I had much the same reaction to them. They posed the question of whether we were going to accept a possible breakdown in the negotiations, which implies, of course, a willingness to intervene militarily if necessary, rather than accept ICC arrangements that represent no substantial advance over the 1954 Geneva Accords.

The issue was the subject of discussion between Bowles, Alexis Johnson and the President on November 1 and a telephone conversation between the President, Harriman and Alexis Johnson on November 2.² Harriman won the argument. One of the few State officers who was sympathetic to the Harriman views characterized the likely result as “a 1954-type ICC plus helicopters”. That is all he had ever expected.

While a stronger ICC would fall far short of providing the basis for ensuring a non-Communist Laos, it was the one thing of real value we might have got out of the Geneva negotiations themselves. The existence of negotiations has, of course, had the value of preserving a formal cease-fire though it has not prevented continuing erosion of the non-Communist position on the ground.

The task of forming a government has been proceeding very slowly. There was an argument about who was responsible for the delays between the Department and Harriman last weekend (cables with your reading material).³ The picture I have been able to get from the traffic is one that tends to confirm the Department’s view that the delay is primarily Souvanna’s fault. Phoumi has now gone so far as to indicate a willingness to go to Xieng Khouang for the next meeting despite the risks that could involve for his personal safety.⁴ Souvanna, though now designated the cabinet-formateur, has not yet come up with a list of cabinet candidates. The usual shadow play about who, where and when to meet continues.⁵

It is now more obvious than ever that the effort to preserve some kind of non-Communist strength in Laos is going to revolve primarily around what can be done to put some strength into a probably very weak Souvanna-led government. I have been prodding State regularly in your absence for a paper on this subject. A paper is finally to be circulated today and some kind of interdepartmental meeting will be called on it in the future.⁶ Planning for integration of the armed forces, etc., if actually implemented, is likely to foreclose at an early stage the option of attempting to preserve non-Communist strength in the South and a de facto division within the context of a theoretically unified Laos. But this is still an option that I believe we should bear in mind even as we begin to go down another road.

RHJ

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 11/61. Secret.
1. See Documents 218 and 219.
2. See Document 217.
3. See Documents 212 and 213.
4. A note on the source text by Johnson at this point reads: “This somewhat less clear than I thought when I wrote this.”
5. A note on the source text by Johnson at this point reads: “See attached memo from State on above subject recently received.” Johnson was apparently referring to enclosure 2 to Document 216.
6. Johnson is referring to the draft paper, “Souvanna Phouma Solution,” September 27; see footnote 2, Document 208. A draft of it was sent by McConaughy to Johnson, November 2. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 11/61)