Office of the Historian

212. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State0

Geneva, October 26, 1961, 8 p.m.

Confe 786. For the President and the Secretary from Harriman. Deliver [garble] a.m.

Cable from Vientiane 6241 to Dept describing Hasey’s talk with Phoumi confirmed my misgivings that Phoumi has no intention of negotiating in good faith with Souvanna for formation of a government, let alone an adequate agreement on integration and demobilization forces. Phoumi sees his supreme power slipping and appears reluctant to join Souvanna govt in working under him for neutral Laos. In conversation with British First Secretary, Souvanna gave right answers on integration forces and closing Laos to Viet Cong, but still unsatisfactory on composition government. On the other hand, he indicated Vientiane neutrals could be included, if cabinet enlarged to 18 or 19 posts. Phoumi or someone else has got to do some tough realistic trading on these two all important subjects, namely, government and military forces. Our negotiations in Geneva are now of second importance to agreements in Laos. I urge in the strongest terms that Ambassador Brown be instructed to use his full authority to tell Phoumi he must undertake negotiations in good faith. If he doesn’t we must find some other way to handle negotiations with Souvanna. It would seem that not only the [Page 483] numbers but the individuals that Souvanna places in important posts is critical. If Phoumi had started to negotiate last July, perhaps he could have negotiated himself in a position of Deputy Prime Minister, providing he had come to a personal understanding with Souvanna to work together against penetration Pathet Lao and victory in elections. Now if Phoumi is to be Deputy Prime Minister, a Pathet Lao would also have to have similar post. If this is not desirable, he should abandon his demand for this position and get down to brass tacks on individuals to hold critical posts, as well as over all composition cabinet and demobilization. I don’t see why Phoumi shouldn’t go to Plaine des Jarres alone since Boun Oum refuses, now that Souvanna has visited Luang Prabang and indicates he will return there. The all important subject is that Phoumi begin to act in good faith and not by his inaction take over US Government policy making.

I further recommend our Ambassador establish direct and continuous contact with Souvanna. It seems unrealistic for French and British Ambassadors and their staffs to travel to Xieng Khuang, while we remain aloof. We must gain and maintain Souvanna’s confidence. If Ambassador Brown does not feel he has man on his staff to establish liaison with Souvanna, I will be glad to release Julian Fromer, who participated in our talks in Rangoon and Geneva, for this purpose, unless Dept prefers to send Christian Chapman.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–2661. Secret; Niact. Repeated niact to Bangkok for Taylor, niact to Vientiane, and to Saigon. A note on the source text indicates that it was passed to the White House.↩
  2. Telegram 624, October 24, reported that Phoumi told Hasey that he feared for his safety if he went to Khang Khay for negotiations, but Charge Creel felt it was as much a desire not to negotiate himself out of office. (Ibid., 751J.00/10–2461)↩