Office of the Historian

211. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State0

Geneva, October 26, 1961, 7 p.m.

Confe 785. For the President and the Secretary from Harriman. Deliver 9 a.m. Reference: Confe 786.1

Reference telegram based on understanding the President’s and Secretary of State’s instructions2 to me still stand that President wants a peaceful settlement providing reasonable chance of resulting in neutral and independent Laos. As far as Geneva’s contribution to that objective is concerned, it seems almost within our grasp, and as I have said, the most critical decisions are now in Laos.

I fully recognize importance of Laos attached to crisis in South Vietnam. It seems to me, however, that we should drive ahead to conclude negotiation for the establishment of an acceptable Souvanna Government, understanding regarding demobilization forces, and conclusion Geneva agreement. If agreement reached, both Soviets and Souvanna have committed themselves to block use of Laos territory against SVN, for what that may accomplish. Regardless of other considerations, I continue to feel that SVN problem can best be solved in SVN, rather than trying to find solution by military action in Laos.

I fear that if SEATO forces introduced in Laos, it will be difficult to prevent extremely dangerous escalation and at best will have forces [Page 482] bogged down indefinitely. Introduction forces SVN would not be as dangerous or without terminus and would have possibility of far more world wide approval. I see nothing that has developed to change the decision the President made months ago to attempt peaceful solution, which seemed remote then, but is possible today if all hands will work energetically to that end. Also, I feel strongly we will be in better position to reach peaceful solution Berlin if Laos agreement concluded.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–2661. Top Secret; Niact. Repeated niact to Bangkok for Taylor. A note on the source text indicates that it was passed to the White House.↩
  2. Document 212.↩
  3. Document 200.↩