210. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Battle) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0
SUBJECT
- Weekly Summary, Geneva Conference, October 17–23, 1961
1. Developments in Laos
At Luang Prabang October 18, Souvanna accepted the King’s request “to attempt unofficially” to form a government of national union. [Page 479] In his press statement following the audience, Souvanna said four steps would be involved: a) the three Princes meet again and agree on the Cabinet’s composition; b) Boun Oum offers his resignation to the King; c) at the same time the King officially designates Souvanna to form a government; d) Souvanna presents the government to the King and is invested by him.1
Souvanna’s attitude at Luang Prabang as described by Phoumi is of some significance in that he appeared not only to acknowledge the King’s sovereignty but accepted the constitutional necessity of remaining unofficial Premier-designate until a new government was agreed upon; he conceded the legality of the Boun Oum government and of the latter’s remaining temporarily in office; and he did not attempt to claim legality for his own “government.” Outside of the audience, little else was accomplished between Souvanna and Phoumi.
Souvanna’s going to Luang Prabang in itself represents a major step. The RLG for its part made a helpful gesture in supplying some funds for Souvanna’s forces and also published a conciliatory statement on the future Souvanna government. Prospects of a rapid formation of the latter seem slim with little or no action being taken at the moment. Boun Oum and Phoumi are unwilling to accede to Souvanna’s request that the next Princes’ meeting be held at Khang Khay; Boun Oum in fact has gone to Pakse by boat for an indefinite time. The Vientiane faction feels it is now up to Souvanna to come up with a proposed slate of ministers before another meeting. On the Pathet Lao side, Souphanouvong did not go to Luang Prabang and according to reports from Geneva, his group may be planning to react against Vientiane demands by some of their own, including one of the two key posts, Defense or Interior. Souvanna told Phoumi he would accept him as Vice Premier but wished to retain Defense for himself, making no mention of Interior, which he probably intends for one of his “neutrals.” There is also the problem of investiture: Phoumi claims the King told Souvanna he preferred adherence to the normal constitutional procedures, i.e., investiture by parliament; Souvanna was non-committal but is unlikely to accept. A British Embassy officer with Phoumi’s approval is flying to Khang Khay in an effort to persuade Souvanna to move ahead on forming his government.
On the question of demobilization and integration of forces, which Phoumi does not seem to regard as seriously as we do, Ambassador Brown has been instructed to press him to insist on a prior agreement on principles with the other two factions before accepting any new government formula. (A draft plan in this connection has been drawn up by the [Page 480] 3 Western Ambassadors and Australian Minister to be considered by the four governments for the eventual use of the Lao groups and also of the allied governments at Geneva.)2
The RLG, probably at the instigation of Sopsaisana, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, last week sent two stiff notes to ICC charging the latter with having broken its agreement on the transport of Souvanna forces to Luang Prabang. RLG-ICC relations at best are hardly harmonious but this marks a new low.
2. Geneva3
Ambassador Harriman reports that the optimism generated in the early part of the week over progress with the Soviets had largely evanesced by week’s end: Pushkin had appeared to consider our SEATO formula acceptable to the bloc as a whole and again stated he was prepared to have the neutrality declaration include a guarantee of the parties that Lao territory would not be used as a base or corridor of aggression. Pushkin’s most useful concession was contained in his concept of three-stage ICC procedures: a) initiation of investigations; b) reporting, and c) recommendations; the first two of which, he said, would require only majority vote but the unanimity principle would have to apply to the third. However, this concession means little unless covered in the final Conference documents and Pushkin on October 20 failed to give Harriman the text he had promised, implying he was having trouble with the Chinese.
Phoui Sananikone, Chairman of the Vientiane delegation, has returned to Vientiane for consultations. According to Phoumi, he and Souvanna agreed last week on Phoui as head of the unified Lao delegation, the formation of which Souvanna considered of immediate importance. Their concurrence however may be based on an equal desire to eliminate Phoui from the Lao political scene.
Quinim Pholsena, Souvanna’s deputy, and Pathet Lao delegate Phoumi Vongvichit also left Geneva for Xieng Khouang on a two-week consultation trip. Vientiane delegation surmises that in light of Pushkin’s apparent eagerness to achieve agreement, the two will present to their respective groups the type of agreement the Communist bloc is prepared to accept.
While we continue our planning for a future Laos on the premise of continued French presence once agreement has been achieved at Geneva, the Soviets and Chinese are strongly opposed to it as “incompatible [Page 481] with a neutral Laos”; the two Co-Chairmen may now consult to devise an acceptable formula on this issue.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 10/61. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.↩
- As reported in telegram 600 from Vientiane, October 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–1961)↩
- In telegram 371 to Vientiane, October 21. (Ibid., 751J.5/10–2061) Text of the agreed draft plan for regroupment, integration, and demobilization of Lao Armed Forces is in telegram 607 from Vientiane, October 20. (Ibid.)↩
- More information on the week’s events at Geneva is in Confe 760, October 20. (Ibid.)↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. Manfull signed for Battle.↩