Office of the Historian

209. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Battle) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0

Washington, October 18, 1961.

SUBJECT

  • Weekly Summary, Geneva Conference October 9–16, 1961

1. Developments in Laos

After considerable confusion generated by the failure of both RLG and Souvanna to respond to each other’s questions on the next steps to [Page 477] be taken, Phoumi acceded to Souvanna’s request that an RLG delegation go to Khang Khay to effect the arrangements for Souvanna’s audience with the King, now scheduled for October 18. Kong Le troops and an ICC security force at Luang Prabang will guarantee Souvanna’s safety. He will presumably see the King alone and then meet with Boun Oum and Phoumi for discussions on his government’s composition; Souphanouvong, however, will probably not be present. One of the main issues is that of the distribution of the center seats, the Pathet Lao (PL) and Souvanna demanding all eight for the latter’s “neutrals,” while Phoumi insists on four for the non-Xieng Khouang neutrals. Furthermore, Phoumi reports that Souphanouvong requests Defense for the PL and, though Souvanna is refusing, this question may well hamper negotiations, particularly since Phoumi is seeking that post for himself and Western support to any RLG under the Paris Agreements cannot be given if Defense or Interior goes to the PL.

Souvanna for his part has been maneuvering thus far without success to obtain public recognition for his designation by having the Diplomatic Corps and ICC present at Luang Prabang. He does not realize that the King, who was displeased with the self-righteous tone of Souvanna’s letter to him of September 271 and who apparently has little regard for any of the three Princes, does not plan to designate him formally but merely to ask him to “try to form a government.” The possibility also exists that the King may attempt to oblige Souvanna to go to the Assembly for investiture. A further problem is that of the timing of the Boun Oum government’s resignation, Souvanna desiring it at once and Phoumi wishing to defer it until an agreement has been achieved on the new government. We recently learned that the French Government has been attempting to diminish Souvanna’s dependence on the Soviets by supplying him with funds and certain other assistance.

2. Geneva2

With the Conference at the critical phase, Ambassador Harriman over the past week has met frequently with MacDonald, Pushkin, and other delegates on a bilateral or small group basis in an effort to find a solution to the major hard issues: (a) ICC voting procedures, fixed teams and operation centers; (b) demobilization and integration; (c) infiltration into South Viet-Nam via Laos; (d) SEATO protocol; (e) Co-Chairmen’s role. The Soviets are particularly adamant on opposing the fixed teams and in insisting on the removal of SEATO protection from Laos. Harriman feels that if these two problems could be resolved, it might [Page 478] then be possible to achieve substantial agreement relatively soon provided that the three Princes’ negotiations are satisfactorily concluded.

With respect to SEATO, the British, French, and U.S. delegates recommend adopting the Indian proposal which Pushkin felt might represent “interesting middle ground,” i.e., the SEATO powers participating at Geneva would undertake to respect the Lao neutrality declaration and the non-participating SEATO powers would publicly endorse this action on grounds that Lao neutrality was being guaranteed by the Geneva commitments. On ICC voting, Pushkin’s only concession has been to admit that agreement here is not tied to the Soviet troika principle but he has rejected a return to the 1954 voting procedures offered by Harriman as a compromise. The most constructive development is Pushkin’s voluntary suggestion to include a provision by which the Co-Chairmen would be responsible for ensuring that the thirteen signatory powers fulfill their obligations.

Of interest with respect to Khrushchev’s message last week stressing the Soviet desire for an early agreement, is the fact that Pushkin who had planned to return to Moscow for the CPSU Congress and to see Khrushchev, cancelled his trip on Moscow instructions.

L.D. Battle3
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 10/61. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.↩
  2. Not found.↩
  3. See Document 206 for more information on the week’s events at the conference.↩
  4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. Lawrence Pezzulo of S/S signed for Battle.↩