Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

208. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)⁰

Washington, October 17, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Planning for the Strengthening of a Souvanna-Led Government in Laos

I have had a further talk with Charles Cross, the Laos desk officer, and have read the paper which he prepared within State on the subject of shoring up a Souvanna-led government.¹ This paper seems to me to provide a good beginning for an interdepartmental exercise.

I recommend that you propose at the Planning Group Luncheon today the establishment of an interdepartmental group at the working level to work under the Southeast Asia Task Force and to prepare a paper on this subject. The group might include representatives of State, Defense, CIA, ICA and the NSC Staff. I recommend that you suggest to Alexis Johnson that this working level group be under the chairmanship of the State desk officer, Mr. Cross, who is one of the few people in State who sympathizes with, recognizes the need for, and has done some thinking about this kind of planning. The general attitude of many of the officers in the FE Bureau of the State Department is that no Souvanna-led government offers a real prospect of keeping Laos neutral and non-Communist. While this pessimism is supported in general by intelligence appreciations, we are committed to this track and it seems to me essential that we make a real college try to make the effort succeed.

It seems to me that any planning effort be organized so as to have both a working and a policy level. The work of the SEA Task Force has suffered from the fact that working level arrangements have been very ad hoc in character, improvised for each redrafting effort. The SEA Task Force itself might have an initial meeting to discuss the general problem of strengthening a Souvanna government and then turn the problem over to the working level group.

It may be argued that we cannot do meaningful planning on this problem until we have a clearer picture of the outlines of a Geneva settlement. However, it seems to me that we can develop plans now which will: (a) analyze alternative approaches to various problems; and (b) at a minimum, lay down general guidelines. Thus, for example, there is a question as to whether, in helping Souvanna (or others) develop a political organization, the emphasis should be upon a mass-base organization which would compete directly with the Communists or whether it should be organized along the lines of traditional Lao political parties with emphasis upon family and other personal ties. We will need a clear plan of action the moment there is a political settlement. Work on a plan would provide the foundations on which detailed programs can be constructed and might even have some effect upon decisions that are made at Geneva and elsewhere as we make our final compromises in connection with a settlement.

As I indicated this morning, some planning, in addition to the paper that was done in State, is going forward in the government. Thus, ICA recently sent a message to the field requesting the recommendations of the Laos USOM on how the aid program should be reorganized in the event a Souvanna government is installed. CIA is said to have done some work on the subject and, of course, a certain amount of the planning that has been developed in connection with the Geneva Conference has a direct bearing. In particular, the quite detailed plan for the reorganization of the armed forces and the plan for reorganization and support for the police forces has immediate relevance.

There is attached for your information Walt’s memo to the President and its attached illustrative list of the topics that might be covered in a plan.²

Bob

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 10/61. Secret.
1. The paper was entitled “Souvanna Phouma Solution” and dated September 27. It made four assumptions: the United States would support Souvanna, he would be dangerously weak, the military option had been abandoned, and influence over Souvanna was limited. The primary U.S. objective was to prevent Laos from being used as a base for infiltration and subversion against Thailand and South Vietnam. Cross outlined actions to strengthen Souvanna politically, such as creating a pro-Souvanna political party under Phoui Sananikone and drastically reducing support of Phoumi. He suggested military actions, such as bringing Kong Le’s forces closer to FAR and away from the Pathet Lao. Cross also outlined ways to assure Thailand and South Vietnam that support for Souvanna would not imperil their security. (Department of State, FE/SEA (Laos) Files: Lot 69 D 169, Laos Task Force, 1961, Sept.–Dec.)
2. Document 205.