205. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy0

SUBJECT

  • Southeast Asian Planning

In the course of the meeting this morning on Southeast Asia,1 General Taylor and I believe it would be wise if you were to make the following point.

We may end up in Laos with a wobbly Souvanna government. Starting right now we need vigorous forward planning to maximize the chance that a Laos which might emerge from the present negotiations would, in fact, remain neutral and independent. We are all aware of the [Page 469] risks involved in this settlement, but we feel that a good many things could be done by all the agencies of government concerned to prevent the most unfavorable possible outcome. A note is attached to this memorandum suggesting some of the directions in which such planning and action might proceed.

Attachment2

Illustrative List of Topics That Might Be Covered in a Plan for Strengthening Non-Communist Forces in Laos in the Event of a Political Settlement

1.
Getting Close to Souvanna. We need activity to search out ways through which we can express our support for Souvanna. These may include economic aid, relief assistance and political actions. At the same time we must honor our commitments to Phoumi. This may create some very difficult dilemmas.
2.
Actions to Strengthen Non-Communist Political Organization. We need to examine the ways in which we can strengthen Souvanna’s political organization; how we can achieve a coalition among the non-Communist political forces; and how we approach the problem of political organization if no such coalition is achieved.
3.
The Army as a Political Force. We are already working on plans for reorganization of the armed forces. We need to consider how we can effect reorganization in such a way as to retain able non-Communist military commanders and place them in politically key spots. We need to consider how we can achieve rapprochement with Kong Le and his forces.
4.
Development of an Adequate Police Force. The creation of an adequate police force with a significant anti-guerilla capability could be almost as important to preservation of Lao independence as a satisfactory reorganization of the Lao armed forces. A plan has been developed for reorganization of the police to provide an anti-guerilla capability and is to be discussed with the French. Whether we will want such a force will depend in part upon who gets the Interior post in the Cabinet.
5.
Economic Development. We ought to seek to absorb the new government in the constructive tasks of economic development. As a first step we should be ready to insure that, as soon as a political agreement is concluded, an able economic advisor from some neutral country perhaps Sweden or India is made available to help develop a preliminary economic plan. We shall need to decide how aid can best be provided to a neutral Laos whether through the UN, through some kind of consortium, or bilaterally.
6.
Creating an Awareness of Communist Techniques of Takeover. Employing related studies on Eastern Europe as a model, we ought to do a quick study of how the Communists might take over a coalition government from within. The study should cover such matters as which are the key cabinet posts, how the Communists are likely to infiltrate political organizations, Communist techniques of village level organization etc. This would be a guide for our own action and might also be translated into French and Lao for distribution to non-Communist political leaders in Laos. There should be a related study on how to forestall Communist success.
7.
Making the ICC Effective. We ought to study the ways that we can make the ICC as effective as possible. The key will be the Indian attitude. A major communication from the President to Prime Minister Nehru may be in order.
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 10/61. Secret.
  2. See footnote 2, Document 204. Records of decisions at this meeting on Laos are limited. A memorandum with the decisions on South Vietnam is printed in vol. I, pp. 343344. NSAM No. 104, October 13, informed the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence that the President authorized six specific actions at the meeting. Only action 5 related to Laos. It reads as follows: “Initiate guerrilla ground action, including use of U.S. advisers if necessary, against Communist aerial resupply missions in the Tchepone area.” The NSAM concluded with the following general statement: “The President also agreed that certain other actions developed by the Task Force and concurred in by the agencies concerned, but which do not require specific Presidential approval, should be undertaken on an urgent basis.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda, NSAM 104)
  3. Secret. Drafted by Robert Johnson.