Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

206. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State⁰

Geneva, October 15, 1961, 3 p.m.

Confe 727. From Harriman. Fecon 334.¹ Weekly evaluation.

In week of long and intensive conversations with Pushkin, bilaterally and in small groups, we have concentrated on basic problems this conference. Pushkin informed us on Monday² that he would be leaving for Moscow at end of week to attend Party Congress in Moscow and to see Khrushchev. Pushkin began week’s discussions by reading to me long message from Khrushchev indicating USSR seeks settlement Laos problem and such a settlement would affect other issues which Soviets hope can be composed by means of negotiations and cooperation with US and not by force or threats.³ Pushkin however continued argue vigorously in support Soviet position on tough issues here. He seemed expect US give in eighty percent if he offers twenty percent compromise.⁴ By Friday⁵ afternoon situation stood as follows:

On SEATO, Pushkin and ChiComs demanded Laos be removed from SEATO Protocol. They declared they would not be satisfied with anything less.⁶

On voting, Pushkin indicated USSR might accept majority vote on procedural issues if matters of principle, including initiation of inspection required unanimous decisions.⁷ Only break on this had been Pushkin’s avowal that Laos agreement not tied to Soviet troika principle. Pushkin however rejected compromise suggestion to return to 1954 Geneva voting principles which specified unanimity in a few fairly well defined cases but left balance of ICC matters to be settled by majority vote.

Although still opposed our proposal for fixed teams and operations centers Pushkin gave some ground by offering that teams could stay in area of suspected violation as long as necessary and certain supply centers might be established.⁸

We discussed on several occasions with Pushkin problem of having conference in some manner take note of Lao Government integration and demobilization plan assuring no private armies and then indicate that failure to carry this out would amount to violation of agreement on which ICC would have investigative responsibility. Pushkin (although always stating no private armies should remain) had previously maintained that this was purely internal affair. Finally however he gave some ground. He said ICC had responsibility for supervising cease-fire and if a private army should start hostilities again, it would be breach of cease-fire thereby giving ICC responsibility. Hence ICC should stay in business, at least on this question, until Lao Government succeeded in disbanding all private forces, as existence of private armies was always a threat.

Perhaps most constructive and encouraging development of conference thus far was Pushkin’s offer during week’s negotiations to write into article on role of co-chairmen a provision under which co-chairmen would assume responsibility for seeing to observation of obligations by 13 signatory states. We had not asked Pushkin for this, and his willingness undertake it provides basis on which he agrees that we can hold Soviets responsible for Vietminh or ChiCom violations.

On Friday afternoon Pushkin informed MacDonald he had cancelled his intended visit to Moscow, presumably on instructions. When I met with Pushkin Saturday morning⁹ he admitted instructions to remain came from Gromyko as result his talk with President. He urged we proceed rapidly to reach agreement saying time had arrived in Laos conference when everything depended on US and USSR. Pushkin said USSR putting all its cards on table and we should proceed to work out compromise agreement on two most critical issues—voting procedure and SEATO.

He made certain proposals on voting which we are studying with view of finding mutually acceptable counter proposals. Pushkin also pressed for some “middle ground” manner of handling SEATO issue. He suggested this might be found through accepting Indian Delegate’s suggestion. He had expanded US proposal that US and other three SEATO members at conference would agree respect Lao Declaration renouncing protection military alliances by suggesting that four SEATO countries not present at conference might also in some appropriate way agree to respect Declaration of Laos Government.

MacDonald, Roux and I have recommended our respective governments that Pushkin’s SEATO compromise be accepted and every effort be made to get other SEATO countries to agree. We concede thereby nothing in substance and present SEATO unity.

SEATO members might make public statements along line that SEATO gladly taking such action because Laos neutrality now being guaranteed by commitments undertaken at Geneva.

If we can reach agreement on Pushkin’s two key issues, in both of which face saving for Khrushchev is primarily involved, it now looks as though we may be on verge of significant break-through which could lead to substantial agreement in near future, depending, of course, on outcome negotiations three Princes in Laos.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–1561. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Vientiane and Moscow.
1. See footnote 2, Document 161.
2. October 9.
3. See Document 201.
4. As reported in Confe 715, October 12. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–1261)
5. October 13.
6. The discussion on SEATO is reported in Confe 714, October 12. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–1261)
7. See Document 202.
8. As reported in Confe 708, October 11. (Department of State Central Files, 751J.00/10–1161)
9. As reported in Confe 725, October 14. (Ibid., 751J.00/10–1461)