201. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State0

Confe 704. From Harriman.

At outset of my conversation October 9 with Pushkin, latter read to me from notebook text of message which he said he had received from Moscow October 5. Pushkin stated that message was Soviet Govt reaction to previous Harriman-Pushkin talks, on which reports had gone to Khrushchev himself. Gist of message, which Khrushchev himself had authorized, was as follows:

Soviet Govt found prior Pushkin talks with Harriman to be very interesting. It noted with satisfaction that US desired solution to Laos question and formation of neutralist govt under Souvanna Phouma. It welcomed US acceptance of concept of neutrality for state. USSR itself has always wanted fully sovereign and neutral Laos. It is essential to put out flames of war in Laos and to keep events in that small unhappy land from leading to wider conflagration.

Mutual understanding will help achieve agreement on mutually acceptable basis. Conference work is now at such stage that it can be finished rapidly, successfully, and in harmony with interest of Laos. Work at conference and agreement must ensure neutral and independent Laos.

This is all Soviet Govt seeks here. If US also wishes this and USSR assumes this is case then there is no obstacle to reaching early accord and signing agreement. As a result of great common effort here, basic outlines of declaration and protocol have already been worked out. Problem now is to concentrate on settling chief important unsettled issues. USSR is ready for this but US and other govts must speed up pace.

USSR shares Harriman view that settlement must be reached at same time in both Geneva and Laos. Soviets believe that Laotians will agree on govt of national unity based on principles of Zurich communique. However, US support of Boun Oum and Phoumi claims vis-a-vis coalition govt will not help achieve success. Success in Geneva will also facilitate success in Laos, important that all delegations work harder now to get agreement.

Soviet Govt has worked hard on study of all issues and on drafting declaration and protocol. It is clear that no agreements infringing on sovereignty of Laos will be accepted by representatives of Laotian people, [Page 460] and positions taken by Laotian Delegations at Geneva already show that this is true. All of them support concepts of neutrality, non-interference, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and all of them are ready to undertake obligations to bring these about.

Within reasonable limits and for fixed time, ICC activities can help achieve these aims, provided sovereignty of Laos is not violated. However, no ICC can protect Laos if 13 other nations at conference do not fulfill their obligations and if co-chairmen do not see to this (i.e., that other nations fulfill their obligations). Main control over agreements will not be ICC in Laos, but good will and conduct of 13 govts.

Like Harriman, Moscow is upset at delay in settlement of Laos issue as whole, wants speedy solution, and will support USDel in all efforts to reach goal of achieving neutral and sovereign Laos. If US and USSR act jointly on Laos question, this will have decisive influence on getting agreement. It will have favorable influence not only in reducing tension in Laos and in SE Asia, but, to certain degree, throughout world.

Moscow agrees with Harriman remark that US/Soviet relations could be different from those which now exist. Harriman has always been considered among those who sincerely want settlement of US/Soviet difference because such development would be guarantee for maintaining world peace. USSR seeks settlement of all world issues by means of negotiations and cooperation with US, and not by force of threats. Khrushchev sends his sincere greetings to Harriman and wishes him best health.

At conclusion of message, I asked Pushkin to thank Khrushchev for personal wishes and reciprocated them. I was also gratified to hear of Khrushchev desire to work out Laotian problems and achieve neutral and truly independent Laos and that Khrushchev believed settlement would have favorable influence elsewhere in world. This put special responsibility on Pushkin and me to come to speedy conclusion of work here.

I then took up concrete issues in accordance with instructions, which are reported septel.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–1061. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated priority to Vientiane and Moscow and to USUN.