Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

204. Memorandum From the President’s Military Adviser (Taylor) to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, October 11, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Discussion of Southeast Asia Planning, 10:45 a.m., Wednesday, 11 October 1961¹

1. It is my understanding that Mr. Alexis Johnson, representing State, will present to you the following principal topics.

a. The present situation in Southeast Asia. He will base this discussion upon the attached summary which you may have read among your papers over the last weekend.

b. The status of the military plan “SEATO 5 Plus”,² which is the old Seato 5 with a greater use of indigenous forces than in the original plan.

c. A new concept for the introduction of SEATO forces into South Vietnam.³

2. With regard to SEATO Plan 5 Plus, I believe that it is drawn properly to cope with an overt resumption of hostilities but, as you have commented, it is not designed to cope with continued infiltration into Southern Laos and across into South Vietnam. The principal unfinished business with regard to this Plan is to nail down the contributions to be made by the other SEATO countries, and to reach agreement as to the circumstances which would warrant implementing it.

3. The concept for strengthening South Vietnam will be presented to you to obtain general approval for its further development. Decision may be asked on some specific actions which are desirable in South Vietnam, regardless of whether the new concept is adopted in its entirety.

4. One important question which should be discussed is the possible U.S. force requirements (air and ground) if the SEATO Plan 5 Plus and the South Vietnam Plan should be implemented either singly or concurrently. While a decision to plan is not a decision to implement, in all logic we should have the forces available or in sight for these Southeast Asia plans and, at the same time, be able to meet our obligations to Berlin and NATO. In my opinion, our present military structure is not sufficient for both tasks. Thus, the capital question is whether additional forces should be mobilized now or the limitations of our military capabilities in Southeast Asia accepted as a permanent fact.

Maxwell D. Taylor

Attachment⁴

SOUTHEAST ASIA

I. Present Situation

A. Laos—Political

1. Soviets continue indicate desire reach agreement but there is little concrete move forward.

a. Soviets still insist on unanimity rule in ICC, are opposed to ICC role in demobilization and reduction of Lao forces and do not agree to any role for ICC that would enable it effectively to observe and report on transit of Viet Minh military personnel into South Viet-Nam.

2. In spite of Harriman mission and urgings from French and U.K. Ambassadors, Souvanna Phouma has not agreed to any satisfactory composition of his Government.

3. “Three Princes” are meeting Ban Hin Heup on October 6 to discuss formation of Government.

[Here follow sections B–G which are identical to the language in the attachment to Document 194.]

II. Additional Courses of Action

A. Laos—Political

1. Through Ambassador Harriman, intensify bilateral negotiations with Soviets with objectives of:

a. Preventing renewal of hostilities in Laos.

b. Obtaining Soviet agreement for an ICC able freely to move and report without an internal veto and with cooperation of Lao Government, with particular emphasis upon the infiltration routes from Laos into South Viet-Nam.

c. An acceptable Souvanna Phouma Government.

d. Satisfactory arrangements for demobilization and reintegration of Lao forces, particularly to insure Pathet Lao do not retain private army.

e. Engaging to maximum Soviet responsibility for fulfillment of conditions by Communist side.

B. Laos—Military

1. Expedite completion present program for U.S. and Thai encadrement of the FAR.

2. Explore with Thailand and South Viet-Nam the organization of small Thai-Lao and Viet-Namese-Lao units, each with at least two U.S. advisers, having as a mission hit-and-run operations into Laos to prevent Communist solidification of their positions near the frontiers.

3. Encourage, including use of U.S. advisers, action against Communist aerial resupply missions, including introduction of special indigenous units on specific interdiction missions, particularly at Tchepone, or by ground anti-aircraft weapons.

4. If the necessity arises, authorize the use of U.S. military transport aircraft for logistic support, including troop lift to and within Laos.

[Here follow sections C and D, “South Vietnam—Political” and “South Vietnam—Military,” which are printed in volume I, pages 338–339.]

E. Thailand—Political

1. Explore with key members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee change in the SEATO voting formula from present unanimity rule to a majority or three-fourths’ rule. Urgently complete action on the Bowen mission and Embassy recommendations for an economic program in Thailand.

F. Thailand—Military

1. Expedite delivery of equipment for border police patrol on Mekong River.

2. Subject to agreement of Thais and working out of financial aspects for dollar and local currency costs, dispatch U.S. Army engineer construction battalion to Thailand for urgent construction of military supply route bypassing Bangkok.

3. Subject to agreement of Thais, rotate U.S. forces, initially of battalion-sized elements, to Thailand for combined training, either bilaterally or, if possible, within SEATO context.

4. If favorably recommended by survey team presently in Thailand, promptly establish combat development and test center.

G. Cambodia—Political and Military

1. Explore with Embassy possibility of tying modest increase in military aid to Cambodian willingness take more aggressive action combat Viet Cong use of safe sanctuary in Cambodia.

H. SEATO—Military

1. If Communists renew major offensive action in Laos, be prepared promptly to implement SEATO Plan 5 plus, in meanwhile continuing efforts to maximize other SEATO members’ contingent troop contributions for and readiness participate in such action.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Countries Series, Southeast Asia: General, 10/11/61–12/31/61. Top Secret.
1. At 11 a.m., October 11, the President met with Rusk, McNamara, Lemnitzer, Allen Dulles, Cottrell, Donald M. Wilson of USIA, Bissell, Ball, Gilpatric, and McGeorge Bundy. The meeting lasted until 12:25 p.m. and was characterized as “off the record.” (Ibid., President’s Appointment Book) For additional information, see Document 205.
2. See footnote 2, Document 188.
3. Printed in vol. I, pp. 340–341
4. Top Secret. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson.