Office of the Historian

203. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Battle) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0

Washington, October 11, 1961.

SUBJECT

  • Weekly Summary, Geneva Conference, October 2–8, 1961

1. Developments in Laos

a.
On October 8, second day of Ban Hin Heup talks, the three Princes agreed on: (a) Souvanna as sole candidate for the Premiership; (b) a 16-seat Cabinet; (c) a “truly neutral” center group (Phoumi intends to insist that half of the center seats go to non-Xieng Khouang neutrals). Both the Premier and Vice Premier may have an additional portfolio e.g., Defense or Interior.1 Phoumi plans to fly to Luang Prabang October 10 to seek a royal audience for Souvanna, possibly for October 11. The actual composition of the government thus far untouched will probably be negotiated in Luang Prabang and may take several weeks to accomplish, partly because Souphanouvong refuses to go to the royal capital and partly because of the obvious difficulties of finding a formula satisfactory to the three parties.
b.
We have instructed Ambassador Brown to urge Phoumi to attempt to secure for himself the Ministry of Defense or, at a minimum, Interior with Phoui Sananikone in Foreign Affairs, and also to press for prior agreement on the critical issue of demobilization and integration of the three forces.2
c.
The first Neutralist Party Congress is to open October 14 at Phongsavan with Souvanna as Chairman, Pheng Phongsavan and Kong Le Vice Chairmen, and former RLG Police Director Soukhan Vilaysarn Secretary General.

2. Geneva

At the Conference we have made some progress on the Co-Chairmen’s role, ICC equipment, and prevention of possible Polish efforts to obstruct ICC’s effectiveness by failing to attend working sessions. The principal aspect of last week’s activities was the British and Soviet Co-Chairmen’s [Page 464] bilateral talks and daily consultation among the Western and allied delegation for consideration of MacDonald’s reports on those talks. On October 2 MacDonald presented to Pushkin the Western list of proposed modifications and deletions from the Franco-U.S. draft protocol, including certain concessions counterbalanced by those we desire of the Communist bloc. The list covers most of the points to be discussed before starting on the basic inter-dependent issues that will tell whether a final agreement is possible. Meanwhile, Pushkin is trying to bypass our list to reach those issues directly.3

On the basis of their recent assessment of Soviet tactics in Laos, the British feel we should take advantage of the present Russian mood to conclude a settlement satisfactory to all parties.4 Our delegation disagrees and recommends that we not rush into making concessions at Geneva.5

We have instructed Ambassador Harriman to pursue his discussions with Pushkin to ascertain whether we can in fact negotiate bilaterally with the Russians on issues of special concern to us and that will in the final analysis be acceptable to the Conference as a whole. Harriman has been asked to concentrate particularly on: (a) the demobilization and integration of the three Lao forces; (b) the composition of the Lao government; (c) Communist infiltration into South Viet-Nam; and (d) the future role of the Co-Chairmen.6

L.D. Battle7
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 10/61. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.↩
  2. As reported in telegrams 562 and 563 from Vientiane, October 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–861)↩
  3. In telegram 322 to Vientiane, October 8. (Ibid., 751J.00/10–361)↩
  4. This summary is based on the “weekly evaluation” in Confe 701, October 7. (Ibid., 751J.00/10–761)↩
  5. As outlined in Fecon 473, October 3, in which the Department of State passed on a summary of a British summary analysis of Soviet policy and intentions at Geneva. (Ibid., 751J.00/10–361)↩
  6. As Harriman was in Washington at the time, the U.S. Delegation presented the rejoinder to the British, as reported in Confe 700, October 6. (Ibid., 751J.00/10–661)↩
  7. See Document 200.↩
  8. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. Manfull signed for Battle.↩