194. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0

There is attached a copy of a talking paper from which, within the limits of the time available, we would propose to discuss the situation in Southeast Asia with the President this afternoon.1 However, the principal purpose of the meeting is to obtain the President’s general approval for the line of action it is proposed that Ambassador Harriman take at Geneva, especially in bilateral discussions with the Soviets. A copy of the draft instructions to Harriman (which, as of this writing, have not yet been seen or approved by the Secretary) is attached.2

As noted in the paper, other courses of action will subsequently be discussed, hopefully early next week, with the President.

U. Alexis Johnson3

Attachment4

SOUTHEAST ASIA

Present Situation

A. Laos—Political

1.
With respect Geneva, Soviets continue indicate desire reach agreement and there is some concrete move forward. However, there are still some essential points that have not been resolved at Geneva. These include:
a.
The ICC voting procedure.
b.
Adequate authority and functions for the ICC, including fixed teams, especially on the Viet Minh transit routes into South Viet-Nam.
c.
Communist insistence on withdrawal of SEATO protocol protection from Laos.
d.
Presence of French training mission.
2.
With respect Laos, in spite of Harriman mission and urgings from French and U.K. Ambassadors, Souvanna Phouma has not as yet agreed to a satisfactory composition of a government of national unity.
3.
In Laos, there is also not yet anything approaching an understanding between the parties on the vital question of demobilization of the various armed forces.
4.
The “three Princes” are meeting at Ban Hin Heup on October 6 to begin discussion of formation of a Government.

B. Laos—Military

1.
While FAR capabilities have increased and numerically it is far superior to the PL, the enemy still retains military superiority.
2.
While the enemy has capability of initiating offensive action any time of his own choosing, he does not yet show any clear signs of doing so and cease-fire generally remains in effect although there is some increase in small probing actions on both sides.
3.
Soviet and Viet Minh supply activities remain at high level and Soviet air lift has been extended to Tchepone.
4.
There probably have been some Viet Minh withdrawals from northern Laos but Viet Minh movement into southern Laos bordering on South Viet-Nam has increased. Thus it appears enemy may be accepting stalemate for time being within Laos and giving priority to stepping up offensive action against South Viet-Nam.

C. South Viet-Nam—Political

1.
According to Saigon country team, Diem Government has not significantly improved its political position among people or substantially furthered national unity.
2.
Also, according to country team, Diem has still not delegated sufficient authority to field command and country team does not feel that “September saw progress toward attainment task force goals of creating viable and increasingly democratic society.”

D. South Viet-Nam—Military

1.
Although GVN military capabilities have increased, Viet Cong capabilities are increasing at more rapid rate and Viet Cong attacks have increased in size.
2.
Viet Cong “regular” forces have increased from about 7,000 at beginning of year to approximately 17,000.
3.
Viet Cong have moved from stage of small bands to large units. During September Viet Cong mounted three attacks with over 1,000 [Page 442] men in each. Viet Cong strategy may be directed at “liberating” an area in which a “government” could be installed.
4.
Although vast majority of Viet Cong troops are of local origin, the infiltration of Viet Cong cadres from North Viet-Nam via Laos, the demilitarized zone, and by sea appears to be increasing. However, there is little evidence of major supplies from outside sources, most arms apparently being captured or stolen from GVN forces or from the French during the Indo-China war.

E. Thailand—Political

1. Thailand has indicated increased dissatisfaction with SEATO, desire have a bilateral defense pact with the United States, and concern that the Souvanna Phouma Government in Laos will eventually result in the loss of Laos to the Communists. The internal situation in Thailand remains stable.

F. Cambodia—Political

1. Relations with South Viet-Nam are on the downgrade, with increased exchanges of mutual recriminations between Saigon and Phnom Penh.

G. Cambodia—Military

1. Although there have been some Cambodian-Viet Cong clashes within Cambodia, hopes for improved Cambodian border control of Viet Cong appear dim at this time.

II. Additional Courses of Action

A. Laos—Political

1. Primarily through Ambassador Harriman, intensify bilateral negotiations with Soviets with objectives of:

a.
Preventing renewal of hostilities in Laos.
b.
Obtaining Soviet agreement for an ICC able freely to move and report without an internal veto and with cooperation of Lao Government, with particular emphasis upon the infiltration routes from Laos into South Viet-Nam.
c.
An acceptable Souvanna Phouma Government.
d.
Satisfactory arrangements for demobilization and reintegration of Lao forces, particularly to insure Pathet Lao do not retain private army.
e.
Engaging to maximum Soviet responsibility for fulfillment of conditions by Communist side.

(There is attached a draft instruction to Ambassador Harriman to carry out the foregoing objectives.)

Other additional courses of action will subsequently be submitted for the consideration of the President.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.00/10–561. Top Secret. Drafted by Johnson.
  2. The President met with Harriman, Rostow, and U. Alexis Johnson at 6 p.m. No other record of the meeting, which was characterized as “off the record,” has been found. (Kennedy Library, President’s Appointment Book)
  3. Attached but not printed. For the instructions as sent, see Document 200.
  4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
  5. Top Secret.