193. Memorandum From the Head of the Delegation to the Conference on Laos (Harriman) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)0
Just as you left my house last night, you asked if I would have any objection to shooting down Russian planes delivering supplies to Tchepone. In the rush, I answered “no”. I want to say, however, that this matter should be studied carefully before a decision is reached. There is, of course, no breach of the cease-fire for the Russians to supply enemy forces by air flying over territory held by them. The planes of our side [Page 439] that have been shot at have been flying over enemy-held territory in order to deliver supplies well behind enemy positions. The enemy have claimed that these flights over their air space have been breaches of the cease-fire, whereas the RLG has claimed the right to supply their forces that have been cut off.
The value of shooting a plane or two at Tchepone must be weighed against the possibility, if not probability, of the enemy taking retaliatory action of a similar nature against our planes flying into Vientiane, Luang Prabang, or some other town held by the RLG.
I am afraid that the Secretary got the impression that the Russian deliveries were being made to help the Viet Cong. As far as I know, there is no evidence to this effect, and the deliveries are presumably for maintainance of the enemy forces that took Tchepone just prior to the cease-fire. If, of course, the enemy flies over territory held by the RLG, that is a different matter. But to send men out under cover, close to the airfield in area held by the enemy, may well bring retaliatory action that will be more damaging to us and may lead to a major breach in the cease-fire. I don’t see much to be gained by jumping the gun on this kind of thing unless we know where we’re going. At the moment when the three Princes are at last beginning to talk, doesn’t seem an opportune time to start.
I have felt for some time that South Viet Nam could perhaps do more than they have been doing in stopping the flow of Viet Minh along the Laos border. There can obviously be no objection, and in fact there would be benefit, from this type of operation.
In any event, if a program of air attack is being considered, Ambassador Brown should be consulted before any action is taken.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–361. Top Secret.↩