Office of the Historian

213. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Conference on Laos0

Washington, October 27, 1961, 8:40 p.m.

Fecon 532. For Harriman.

Your 7861 emphasizes very well critical stage we have reached both Laos and Geneva. It is of utmost importance that we exercise greatest care as you suggest in leaving no stone unturned in influencing events in Laos in right direction. Although we would be unwise assume Phoumi [Page 484] has abandoned his personal ambitions, believe his latest conversations with Brown (Vientiane’s 631, 632)2 among others are indications that Phoumi for present at least is pursuing general line we desire. Also we feel Phoumi assessment that PL will undoubtedly attempt block Souvanna from attaining truly neutral Laos is essentially accurate. Problem as seen from here seems to be Souvanna’a slowness in drawing up Cabinet list for negotiation and not Phoumi/Boun Oum unwillingness travel Xieng Khouang. Meeting in Luang Prabang with King was good beginning. It did not result in any embarrassment to Souvanna as he had feared. RLG went very far in allowing Russian planes to transport Souvanna troops in order to ensure his security, act which must have been very distasteful to King and RLG. Nevertheless they met in atmosphere cordiality which argues for Luang Prabang being proper place for continuation of unification talks. We also note report that Souphanouvong has left Xieng Khouang for Hanoi (Vientiane’s 624)3 and we are concerned over fact that he does not seem amenable to joining in meetings unless they are held in his territory with all that implies. One of factors in three Princes rapprochement should be recognition of crown and institution of monarchy; this cannot better be symbolized than to have reconciliation meetings vicinity King.

We consider question of any demarche to Phoumi best left to Brown’s discretion in light evolving local situation. If negotiations appear to falter due Phoumi’s intransigence, Brown has adequate instructions authorizing him urge Phoumi in strongest terms negotiate in good faith (Deptel 287).4 Advice to Phoumi re negotiating on Cabinet positions covered Deptel 3225 and others. We in coordination British and French are now working on approaches to Phoumi and Souvanna re demobilization and integration forces (Deptel 371).6 We will be awaiting Brown’s recommendations re establishing direct and continuous contact with Souvanna in light possible effect on our influence over Phoumi and our relationships with British and French. We must avoid lending degree of recognition to Xieng Khouang which it has not yet achieved at present stage of negotiations.

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–2661. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Cross, cleared in draft by Anderson and Cleveland and by McConaughy, and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Repeated niact to Vientiane and priority to Saigon and Bangkok.↩
  2. Document 212.↩
  3. These telegrams, both dated October 26, covered a number of issues, but in them Phoumi conceded that he was prepared to reconsider a visit to the Plaine des Jarres to meet with Souvanna if it might help to establish Souvanna in the royal capital and get him out of the Xieng Khouang atmosphere. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–2661)↩
  4. See footnote 2, Document 212.↩
  5. See footnote 2, Document 189.↩
  6. See footnote 3, Document 203.↩
  7. See footnote 3, Document 210.↩