214. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far
Eastern Affairs (Steeves) to Acting Secretary of State Bowles0
Washington,
November 1,
1961.
SUBJECT
- What is At Stake in Geneva
Situation
Through a series of fallback positions over the period of the past few
months in the drafting committee in which we have receded rather far
from that which we originally determined to be our essential positions,
we are now faced with the necessity of making a decision as to whether
or not we will concede to the Russians the few remaining points
symbolized by the demand for unanimity vote on reports from the ICC. This point, although essential, is
only illustrative of the gradual erosion of our position which has taken
place and is as good a point as any upon which to stand fast if our
purpose is to get an agreement out of Geneva that will provide us with
the necessary and minimum safeguards.
There is attached a study prepared by the Department of Defense1 which
analyzes the concessions which we have made and those areas in which the
Russians in the drafting committee have made concessions to our
views.
While there may be a subsequent point in the drafting negotiations where
we could decide to make the issue, all indications are that the
criticality of the current points may be as good a time as any to review
our position and ascertain whether or not we are coming dangerously near
to taking a step which will be inimical to our future interests.
Factors to be Considered Favoring a
Delay
- 1.
- General Taylor is
returning to report on Friday.2 It is
essential that our plans in Viet-Nam be coordinated with our
position in Laos.
- 2.
- Much of the negotiation in Geneva from here on depends finally on
the participation of a Laos delegation representing a new government
of national unification which has not yet been formed and is
experiencing delays in this process.
- 3.
- The recent development of cleavage between Peking and Moscow may
have crucial effects on the negotiations and a slight delay would
seem advisable until the implications of this rift are a little
clearer.
- 4.
- A reliable intelligence report indicates that a major portion of
the Chinese delegation may be departing from Geneva.
Recommendation
Under these circumstances it would seem advisable to recall Ambassador
Harriman in order to review
our entire position and determine our future course. The benefits which
might accrue from a delay and this consultation are: (1) allow an
opportunity to assess outside factors mentioned above, and (2) to
indicate to the communists that our position is hardening and that we
will not make unlimited concessions merely for the sake of
agreement.
While recommending this course of action, factors which argue against
delay should also be stated. These are: (1) Some progress has been made
towards reaching agreements and Ambassador Harriman’s conviction is that if the momentum is stopped
at this juncture the effect may be counterproductive. (2) Delegations
such as the British, French and Canadians would not approve our taking a
more severe line and believe that we should accept the present framework
of agreement as about the best that we can get. This is also Ambassador
Harriman’s view.
Attachment3
Washington,
October 27,
1961.
Memorandum From the Acting Director
of the Far Eastern Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs (McCormick), to the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
(Williams)
SUBJECT
- Status of Laos Negotiation Issues
This paper summarizes the concessions made by the United States and
by the Communists, based upon the original neutrality declaration
and terms of reference documents tabled by the two sides.
[Page 487]
A. Concessions by the United
States:
- 1.
- Enclosure 1 lists 27 major and minor concessions by the United
States.4 Most significant concessions include
- a.
- Public announcement by SEATO members of their acceptance and
willingness to respect Laotian renunciation of SEATO protection.
- b.
- Acceptance of the necessity for the ICC to operate only “with
the concurrence” of the RLG.
- c.
- Acceptance of a somewhat ambiguous article on logistic
support for the ICC (RLG
to be primary source and no provisions for
maintenance).
- d.
- Deletion of prescribed entry and departure points for
military personnel and equipment.
- e.
- Deletion of prescribed operations centers (ICC may, however, get
authority to establish logistic support bases).
- f.
- Elimination of fixed teams.
- g.
- Acceptance (only in principle thus far) that a
majority vote of the ICC
or a request from the RLG will be necessary to start
investigations.
- h.
- Acceptance of view that unanimous vote of the ICC will be required in
some cases (Polish veto).
- i.
- Deletion of requirement that ICC be provided a census of military forces
and equipment.
B. Communist Concessions:
- 1.
- Acceptance of a provision requiring ICC member countries to have substitute ICC and team members promptly
available.
- 2.
- Acceptance of a provision giving the Commission and its teams
authority necessary for investigation, inspection and
verification, and free access to all parts of Laos as necessary
for performance of their duties. (It must be noted however that
this article is circumscribed by others which, thus far, make
this authority applicable only to investigations of cease-fire
violations, and of entry and withdrawal of foreign troops. These
ICC actions also require
concurrence of the RLG. Further, the Communists have not yet
agreed to stationing any permanent ICC personnel outside of Vientiane.)
- 3.
- Acceptance of a provision that ICC logistic support not available from the RLG may
be obtained elsewhere.
- 4.
- Acceptance of principle of PW’s being permitted to go to
destination of choice (this apparent concession, however, is
well-hedged by requirement that PW’s first must be turned over
to their national authorities).
- 5.
- Acceptance (so far only oral) of a provision in the neutrality
declaration renouncing the use of Laotian territory for
operations against neighboring states.
[Page 488]
C. Significant Issues Remaining to
be Negotiated:
- 1.
- Extent of matters which will require unanimous ICC vote.
- 2.
- Form and number of bases or centers which ICC may operate outside
Vientiane.
- 3.
- Inclusion of provision giving ICC some general responsibility for overseeing
implementation of neutrality declarations by Laos and other
nations.
- 4.
- Form and scope of minority reports by members of ICC teams and ICC.
- 5.
- Length of tenure of ICC and
procedure for its termination.
- 6.
- Time at which Articles requiring withdrawal of U.S. military
assistance and personnel shall become effective.
- 7.
- French presence (or establishment of a neutral military
training mission).
31 Oct Addendum: Ambassador Harriman has just repeated his recommendation
that he be authorized to accept Pushkin’s latest proposals with minor
amendment.6 Approval would entail, inter alia,
U.S. acceptance of:
- a.
- A requirement that the ICC submit “agreed” reports, with all
ICC conclusions and
recommendations subject to the unanimity rule (Polish
veto). The article establishing this requirement would
also contain the ambiguous statement “nevertheless, if
differences on particular questions emerge among the
members of the Commission, these differences may be
appropriately reflected on the report.”
- b.
- Deletion of all reference to ICC operations centers or logistic centers
outside Vientiane.
- c.
- A voting formula less acceptable than that in the 1954
Geneva Agreement wherein only reports of cease-fire
violations “which might lead to resumption of
hostilities” required unanimity. Under the current
proposal all conclusions regarding cease-fire violations
would require unanimity.
Added to the concessions already made (Encl 1), the net result
would be nearly complete acceptance of the original Soviet draft
and abandonment of nearly all of the original U.S. position.
