217. Memorandum for the Record0
SUBJECT
- Geneva Negotiations on Laos
On the evening of November 1, the President telephoned to Ambassador Harriman at Geneva to discuss the question of the draft section on reports by the ICC. (For ready reference following is the text which Ambassador Harriman desired to accept.)
“The International Commission shall submit agreed reports on investigations. Nevertheless, if differences on particular questions emerge among the members of the Commission these differences may be appropriately reflected in the reports.
“Conclusions and recommendations of the Commission on investigations shall be adopted unanimously in accordance with Article ______ on voting.”
The President expressed his concern as to whether the Poles could block the issuance of a report containing minority Canadian views in view of the use of the term “agreed” in the first sentence of the draft. Ambassador Harriman explained his view that this would not be possible and that all the principal delegations including the Soviets agreed on this. Ambassador Harriman explained that the U.S. was the only delegation withholding its agreement and that he felt it urgent we should proceed.
Following the conversation, DepTel Fecon 5541 was sent to Ambassador Harriman.
In response to that telegram, Ambassador Harriman telephoned the President at 8:00 a.m. on November 2. Ambassador Harriman stated that the draft gave Pushkin the “facade” that he was seeking while giving us the “substance” that we were seeking. He stated that investigations could be initiated and carried out at the request of the RLG or a majority of the ICC. With respect to reporting, all three parties could freely express their individual views to the degree that they desired, but that this would be incorporated in a single document which Pushkin desired to have called an “agreed report.” Pushkin took the position that it would be “impossible to imagine” such a report being held up by the refusal of one member of the ICC to sign. While the first sentence used the term “agreed”, the next sentence made it completely clear that minority views could be freely expressed. Ambassador Harriman stated that all the delegations agreed on this and that the Indians would confirm in writing. Ambassador Harriman stated that in addition to Lall, Desai of the Indian Foreign Office confirmed the Indian interpretation of this article. The controlling word was “shall” in the first sentence. Ambassador Harriman stated that all of his staff also agreed on this.
The President expressed his concern that if the Communists do violate the agreement that the Canadians and/or Indians be able promptly to report what they found and that the language of any document agreed upon would not inhibit this. Ambassador Harriman stated that if one member of the ICC refused to sign a report it would be a breach of the agreement and a breaking of the obligations of the members of the ICC. Ambassador Harriman expressed his concern that the conference could “blow up” and it was important to get ahead. He also expressed his concern that Phoumi was dragging his feet with regard to formation of a government and it was important that Phoumi act in good faith in this regard. While Phoumi can make excuses, the important thing is that he gets ahead. Ambassador Harriman also expressed his concern over [Page 495] the Meo shelling of Xieng Khouang. The President said that he understood one of the blocks was that Souphanouvong had gone to Hanoi.
The President said that Harriman should obtain from the Indians confirmation in writing of the interpretation of this article, and in the meanwhile, authorized Ambassador Harriman to go ahead and agree to the draft language of the article. The President asked Ambassador Harriman to send him a cable on the subject.2
The President requested Mr. Johnson to see what additional we could do to stop Meo attacks or other actions that might upset the situation and to get Phoumi moving better on the formation of a government.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 11/61. Secret. Prepared by U. Alexis Johnson. Sent to McGeorge Bundy at the White House by Battle under cover of a memorandum of November 2. In that memorandum, Battle explained that Johnson had not had an opportunity to review or sign the memorandum after dictating it that morning.↩
- Fecon 554, November 1, outlined the President’s concerns. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–1161)↩
- See Documents 218 and 219.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩