Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

159. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, August 11, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Southeast Asia

On Monday, August 7, you asked for: (a) a military plan designed to cover action in the panhandle of Laos and to apply military pressure against North Viet-Nam; (b) a memorandum on the situation in Geneva; and (c) a statement of the means by which the U.S. can bring the intervention of North Viet-Nam in Laos and South Viet-Nam to the attention of world opinion.¹

The initial response to the first request was the briefing you received from the military on Thursday.²

With respect to that briefing I would make two observations:

• —The spectrum of measures designed to put increasing pressure on the Vietminh needs careful study in order to assess the effects at each stage; and the political framework for such measures is still to be developed.
• —The panhandle operation is on such a scale that it doesn’t really give us what we are looking for; that is, an application of force in the area, which is more effective than the FAL operating alone, but less massive than SEATO Plan 5. There may be no serious alternative; but we should look a bit harder.

The attached statements prepared by the Department of State respond to the other two questions you posed.³

The first of these statements, dealing with negotiations on Laos, is straightforward and satisfactory. The second, containing suggestions for publicizing North Viet-Nam’s aggression, demonstrates quite graphically some of the difficulties with our present planning on Southeast Asia.

The first two and one half pages of this statement deal in a very general way with the techniques we might employ to publicize Vietminh activities; but the discussion is quite unrelated to any over-all objective or strategy. Its authors recognize that any program for informing world opinion must be related to a specific plan of action which might involve a phased buildup of military, political and diplomatic actions. But there is no indication of what those actions might be.

In consequence, the emphasis is primarily on publicity techniques. The paper refers, for example, to the use of the UN in making our case against North Viet-Nam; but it does not suggest how we would play that case in the UN; what kind of UN action we would seek; what we would do if we did not get that action.

The last part of the paper is essentially an outline of a military plan for an initial, limited, semi-covert military mop-up in Southern Laos. This has been developed by Cottrell in State; but it has no JCS blessing. It is proposed that the propaganda support for this operation be restricted to a generalized argument about the importance of the freedom of Southeast Asia. It does not link naturally to the case against Hanoi.

Where, then, do we stand?

1. We have a Laos conference position, to test whether a settlement acceptable to us is possible. To this the British and French agree, and the others on our side will come along a bit painfully.

2. We have a military contingency plan (5/16) [5/61] if the offensive is overtly resumed on a substantial scale. To this the British agree and, presumably, the rest of SEATO, except the French whom we would probably ask to stand down without veto. But this plan does not protect the Viet-Nam-Laos border.

3. We have the beginnings of a panhandle plan; but this is as heavy in Americans as SEATO 5/16. The question is whether this is politically viable and acceptable to you if what we face is either a de facto split or a creeping offensive in the South, rather than a major overt offensive.

4. We have some proposals for increasing degrees of direct pressure on North Viet-Nam; but these have not been fully assessed for their military and economic consequences. Nor have they been linked into a political and diplomatic framework. They would presumably be contemplated if the scale of Vietminh frontier-crossing—into Laos or Viet-Nam—should be increased.

5. We are vigorously collecting data on Hanoi’s aggression; but we have no orderly plan to use it in any of the three possible forums:

• —ICC Viet-Nam;
• —Geneva Conference;
• —UN

6. In a charming bureaucratic ploy we have a military mission going to Southeast Asia; but its instructions are not now linked in any systematic way into the thought of the town.⁴ (They may be better coordinated after a meeting this afternoon between General Lemnitzer, General Taylor, Alexis Johnson, and myself.)⁵

7. In short, we are making piecemeal progress in Southeast Asia planning; but we desperately lack a central mechanism to give the operation pace and coherence.

8. You may be interested in reading the attached memorandum I did for General Taylor on August 9 (copy to Alexis Johnson) on a SEATO (or Allied) Southeast Asia patrol force.⁶ This modest and pacific operation might help stabilize the area, if we get a wobbly Laos settlement. It could be the least offensive military action we might take after surfacing the evidence on Hanoi’s aggression.

Enclosure A⁷

Negotiations on Laos—Recent Developments

The following has been prepared in response to paragraph 1 of the President’s memorandum of August 7 to Mr. Rostow and General Taylor. Ambassador Harriman plans to cable additional material on August 12.⁸

The Geneva Conference has settled down to discussing the various draft proposals relating to neutrality and controls. All of the drafts will be taken up provision by provision; where differences develop, debate will be limited and the Conference will move on to the next item leaving points in dispute to be settled later. Owing to the number of participants, the number of provisions involved (33), and Soviet obstructive tactics, the Conference is moving slowly. It is now dealing with relatively non-controversial matters related to the status of Laos as a neutral, but even these have been difficult to agree on. The only accomplishment of the Conference last week was agreement on the preamble to a Lao Declaration of Neutrality.

As for the ICC, the Conference has not yet reached the provisions on controls which will be the most controversial and will bring into the open our basic differences with the Communists on the question of the international presence required in Laos.

The central issue regarding the ICC is its power to supervise and control (a) the terms of a cease-fire agreement, (b) the withdrawal of foreign forces, and (c) the introduction of foreign military personnel, materiel and equipment. Our position is that unless the ICC has the power to act, any international agreement on the neutrality of Laos is meaning-less. Thus we have instructed Ambassador Harriman that we can accept any control formula which insures the ICC’s unrestricted ability to move, to investigate and to report. The principal characteristics of such a formula are that the Commission must have:

a) Its own transport and communications equipment and unconditional control thereof;

b) Free and immediate access to all areas of Laos;

c) Authority to make decisions by majority vote and issue majority and minority reports;

d) Adequate teams and equipment to do the job;

e) Its security assured by the Lao Government.

We have told Ambassador Harriman that we cannot accept any formula which would limit the Commission’s ability to supervise agreements reached at the Conference by built-in veto powers, requirements for unanimous decisions, limitations on transport or freedom of movement.

Although this subject has not yet been debated at length in the Conference, there is adequate reason to believe that the other side is determined that the ICC should be weak and ineffectual. Their strongly negative attitude towards certain interim powers proposed for the ICC and the drafts they have presented fully confirm our fears on this score.

The other basic issue to be settled is the formation of a government of national union. While this issue is not directly before the Conference, it has an important, if not crucial, bearing on the outcome of the Conference since clearly the Communists are pushing for a coalition government in the expectation that such a government would be weighted in their favor and would support their positions at the Conference. Phoumi and Souvanna met at Phnom Penh late last week without Souphanouvong to negotiate this issue. Their discussions were clearly inconclusive, but appeared to provide the basis for further meetings. The talks were relatively satisfactory as they involved neither premature concessions by Phoumi nor a breaking of contact. Ambassador Brown, however, doubts whether Phoumi is really negotiating with Souvanna in good faith and suspects that Phoumi may be stringing things out during the rainy season intending to turn to military action in the fall.

The issue of controls and the formation of a Lao Government were considered by the Secretary with the British and French Foreign Ministers in Paris over the week-end. They agreed on a paper recommending that the three governments seek a basis which would permit them to support Souvanna Phouma as the Prime Minister of a neutral Government of National Union. The basis for such support would be prior understandings with Souvanna and other Lao leaders on four major matters:

A) The composition of the Government;

B) The role of the ICC;

C) The Lao army and the problem of the PL forces;

D) French military presence.

A) Lao Government. We would support a government under Souvanna which respected the Monarchy and the Constitution, and in which none of the key portfolios (e.g., Foreign Affairs, Defense and Interior) would be given to Communists or fellow travelers. Phoumi should be given a key portfolio. There should be a large center group made up of political figures associated neither with the Communists nor the present government. A few Communists could be in the Cabinet with minor portfolios and balanced by an equal number of Phoumi’s group. Elections would be postponed until tranquillity has been restored to the country.

B) ICC. The British and the French generally accepted the principles enumerated in the fourth paragraph above.

C) The Lao Army and the Pathet Lao Forces. A small army loyal to the central government should be formed and all other military forces should be disbanded. This should be done in a way to minimize PL influence.

D) The French Presence. The French Military Mission should be maintained under conditions satisfactory to the French.

It was agreed that the French would make the initial approach to Souvanna which the British would follow up. Our Ambassador (Brown) would approach Phoumi, and the French Ambassador to Laos (Falaize) would go to Xieng Khouang on August 10 to see Souvanna.

On August 9 Ambassador Brown reviewed the proposals with Phoumi, who was bitterly critical of the retention of the French Military Mission and of Falaize’s trip to Xieng Khouang but made no comment on the proposed composition of the government or powers of the ICC.

In his memorandum the President asks whether Ambassador Harriman should be requested to return home, presumably for consultation. We do not believe that the Ambassador should return at this particular moment. He has just seen the Secretary, and was in Washington for Phoumi’s visit. Furthermore, we believe that the next week or two should give us an indication of the kind of government we are likely to get in Laos. We believe the Geneva Conference should be allowed to proceed with as much momentum as possible. Ambassador Harriman’s presence therefore seems needed in Geneva for the present.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia: General, 8/8/61–8/15/61. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that it was sent to Hyannis Port as part of the President’s weekend reading for August 8.
1. See Document 155.
2. See Document 157.
3. These undated statements were entitled “Negotiations on Laos—Recent Developments” and “World Opinion of Southeast Asia.” The first is printed as an enclosure, the second is not.
4. On August 1, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric requested that the JCS undertake a study of force requirements and logistical problems required to hold Southeast Asia—Thailand, South Vietnam, Cambodia, and the southern part of Laos—from Communist attack. Brigadier General WILLIAM H. CRAIG of the Joint Staff headed the mission. (Memorandum from McNamara to Lemnitzer, August 1, enclosure to JCS 2339/12, August 9; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JMF 9150/3410 (1 Aug 1961))
5. See Document 160.
6. Not printed. The patrol would be primarily aimed at interdicting infiltration from North Vietnam, providing the “court of world opinion” tangible evidence of that infiltration, giving South Vietnam and Thailand a “plate glass” commitment, and providing them psychological reassurance at minimum U.S. cost.
7. Secret.
8. See Document 161.