Office of the Historian

160. Memorandum for the Record0

Washington, August 12, 1961.

SUBJECT

  • Meeting on Southeast Asia, August 11, 1961

PRESENT

  • General Lemnitzer
  • General Parker
  • Secretary Alexis Johnson
  • Mr. Steeves
  • Mr. Rostow
  • General Taylor
  • General Fontana
1.
The purpose of the meeting was to carry on the discussion of the Joint Chiefs’ plan for Southeast Asia presented to the President on August 10.1 It was established at the outset that General Lemnitzer felt that the friendly forces involved in this plan would be sufficient to accomplish the objectives of the plan. It was agreed that these objectives were or should be:
a.
To minimize territorial loss in North Laos.
b.
To protect the flanks of South Vietnam and Thailand.
c.
To stabilize Southern Laos.
d.
To encourage military cooperation among Laos, Thailand and South Vietnam.
e.
To minimize U.S. military involvement.
2.
In the subsequent discussion it was stated that there were several degrees of U.S. military participation which should be considered. In ascending order they were the forces necessary:
a.
To reassure Sarit, Phoumi and Diem.
b.
To obtain a maximum effort from the indigenous forces. (This was considered to require a major increase of military advisers with Lao units, probably extending them to company level. The figure of 2,000 additional military spaces, mostly U.S., was indicated as the probable requirement.)
c.
To supplement the deficiencies in indigenous forces.
d.
To act as an area emergency reserve.
3.
It was agreed that the pressing requirement is for a comprehensive area plan based upon the assumption of a partition of Laos followed either by a visible stepped-up invasion from the North or by an increase of surreptitious infiltration with added pressures on areas presently in RGL hands. The conferees noted the danger of a quick attack at the end of the rainy season against key points such as Vientiane and Paksane.
4.
Mr. Johnson expressed the view that only in the first case, visible invasion, would it be possible to invoke SEATO Plan 5 because of the probable reluctance of our Allies and of the American people to direct military involvement. In the second case, increased infiltration, it would be necessary to rely upon indigenous forces without any significant involvement of American troops.
5.
The two situations were discussed and agreement generally reached along the following lines. In the first case, the military answer would be SEATO Plan 5, supplemented by the use of Thai forces to defend Laotian areas west of the Mekong, both in the north and in the south. Also, Diem would be encouraged to push out into the Panhandle for the purpose of clearing and holding that area. Hanoi would have been warned in advance that invasion would bring in SEATO forces and air attacks on targets in North Vietnam.
6.
In the second case, the military plan would be to stiffen the FAL by additional military advisers on the scale indicated in paragraph 2 b above. Also, Diem’s army would be increased over present levels to allow him the necessary freedom of action in the Panhandle. On the Thai side, Sarit would be offered additional assistance. Sarit and the others would have to be assured that SEATO Plan 5 would be invoked if, at any time, a major attack were launched from the North.
7.
Accepting these two outline plans as reasonable points of departure for military planning, Mr. Johnson undertook to develop an interdepartmental plan which would relate appropriate political, economic and propaganda measures to the military plans discussed. While indicating that no formal interdepartmental task force was necessary, he agreed that the State representative, Mr. Steeves, should work closely with representatives of Defense, USIA, ICA and Treasury.
M.D.T.2
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia: General, 8/8/61–8/15/61. Secret. Prepared by Taylor.↩
  2. See Document 157.↩
  3. Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.↩