275. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan0

272. Karachi’s 19771 and 1984.2

On basis reports from Kabul and Karachi we judge that atmosphere on Afghan side has not improved sufficiently to justify carrying forward with our suggested initiative on Af-Pak border impasse. We see no advantage in trying this out until Afghanistan has reciprocated conciliatory Pak gestures. Before putting idea aside, however, we believe Ambassador Steeves should make another try at convincing new Afghan leaders that favorable opportunity for improvement Af-Pak relations now exists but will be lost unless Afghan response to conciliatory Pak gestures is forthcoming. April 1 Afghan statement is not enough. There must be perceptible toning down of Pushtunistan broadcasts beamed to Frontier Area. This action is sina qua non to further progress particularly on question restoration Afghan consular offices in frontier area. Without moderation Afghan propaganda, Paks may end their own self-imposed moratorium. While perhaps desirable from RGA viewpoint to maintain fiction that normal relations with Pakistan and Pushtunistan are separate issues, fact remains that events August-September 1961 were direct GOP reaction to intensified Afghan propaganda and increase in Afghan-inspired incidents in tribal area during previous year. We do not wish cloud picture with Pushtunistan issue, but RGA should have no doubts of our view that this issue is heart of problem. Accordingly progress on transit impasse will require some adjustment, though not necessarily abandonment, Pushtunistan campaign.

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In carrying forward these discussions with RGA, Ambassador Steeves may find it necessary to remind them again that border remains closed at Afghan insistence and that though it is in over-all Pak interest improve relations with Afghans, there are few if any immediate pressures compelling one-sided Pak generosity.

When and if there is evidence that in fact offensive Afghan propaganda is toning down we will reassess situation and decide if course of action proposed Deptel 268 to Kabul3 can be moved forward. In this connection we concur modification point b of formula along lines suggested Karachi tel 1984 to Department. In meanwhile we hope Embassy Karachi will continue urge GOP maintain cease-fire on propaganda pending further developments.

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL AFG-PAK. Secret. Drafted by Carle and Cameron and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Karachi and repeated to Tehran.
  2. Telegram 1977, April 12, reported that a review of radio broadcasts from Kabul to Pakistan during the previous few days provided no evidence of any moderation of Afghan propaganda on the Pushtunistan issue. (Ibid.)
  3. See footnote 3, Document 273.
  4. Document 273.