Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

274. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State⁰

London, April 11, 1963, 7 p.m.

3989. Department Pass Defense. Embassy telegram 3984.¹ During two-hour meeting² which Secretary McNamara group had April 10 with British group headed by Sandys and including Mountbatten and General Hull,³ there was general agreement on important aspects of US/UK military assistance programs to India which laid the groundwork for subsequent discussions by the Bundy group with the British. Major points of interest in these meetings not covered in agreed record reported reftel were as follows (should be noted this telegram not reviewed by Secretary McNamara or Bundy):

1. Secretary McNamara stated UK and Commonwealth should take the lead in future military assistance to India; US would not wish to spend any funds beyond Nassau ceiling until a firm plan had been agreed between the US and UK. Sandys noted his relief at this statement and indicated he had thought the British would have to restrain the US regarding future military assistance. Secretary McNamara said that assuming political decisions on further aid to India were reached, US would be prepared to support such an agreed plan on same 50-50 basis as Nassau agreement.

2. In commenting on implications of US/UK air defense scheme for India, Sandys stressed that it was necessary to consider carefully where introduction of US and UK units might lead us. In particular, he noted that actual engagement of US/UK aircraft with Chicoms might lead to “war with China,” with possibility Chicom retaliation against Hong Kong. He also said that an air defense commitment might lead US/UK close to a “defense pact” with India. He suggested these implications lead back to thought that only logical Indian defense arrangement is one covering subcontinent as a whole with US/UK participation. Secretary McNamara responded that the introduction of US/UK units should be only a remote contingency; present priorities should go to strengthening existing units of the Indian Air Force.

3. Following extended discussion, agreement was reached that strong efforts should be made to restrain Indian planning to a level of approximately 16 army divisions, which would include three for Kashmir. Discussion of manpower level for ground forces initially centered on figure of 650,000, but it was agreed this might be low and needed further refinement.

4. In response to Sandys question if US had calculated any financial total for possible future US/UK military assistance, Secretary McNamara said that although no precise calculations had yet been made, his own very rough estimate might be about $150 million, spread over a three-year period, for both nations. Sandys later emphasized that the UK is not now committed to any specific method of sharing costs of further military aid to India beyond Nassau limits.

5. General Taylor stated that priority of effort should now be given to maximizing the effectiveness of existing Indian units, particularly the six mountain divisions. Secretary McNamara repeatedly emphasized the serious logistic and training deficiencies of the Indian Air Force.

6. Both Sandys and Snelling emphasized that any discussions with Indians of force levels and any actions with respect to military assistance should be most carefully related to political developments, particularly Kashmir.

7. In meeting with Bundy, Snelling indicated that while final decision not yet made, Sandys proposes to attend CENTO meeting, primarily for discussion of Kashmir question with Paks, and to proceed to Delhi about same time as Secretary Rusk’s visit.

Bruce

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1-4 INDIA. Secret. Repeated to New Delhi for USMSMI, Karachi, and CINCEUR.
1. Telegram 3984, April 11, transmitted the agreed record of a series of meetings in London of a U.S.-U.K. working group on military aid to India. The U.S. participants in the working group were headed by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense William Bundy. The British contingent was headed by Sir Arthur Snelling, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. (Ibid., DEF 19 US-INDIA)
2. A memorandum of the conversation which took place during this meeting is ibid., DEF 12 INDIA.
3. Lord Mountbatten, Chief of the Defense Staff, and General Sir Richard Hull, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.