Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

273. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan⁰

Washington, April 10, 1963, 8:23 p.m.

268. We may have reached point where the two essential elements for solution on transit impasse are in sight, i.e., Pak willingness restore Afghan representation in Peshawar and Afghan action to moderate Pushtunistan campaign. GOP has shown desire normalize relations and willingness not be difficult on question Peshawar consulate (Karachi tel 1935 to Dept¹ rptd Tehran 119, Kabul 151). At same time Paks have indicated they prepared accept continuation of Pushtunistan campaign but have defined limits of tolerance, i.e., no active incitement by Afghans in tribal areas and some abatement propaganda. On Afghan side, policy of nonincitement of tribes apparently has prevailed for some time and has been given official sanction by Prime Minister Yusuf in initial speech when he underscored peaceful pursuit Pushtunistan aspirations. If initial reports (Kabul tel 447 to Dept² rptd Karachi 185, Tehran 167) that RGA radio propaganda moderating are borne out, then gap between disputants seems narrow.

If this assessment valid, we think some steps should be taken shortly attempt capitalize on developments. We are concerned that propaganda slip or unfortunate statement by leader of either side could reverse current trend. We think US can at this stage supplement Iranian effort. We have no wish take over job from Iranians, but our better communications may assure clarity at critical juncture.

We have in mind direct and confidential approach to GOP and RGA Foreign Ministers by Ambassadors McConaughy and Steeves to determine whether they willing discuss in Tehran settlement within framework set of principles which both governments would agree to in advance of Tehran meeting.

As we see it, such set of principles might include following:

a. Mutual agreement to resume diplomatic relations;

b. GOP agreement to restoration Afghan consulate at Peshawar (and perhaps at Quetta) and Afghan trade agencies in Chaman, Parachinar and Peshawar;

c. RGA agreement, if GOP so desires, re-establishment Pak consulates in Afghanistan;

d. Mutual agreement that officials stationed in each others territory will be received in accordance with established international usage and will function in accordance with established international usage;

e. Mutual agreement that both countries will abjure propaganda which creates hatred and incites to violence against each other. FYI: This is formula in Gentleman’s Agreement ending 1955 dispute. End FYI.

f. Any matters of mutual concern between the GOP and RGA in the future will be handled through normal diplomatic channels.

FYI: If either party raises question of RGA agreement to withdrawal of trade agencies if completion rail spurs make their functions unnecessary, US position is that we willing complete Spin-Baldak spur as soon as possible, and will consider economic and engineering feasibility of improving and extending Khyber railway into Afghanistan. We would hope however latter project would not prove necessary. End FYI.

It would be explained to both governments that foregoing proposals are being submitted in identical fashion on US initiative to each country and do not have prior agreement of other party. Nevertheless we believe that they provide equitable and honorable route to normal relations. If both governments indicate substantial agreement on basic principles, we will request their permission to present formula to Aram with suggestion that he invite both governments to send plenipotentiary representatives to Tehran to “continue negotiations initiated in New York between Naim and Mohammed Ali.”

If foregoing works out, we would envisage short tripartite meeting in Tehran chaired by Aram from which would be issued a communique embodying agreed principles and containing expression of appreciation from both sides for Iranian efforts.

For Karachi and Kabul

Embassies’ comments on foregoing proposal and timing requested soonest.³

For Tehran

Embassy’s comments requested on foregoing proposal, especially as regards avoidance appearance of taking over from Iranians.⁴ If all three Embassies consider proposal worth trying, Ambassador might tell Aram frankly what we are considering and reasons therefore.

Ball

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL AFG-PAK. Secret. Drafted by Carle, Naas, and Gatch; cleared by Cameron and with GTI and AID; and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Tehran and Karachi.
1. Dated April 7. (Ibid.)
2. Dated April 6. (Ibid.)
3. The Embassy in Kabul cabled back concurrence in the substance and timing of the proposals outlined in telegram 268, but questioned whether the text of an agreed set of principles should be released in a concluding communiqué. (Telegram 455 from Kabul, April 11; ibid.) The Embassy in Karachi also concurred that a U.S. initiative could usefully supplement the continuing good offices effort on the part of Iran. But the Embassy felt that there was little chance of securing the agreement of the Ayub government to the proposed set of principles unless there was evidence of moderation of the Afghan propaganda campaign concerning Pushtunistan, and unless point b. in the set of principles was modified to read: “GOP agreement restoration such Afghan representation, including at Peshwar, as may be agreed appropriate and necessary.” (Telegram 1984 from Karachi, April 12; ibid.)
4. Ambassador Holmes cabled from Tehran that, in his opinion, it would be a mistake for the United States to attempt to take over the Iranian mediation role to the extent proposed. (Telegram 876 from Tehran, April 13; ibid.)