Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

276. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State⁰

New Delhi, April 15, 1963, 11 p.m.

3985. I had a long (hour and a-half), difficult and by no means encouraging discussion with Nehru this evening, all of it devoted to Kashmir. Once or twice he got very angry, shouted and pounded the table but in the end calmed down. The following emerged:

(1) I put up to him the importance of a prompt move toward a settlement and spelled out view that this could only be accomplished by dividing the Valley with appropriate arrangements. (I avoided words “substantial position” to be sure of a fair split. This may have been a mistake.)

Thanks apparently to my careful preparatory work, he was admirably equipped with all the adverse arguments: the ancient integrity of the community, the small area and (there may be some merit in this) the hostility to the idea in the Valley itself. He noted also that any retreat from the past left the Valley indefensible. I countered these arguments without much difficulty. There are innumerable places—Bengal, Assam, Punjab borders—which are equally indefensible. Partition solved the problems of Bengal and the Punjab. The effect can be softened. I was proposing this only because no better opportunity seemed in evidence. Etc., etc.

(2) He then asked why we were pressing so hard. I replied that it was because we had important tasks ahead and Kashmir stood in the way of completing them. He then said it would have been easier to solve the issue if it hadn’t become involved in the problem of arms aid and related decisions. I pointed out that they were inextricably involved by nature. We were serious about defense and had to pay for any misuse.¹

(3) He then asked, this involving considerable anger, why we assumed the Pakistanis were right and the Indians wrong. I reverted to impossibility of solution that excluded either from the Valley and added that Indians had in fact alienated world opinion. Their UN representation had won the battles and lost the wars. The American people could never understand any issue that wasn’t decided by a vote.

(4) The latter point produced a remarkable turn to the discussion. He said he too would prefer a vote. I said this was most encouraging news and I would promptly report it. We had avoided pressing him on a plebiscite because we didn’t think it was acceptable.

(5) I probably moved in too rapidly on this. In any case Nehru backwatered. He said such a course would have to meet the approval of the Kashmir government and his cabinet colleagues who were less favorable. I pointed out that the people of Kashmir could hardly object to voting on their own fate and his cabinet colleagues were, one assumed, subject to persuasion on his part. He then elaborately emphasized the personal nature of his remark and said he would have to consult with his colleagues.

(6) There was a great deal more debate which would be far too dreary to repeat. I returned repeatedly to the question of whether he wanted me to report to Washington that GOI although avowing a desire for settlement had nothing to offer. He kept reiterating that they had offered a great deal and I in turn pointed out ad nauseum that they had not offered anything in the Valley and no Pakistan government could accept any solution that excluded them from the Valley. He also went off at intervals into Pak misbehavior with China, the past sins of the British on communal matters, Kurshid’s alleged visits to China and other irrelevantia. I noted that our intelligence on Kurshid’s movements was quite good and dismissed this and the allegation that the Chinese were training guerrillas in Kashmir as fabrications.

(7) I kept pressing him if he rejected partition as to what he had to offer of an affirmative sort. While I could understand his reluctance on some solutions I could not accept his reluctance on all. There was, perhaps, a half hour of this. The upshot was a postponement. He finally said he wanted to consult his cabinet colleagues before making a final statement as to what they could accept. We made an engagement to meet the end of the week.

I am naturally disappointed. He was in a very resistant mood and I had the feeling that something may have bitten him in the last day or two.

(8) Tomorrow I will see T.T. Krishnamachari and M.J. Desai and impress upon them the importance of trying to move the old man, though I have to be careful as usual not to seem to be mounting a campaign within his own government. I also need to test the repercussions of tonight’s session which, though I kept it cool on my side, repeatedly reached the bare knuckles stage. It was, in fact, the most unadorned conversation I have had with Nehru in two years, although we ended on an even note. I will pass the full story on to the British.

Galbraith

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Kashmir, 4/63. Secret; Operational Immediate; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Karachi and London. A copy of this telegram was attached to White House telegram CAP 63197, April 16, from Bromley Smith to the President’s Naval Aide, Captain Tazewell T. Shepard, Jr., for transmission to President Kennedy, who was vacationing in Palm Beach, Florida. A handwritten note on the source text, in an unknown hand, reads: “President read.”
1. Galbraith elaborated upon this point in a message that he sent to Nehru on April 17. He pointed in particular to the difficulties involved in securing Congressional approval for military assistance to both parties involved in a festering dispute. (A copy of the message was sent from New Delhi to the Department of State in telegram 4011, April 17; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-INDIA)