Office of the Historian

179. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0

Washington, January 29, 1962.

SUBJECT

  • Presidential Meeting on Nasser Problem

To me the key problems are:

(1)
What is the rationale for proposed State action program1—I would presume from JFK’s request for discussion that he is not fully satisfied with arguments in Rusk and Komer memos,2 so real merit in having Phil Talbot or someone restate the case;
(2)
Nasser visit—neither desirability nor timing of this kingpin of new approach yet settled. State is preparing memo arguing for April visit but better air its case orally;
(3)
What do we get out of whole approach to Nasser?—Essentially this is an exercise in how to compete with the Soviets in getting along with a major neutralist, so President should be clued on long-term potential and limited likeliHood of concrete short-term returns;
(4)
What are the risks?—naturally, he (JFK) worried about domestic reaction although I gather Mike Feldman et al. were less concerned about strong domestic reaction than about likeliHood our approach wouldn’t add up to anything, so be regarded as a New Frontier failure— [Page 448] aside from this, however, we not risking very much in early phases of approach.

I heard conflicting reports about the President’s attitude. State apparently heard that he was not very enthusiastic about Nasser gambit and said he would go ahead with visit only on strong State recommendation and would hold State responsible if anything went wrong. State office director, at least, was much shaken by this, because any number of things could go wrong (for example, Bowles visit leaked to press on Thursday, thus diluting impact we planned). On other hand, Carl3 assured me that JFK had not yet made up his mind on Nasser approach. Take your choice.

Dramatis personae. Since this is really a major policy gambit and since President obviously calling meeting because he not yet sold, I think heavy guns should be present.

(a)
Rusk or Ball— Rusk himself signed memo of transmittal.
(b)
McGhee?—My spies tell me George was chief objector in Department to new approach. (He never changes.)
(c)
Phil Talbot
(d)
W.W.R.—He and I, of course, were chief advocates of exploring new approach.
(e)
Bowles—I don’t see how we can leave him out.
(f)
Hamilton or preferably Gaud— AID will pick up any tab so better be clued.
(g)
Bundy and Komer4
RWK5
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Series, United Arab Republic, Nasser Visit. Secret.↩
  2. Document 159.↩
  3. Rusk’s memorandum is Document 159. Komer wrote two memoranda on the Department of State action plan, Documents 163 and 173.↩
  4. Carl Kaysen.↩
  5. The President’s Appointment Book does not indicate a meeting between the President and the individuals mentioned here for this period. (Kennedy Library)↩
  6. Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.↩