Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962

173. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, January 23, 1962.

What Would US Get Out of Approach to Nasser?

I’d respond to your query as follows, bearing in mind that State proposals involve no “sweeping commitments” to UAR in early phases but are mainly to feel Nasser out:

1. Our first aim would be to dangle before UAR more of a Western alternative to excessive dependence on the Bloc. Egypt’s economic troubles are such that if we do not help her she will almost be forced to turn even more to Moscow.

2. It serves our interests to have good relations with a key neutralist like Nasser, just as with Tito or Nehru. Moreover, he is still the most important single Arab leader.

3. The Syrian debacle plus acute UAR economic difficulties create a real opportunity for US. The Arabists say that Nasser’s state of uncertainty and confusion make him most impressionable at this point; and we don’t want him to flail out blindly in desperation.

4. At the moment, Nasser seems to have concluded from the Syrian failure that, instead of trying so hard to promote revolution elsewhere, he had better turn inward toward solving Egypt’s own colossal problems. We want to encourage him to do so.

5. It is also to our interest to disabuse Nasser of his idee fixe that “Western imperialists”, primarily U.K. but even the US (despite Suez), are basically hostile. He has felt this way since the Aswan Dam fiasco.

6. At the same time Nasser, while accepting anything the Bloc will give him, seems under no illusions as to Moscow’s aims. So he is worth supporting not just to keep him out of Khrushchev’s clutches, but because at some points (e.g. Iraq, Syria) his line and Soviets may sharply diverge.

7. Hopefully, greater reliance on the US could have some restraining influence on UAR policies, if only by creating a vested interest on Nasser’s part in staying on good terms with us. At any rate we could at least talk to a friendly Nasser better than we can now.

Admittedly, these potential gains are intangible and long term, in fact a gamble. But what is called for doesn’t cost us much either—it is essentially some forthcoming gestures; State doesn’t propose giving Nasser much (PL 480, etc.) that we aren’t planning on giving him anyway at this point.¹

R.W. Komer

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Series, United Arab Republic, Nasser Visit. Secret.
1. During a telephone conversation at 11:15 a.m. on January 26, Ball told McGhee that he had raised the mission to Cairo with Edward Mason who had tentatively decided to go. According to notes of the conversation, McGhee then “said the President had not yet approved this. His comment was presumably what do we get out of it. McGhee will check on the status this afternoon. He would like to pry him loose. This is something he will have to do in low key. It is not a question of going out and getting into their over-all planning. Ball said it was a shame to get it cranked up if we really did not want to do it. McGhee said he thought he would be useful, as long as he gets the right pitch. He thinks the thing is in proportion now. It has been watered down. McGhee said he would see if he could pry it loose at the White House.” (Ibid., Ball Papers, United Arab Republic)