Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962

174. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Kuwait and the Embassy in the United Kingdom⁰

Washington, January 26, 1962, 3:18 p.m.

CA–951. London A–833,¹ Baghdad D–425,²Deptel 405 to Kuwait, 195 to Baghdad.³ Dept commends field for helpful assessments of Kuwait situation and for proposals as to US policy and courses of action. Following considerations appear to us at present to be paramount:

1. Over the long run maintenance of Kuwait’s independent status is best means preserving Western stakes in this important segment of ME oil. Even in a post-Qasim period it would be undesirable to have oil resources of Kuwait and Iraq or Kuwait and Saudi Arabia under sway of any single government, although US is not in principle opposed to strengthened ties between these countries.

2. Two principal deterrents exist as obstacles to quick grab of Kuwait by Qasim:

a) The presence of British military power capable of repulsing Iraqi attack or uprooting Iraqis should they become established before British military could arrive in force.

b) Secondary but important is general acceptance of Kuwait as an independent state, particularly by its Arab neighbors.

Obviously these two deterrents are closely interdependent. Without status as an independent Arab nation in good standing, British guarantees of Kuwait would leave it with little but the appearance of a British dependency. Qasim might be tempted to contest British power if he thought he could obtain sympathy or support from his fellow Arabs or others in the Afro-Asian Bloc. Yet lacking the deterrent of British power, Qasim might think it worthwhile to risk the opprobrium and isolation from his Arab neighbors and the rest of the world consequent to riding roughshod over Kuwait’s now widely accepted sovereignty.

As to (a), we believe that in two tries the British have gained a better understanding of how and with what probable after effects their strength can be applied.

The question remains as to what the US can do to strengthen deterrent (b) above. Surprising progress has been made since the British-Kuwaiti exchange of letters on June 19, 1961; accepted into the Arab League, Kuwait had as of December 31, 1961 secured recognition from over 60 governments while 4 diplomatic missions had been established on Kuwaiti soil and Kuwait missions had been established in 3 foreign countries. Since before last June Kuwait had been moving toward independent status through gradually expanding its membership in subsidiary international organizations.

Nevertheless, the key fact about Kuwait for its Arab colleagues (and most important supporters) is its oil resources, considered by many of its neighbors not Kuwaiti but rather as “Arab” wealth. Arab respect for Kuwait’s sovereignty is based on, (a) an aversion to seeing such overwhelming resources accrue entirely to one country, Iraq, thus providing it the basis for a dominant role in Arab affairs, and (b) their hopes that Kuwait may adopt a wealth-sharing program. As noted in the various messages under reference and Deptel 405 to Kuwait rptd Baghdad 195, Kuwait is now moving cautiously toward satisfying the latter hopes by supplementing earlier private gifts (which whatever their size and extent have failed so far to create for Kuwait an image of benevolence) with a business-like program of development lending.

In these circumstances the US can:

(1) Offer encouragement in the course of our normal contacts with Kuwaitis for orderly and rapid development of their Development Fund. Department doubts necessity or desirability at this time of making direct, formal representations to the Ruler on this subject.

(2) Make available the fruits of our experience in this field and encourage Kuwaitis to take advantage of the experience of others, particularly the IBRD.

(3) In due course discreetly encourage other governments to take advantage of the assistance Kuwait is prepared to offer, noting as appropriate our understanding that the Kuwaitis are going at development assistance in a business-like manner.

(4) Encourage the Kuwaitis as opportunities arise to give maximum publicity to their foreign aid program.

(5) In collaboration with the British encourage the Kuwaitis to enlarge the scope of their diplomatic contacts by placing missions in a number of key countries, bolstering these by dual accreditations if necessary. As necessary encourage other countries to extend recognition and place diplomatic representatives in Kuwait.

On the Department and Embassy Kuwait will fall much of the burden for implementing the foregoing although Embassy London may find opportunities to encourage the UK Government to take a similar line in its contacts with the Kuwaitis and other Arab governments. Other addressees may find the foregoing useful background guidance, as the problem of Kuwait continues to be a matter of discussion in the Near East over the next few months.

The Department would welcome whatever comments posts may wish to submit.

Ball

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786D.00/1–2662. Secret. Drafted by Seelye (NEA/NE) and Thacher on January 25; cleared by Williams (AID/NE), Root (AFN), and Rewinkel (BNA); and approved by Strong who initialed for Ball. Repeated to Dhahran, Cairo, Amman, Damascus, Beirut, Khartoum, Paris, Rome, Rabat, Tunis, Tripoli, Benghazi, Baghdad, and Jidda.
1. Dated January 8. (Ibid., 786D.00/1–862)
2. Dated December 20, 1961. (Ibid., 611.86D/12–2061)
3. Telegram 405 to Kuwait was repeated to Baghdad as telegram 195, January 12. (Ibid., 786D.00/1–1262)