159. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy0
Washington, January 10,
1962.
SUBJECT
- Action Program for the United Arab Republic1
Following reconsideration of the key position of the United Arab Republic in
the Near East and Africa and in light of urgent requests for various forms
of aid put forward by the U.A.R. Ambassador
here, we are proposing a program of coordinated steps in our relations with
this
[Page 385]
important country. Our
objective would be to encourage orderly economic development in the United
Arab Republic with beneficial consequence for Near East area stability, and
to provide significant Western alternatives to U.A.R. economic, and possibly political, dependence on the
Soviet Bloc. We propose no sweeping commitments to the U.A.R. at the outset and, prior to initiating
each step, we would review carefully the nature and extent of U.A.R. responses to previous steps.
In explanation of this proposed program I enclose the following:
- 1.
- Over-all rationale;
- 2.
- Explanatory memorandum on message from you to President Nasser and text of message on
economic cooperation;
- 3.
- Memorandum seeking your good offices to secure the services of Dr.
Edward Mason of Harvard
University for a two-week exploratory economic mission to the United
Arab Republic; and
- 4.
- Memorandum suggesting an invitation to President Nasser to visit this
country.
I should be grateful for your consideration and, if you deem appropriate,
approval of each of these individual steps.
Enclosure 1
BACKGROUND MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT
- Action Program for the United Arab Republic: Rationale and
Recommendations
Background
The United Arab Republic’s severe economic plight and its fear of
over-involvement with the U.S.S.R. have
led to initiatives to secure more comprehensive U.S. economic
assistance. It is clear we have come to another crossroads in our
relations with the Nasser regime,
similar perhaps to those that confronted us on the arms question in
1955, on the High Aswan Dam in 1956 and on the initial request for wheat
under PL-480 in 1958. Our purpose is
again being tested and how we respond may set the pattern of our
relations with the U.A.R. for a
considerable
[Page 386]
time to come.
Ironically, we are again in a situation where either a positive or a
negative response is fraught with possible dangers. In proposing this
program we are aware that the United Arab Republic’s present political
posture, its antagonism toward France and the United Kingdom, its
seizures of private industry and other property, its attacks on other
Arab leaders, its continued (but currently non-activist) hostility
toward Israel and its dealings with the Soviet Bloc create an atmosphere
which in the short-term inhibits the development of mutual confidence
between us. It is not in our interest to condone these policies or to
bail the U.A.R. out of the difficulties
in which it finds itself. Our purposes are principally long-term.
In the light of our earlier experiences and to achieve our broad
objectives in the Near East, and despite the unhappy policies currently
pursued by the U.A.R, we believe a cautiously positive response is
indicated. Thus, we have sought to devise a step-by-step plan of action,
evaluating results achieved and the over-all atmosphere of our relations
before embarking on each successive stage. Our plan is not rigid; its
steps can be altered to fit circumstances as we proceed. An essential
element is the avoidance of irrevocable commitments.
Our general policy toward the U.A.R. has
been set forth in a memorandum to Mr. Bundy of November 16, 1961.3 The action
program here proposed is consistent with the earlier policy
statement.
Objectives
An important underlying motive is our desire to capitalize on the
opportunity to work in a backward but key geopolitical country which has
already adopted many of the reforms sought in the Alliance for Progress.
In this context, long-term objectives must be separated from short-term
tactical considerations. We do not, of course, seek or expect specific
political commitments in return for expanded U.S. interest and
assistance. However, by responding to urgent U.A.R. requests we can reasonably expect:
- 1.
- Further important strengthening in the fabric of U.S.-U.A.R. relations resulting
in:
- 2.
- A greater over-all U.A.R-.U.S. involvement carrying with it a
tacit and restraining influence on U.A.R. policies in matters of direct significance
to the U.S.
- 3.
- Prevention of excessive U.A.R.
dependence on the Soviet Bloc with the risk of growing U.A.R. responsiveness to Soviet
pressures.
- 4.
- Creation of a deterrent to radical behavior on Nasser’s part, both internally
and abroad.
There are concrete indications that the U.A.R. seeks consciously to follow political policies that
will enhance its prospects for securing U.S. aid. Nasser’s consistently forthright
attacks on communism, and on the
[Page 387]
Soviets when they overreach themselves, is one such indication. His
relatively helpful stance at the recent Belgrade Conference is another.
During the recent United Nations General Assembly debate on Palestine
refugees U.A.R. representatives were a
restraining influence on Arab extremism. U.A.R. policy in the Congo has recently veered away from
direct intervention in favor of the Soviet-oriented forces of Antoine
Gizenga and a disposition to eliminate the cleavage between the
Casablanca and Monrovia powers has recently been indicated. While
Nasser publicly inveighs
against “reactionary” rulers, at the same time he emphasizes to his
people the necessity of concentrating on internal U.A.R. development.
We can hope our assistance may exert a subtle influence on the U.A.R. internal political structure. Since
the Syrian revolt there is evidence that Nasser has been sharing some of his power with former
members of the RCC, some of whom, such as Baghdadi and Muhyiddin, lean
to the West whereas others lean to the Soviets. The U.A.R. Ambassador has informed us that
current U.A.R. requests originated with
Baghdadi, the economic czar. The latter’s position will be strengthened
to the extent he succeeds in obtaining Western assistance.
On the other side of the ledger we have to recognize that Nasser is not reliable and that his
cooperation can only be insured as long as he thinks the stakes are high
enough to justify it. Even then unforeseen developments, for example the
“Cleopatra” incident, can quickly destroy the good work of many months.
Nasser is presently addicted,
perhaps incurably, to a radical type of socialism which is inimical to
our concepts of free enterprise. Senator Humphrey believes, on the basis of his recent interview
with Nasser, that more exposure
to American business methods might tend to moderate Nasser’s doctrinaire attitudes.
Ambassador Badeau believes that
the pragmatic necessity of making his economic program work will temper
some of these views. This remains to be seen.
Nasser’s current obsession over
security, his arbitrary arrests and sequestrations and his handling of
the French espionage case are not to be condoned. There is a systematic
program against foreign minorities who are disliked because of their
past dominance of Egyptian business and commerce. Aid for the U.A.R. —the enemy of Israel and a leading
neutral—is not easy to sell to Congress and the U.S. public. In our
economic aid we must proceed cautiously to avoid bailing the regime out
of the economic consequences of the recent wholesale nationalization and
expropriation. U.S. aid must not, of course, be used to enable the
U.A.R. to purchase arms from the
Soviet Bloc.
[Page 388]
Conclusions
On balance we believe we should seize the opportunity presented us for
constructive, long-term action. If we hesitate or stall such an
opportunity may not soon occur again.
Plan of Action
Aside from maintaining current programs of assistance, we have in mind
these inter-related steps, namely:
- 1.
- Conclude a multi-year PL-480
agreement (with a provision for annual review) indicating our
decision to open negotiations by a message from you to Nasser. We would anticipate our
PL-480 aid to continue at
about the current level of $120 million annually. Conclusion of
this agreement would be contingent on U.A.R. cooperation in providing access to pertinent
information to justify it.
- 2.
- Offering to send an economic consultant with respect to
possible economic planning assistance or other forms of economic
cooperation.
- 3.
- An invitation to Nasser
for a formal state visit in the spring or fall of 1962 depending
upon your political judgment as to which time would be most
suitable.
In addition, we should keep in mind the need for a financial
stabilization program. If the U.A.R. is
willing to accept a new IMF mission and
will undertake to implement its recommendations, the IMF may, during the spring of 1962,
undertake to work out a stabilization program of $150 million or more,
of which upward of $75 million would have to come from non-IMF sources including the United
States.
Other steps such as dispatch of a permanent U.S. Government, private or
international economic planning mission, participation in an IMF-financed stabilization program and
concerting with the IBRD and/or other
nations in an organized lending program are dependent upon what emerges
from the crucible of exploratory talks, a Kennedy-Nasser
confrontation, and on the ability of the U.A.R. to demonstrate to the IBRD and other donors its eligibility for such an
arrangement. With the exception of possible participation in an IMF-sponsored stabilization program, no new
U.S. aid would go to the U.A.R. until
the end of Calendar Year 1962 at the earliest.
We believe the multi-year agreement is (a) a means of reaping a political
dividend without raising the level of the aid we are able to provide on
an annual basis; (b) a modest partial response to the U.A.R. ‘s appeal for closer economic
cooperation; (c) genuinely of value to the U.A.R. planning effort; and (d) from the standpoint of the
needs of the Egyptian people, completely justifiable in terms of the
basic concepts of the Food for Peace program. We believe it should be
concluded prior to an agreement with Israel, for which the Israelis are
pressing.
We believe the proposed exploratory talks by an economic consultant are
desirable (a) as an indication that we take the U.A.R. professions
[Page 389]
of a desire to cooperate seriously; (b) as a means for testing U.A.R. intentions; and (c) in order to come
to grips with the problems involved in a more comprehensive economic
association, should it at some later time appear desirable.
We believe the Nasser visit is
desirable (a) to provide an opportunity for a personal confrontation
with you; (b) to educate Nasser
about the U.S. and the West generally (he has never visited a Western
country except for his 1960 United Nations General Assembly appearance);
and (c) to overcome his sense of ostracism which we believe has
adversely affected his attitude toward the U.S.
We are mindful of the possibility of these steps appearing to be an
endorsement of the Nasser regime,
but believe the U.A.R. itself will seek
to play down any public suggestion of closer ties with the U.S. Any
concrete development, such as actual signature of the multi-year
agreement or announcement of a Nasser visit would presumably not take place for some
months yet, hopefully after the current dust kicked up by Nasser’s internal measures has settled.
And there is reason to hope that taking these steps might cause him to
settle the dust faster than he otherwise might. We are not in a position
to judge the effects of domestic U.S. reaction and we are mindful that,
from a foreign policy standpoint, there are calculated risks involved.
We nevertheless feel that action on these lines would be desirable in
considering all circumstances.
Enclosure 24
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT
- Proposed Letter to President Nasser on Economic Cooperation with the United Arab
Republic
We have had a number of appeals by the United Arab Republic Ambassador,
acting, he asserts, on instructions from President Nasser, for closer cooperation with the
United States in the economic field. These approaches have been set in a
clearly identifiable political context.
On the basis of these requests we called Ambassador Badeau back to Washington and worked
out with him a step-by-step program designed
[Page 390]
to strengthen our position in the United Arab
Republic, each step to be carefully reviewed prior to its being
undertaken.
Ambassador Badeau agreed that an
appropriate beginning would be to offer Nasser exploratory conversations looking to conclusion
of the three-year Public Law 480 food sales program urgently requested
by the United Arab Republic. It was also agreed the Ambassador would
discuss the possibility of your appointing a special consultant on
economic planning to join with Ambassador Badeau in preliminary talks aimed at delineating such
areas of economic planning assistance and economic cooperation as might
be practicable and constructive in terms of United States-United Arab
Republic interests. In a separate paper we will propose Dr. Edward Mason of Harvard University as
the candidate for this task. The Agency for International Development
has suggested that it might be well to obtain Dr. Mason’s approval in principle to
undertake the task before the message is sent since it is difficult to
obtain the services of consultants of the caliber required.
In order to strengthen our Ambassador’s position in the United Arab
Republic, to lend added weight to this approach, and as an opportunity
to further develop your relationship with President Nasser, we propose that you authorize
Ambassador Badeau to deliver to
President Nasser the letter
embodied in the attached draft telegram.
Your approval of the proposed message to President Nasser is requested.
Enclosure5
To: American Embassy Cairo
Pursuant your consultations in the Department and to instructions
Department telegram 736,6 you authorized seek interview and
present following written message to President Nasser from President Kennedy:
His Excellency
Gamal Abdel Nasser,
President of the United Arab Republic.
“Dear Mr. President:
“I have asked Ambassador Badeau,
who has been consulting in Washington on matters affecting relations
between our two countries, to
[Page 391]
speak to you on my behalf on a subject which has been much in our
thoughts lately, namely the form and content of our economic assistance
program in the United Arab Republic. Recognizing the importance of
economic cooperation to improved living standards, the fostering of
political stability and as a factor in promoting good relations between
us, we have constantly sought to give sympathetic attention to the needs
of your country.
“Recently your Ambassador in Washington has discussed with a number of
United States officials possible means for developing the United States
contribution to the United Arab Republic’s programs for economic
planning and economic growth. We asked Ambassador Badeau to return to Washington to aid
us in understanding the objectives you have in mind. A number of
possibilities were reviewed.
“It is a matter of great personal satisfaction to me that we have now
instructed Ambassador Badeau to
inform you that he is authorized to commence detailed discussions with
your Government regarding conclusion of a multi-year agreement for sales
of food grains to the Government of the United Arab Republic by the
Government of the United States. It is my deep hope that the negotiation
and implementation of such an agreement will engender an exchange of
information and ideas beneficial to concepts of cooperation between our
two countries.
“I am aware of the interest of your Government in further intensive study
of the problems of economic planning, economic development and trade.
Should you wish to explore these matters in further detail with us, I
should be happy to seek the services of a well-qualified consultant in
economic planning to join with Ambassador Badeau in discussing them with you and appropriate
members of your Government.
“Let me reiterate, Mr. President, my sustained interest in strengthening
relations between our countries and my hope for continued close official
and personal contacts between our peoples and governments. Ambassador
Badeau, who has my fullest
confidence, is prepared to convey to me whatever thoughts you may have
on any of the foregoing subjects.
“Sincerely yours, John F.
Kennedy”
[Page 392]
Enclosure 37
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT
- Recommending that you Request Dr. Edward Mason to Undertake Exploratory Mission to the
United Arab Republic
I refer to the memorandum on the subject of economic cooperation with the
United Arab Republic.
The United Arab Republic Ambassador has had conversations with Dr.
Rostow (then of the White
House staff), Assistant Secretary Talbot and Mr. Eugene
Black of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development regarding the United Arab Republic’s desire for high-level
planning assistance in its economic development. The Ambassador later
indicated that a United States planning mission of two to six persons
would be desirable, emphasizing, however, that the quality of the
planners would be more important than the quantity and that it was
important to have only individuals of the most outstanding
qualifications.
Ambassador Badeau, who has been
here on consultation, believes that the present Egyptian concept of the
role of such planners, their access to information pertinent to their
work, and their terms of reference may leave something to be desired. He
urged that as a preliminary step an eminent planning consultant go to
the United Arab Republic in early February, or if more convenient in
January, to discuss with United Arab Republic officials and ultimately
with President Nasser the United
Arab Republic’s economic development plan, the problem areas in the
United Arab Republic planning and economy, the role that a United States
planning group might play, the prerequisites for effective collaboration
with the United States in the economic field, and the facts of life
about a consortium approach to the United Arab Republic problem. He
would also make recommendations to us.
The name of Dr. Edward Mason of
Harvard, who is well known to you, has been proposed by Dr. Rostow as an excellent choice for such
a mission, which need not last more than two weeks. It is believed,
however, on the basis of several recent rejections by Dr. Mason of consulting assignments, that
he would accept only if asked to do so by you. Moreover his prestige and
influence would be greatly enhanced if it were made known to the United
Arab Republic that he is your personal choice for this task.
[Page 393]
I should be most grateful therefore if you could ask Dr. Mason, who can be reached by telephone
at University 8–7600 in Cambridge or by mail at Littauer, Harvard
University, to undertake this mission. If he accepts, the Department
would, of course, provide an appropriate briefing prior to his
departure.
Enclosure 48
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT
- Recommendation for a Visit by President Nasser of the United Arab Republic
in the Spring of 1962
An invitation to President Nasser
of the U.A.R. to visit the U.S. has been
frequently discussed within the government through the years. Rumors
have appeared in the press and hints have been thrown out to Nasser by various visitors, latterly
Senator Humphrey, that such an
invitation might soon be forthcoming. Nasser himself is believed keenly aware that throughout
his tenure he has been “passed over” in the ranks of chiefs of state
visiting this country. We think it desirable that we reach a decision
soon regarding an invitation for a state visit. In this connection there
are a number of favorable and unfavorable factors which I itemize as
follows:
I. Favorable Factors
- A.
- Consonant with his denunciation of Soviet nuclear testing and
generally moderate stance at the Belgrade Conference, Nasser appears to be moving toward
a more truly neutral position, has loosened his ties with the Soviet
Bloc and is currently demonstrating a desire for stronger relations
with the U.S.
- B.
- We believe that our friendly, personal relationship with him
nurtured through correspondence, through Mrs. Kennedy’s recent attendance at the
Tutankhamon exhibit and by other means, has had a considerable
influence in accelerating this trend and that a personal
confrontation would present an opportunity to persuade Nasser to pursue more constructive
policies.
- C.
- The U.A.R. appears to be adhering
steadfastly to its suggestion that the Palestine question be “put in
the ice box” as a source of controversy between us. The U.A.R. delegate was more helpful than
any other Arab representative at the United Nations General Assembly
debate on Palestine.
- D.
- Ambassador Badeau believes
Nasser’s position in the
U.A.R. is secure for the time
being and that despite our disagreement with certain radical aspects
of U.A.R. policy a Nasser-type revolution is closer to
Arab aspirations than, for example, the rightist trend in Syria.
Some of Nasser’s social goals
conform to the spirit of the Alliance for Progress.
- E.
- Nasser would have an
opportunity to gain first-hand knowledge of our society in its
various aspects, knowledge which he is utterly lacking. His more
radical ideas of how to achieve his social goals might be moderated
by exposure to American methods.
- F.
- A confrontation would provide an opportunity for a dialogue on
such matters as the desirability of U.A.R. concentration on internal development; finding
common ground for our respective policies in Africa; discussing the
U.A.R. ‘s role in the Arab
world; promoting the theme that the non-aligned nations should avoid
positions designed to erode Western strength if they expect to stay
free of Soviet domination; quietly fostering U.A.R. cooperation, or at least non-opposition, to the
Johnson mission; and exploring the possibility of an informal arms
limitation arrangement between the U.A.R. and Israel.
II. Unfavorable Factors
- A.
- An invitation to the President or Prime Minister of Israel might
be a political necessity to offset the invitation to Nasser.
- B.
- The Syrian revolt has dealt a blow, though apparently not a vital
one, to Nasser’s prestige and
position.
- C.
- Internally Nasser is
pressing a brand of socialism which, despite certain beneficial
aspects, has been generally inimical to the interests of private
enterprise and may set a bad example for the Eastern Arabs.
- D.
- The U.A.R. is currently undergoing
a wave of “security hysteria” which has led to arrests of
individuals formerly associated with the Farouk regime,
sequestrations of property of the wealthy class and a general
atmosphere of fear and malaise among propertied elements.
- E.
- French opposition to any friendly overtures toward Nasser is likely to be vehement in
view of the French spy trials.
- F.
- These factors are likely to arouse considerable criticism of an
invitation to Nasser both
domestically and abroad.
On balance we are inclined to believe that the favorable factors which
may bring long-term benefits, outweigh the unfavorable factors, many of
which we believe to be short-term.
[Page 395]
In view of the domestic criticism that is certain to be aroused by the
visit, we believe it is essential to avoid conflict with the 1962
Congressional election campaign and tentatively have been thinking of an
invitation in February (after the conclusion of the French spy trials)
for a visit in April, 1962. This would depend upon your judgment as to
the latest time in the spring that the visit could take place without
complicating the domestic political situation. Alternatively the visit
might occur after the elections in November. As the timing of an
invitation and of the visit itself must be coordinated with other moves,
it would be helpful if you would inform the Department of your
views.
