151. Memorandum for the Record0
SUBJECT
- Mike Feldman’s Views on Nasser Visit
While Mike is not very sanguine over the prospects of getting anywhere with Nasser, he does not think the domestic political repercussions would be insuperable if we handle them properly. Timing and adequate preparation would be important.
- (1)
- Mike feels strongly that any Nasser visit must be quiet, without undue fanfare. He recalled that the ceremony surrounding King Saud’s visit1 had really hurt the Eisenhower Administration with the Jewish community in the US without producing much of anything. Our reception of Nasser should be businesslike and in low key.
- (2)
- He agreed that proper timing in an election year was vital. A Nasser visit on March or early April (I described State’s timing) would probably be early enough before the campaign season, provided the other conditions he suggested were met. He agreed that a visit in December, after the elections, might be somewhat better from the domestic standpoint but did not seem to think that such postponement was overriding.
- (3)
- Another essential was that we must be able to point to some concrete accomplishment from the visit, in order to turn aside any Saud-type reaction. It would look like a domestic defeat for the President to have received a neutralist with a record of hostility without being able to demonstrate that we got something out of doing so. Mike felt very strongly about this, and I quite agree that we must be able to show that any new relationship with Nasser is a genuine “two-way street.”
- (4)
- Mike wanted advance notice of at least a week before the visit, preferably before it was announced, so that he could lay the necessary groundwork. He thought that if we provided him with a good case, he could soften the adverse impact of the visit through his excellent contacts with leaders of the Jewish community (e.g. the periodic conferences of presidents of major organizations).
- (5)
- Like Dick Donahue,2 he did not seem greatly concerned about any adverse impact on the trade or aid bill votes. In his opinion such difficulty as arose would come more from sensitive amendments to the aid bill in particular, e.g. denying aid to any country which did not allow freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal.
I described State’s tentative timetable of moves in the Nasser gambit as worked out with Badeau3—acceptance in principle of multi-year PL-480 in December, sending out a planner in January, invitation in February for a visit in late March or early April, and then if all went well possible US participation in a consortium. He emphasized the importance of parallel gestures toward Israel and the political necessity that we get something for what we gave. I renewed my promise to keep Mike clued and to make sure that he got advance notice if the visit jelled.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer, Vol. II. Secret. Drafted by Komer and distributed to McGeorge Bundy and Kaysen.↩
- Reference is to the visit of King Saud of Saudi Arabia to the United States January 30–February 8, 1957. For documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. XIII, pp. 413–486, and vol. XVII, pp. 101–105.↩
- Richard K. Donahue, Staff Assistant to the President for Congressional Liaison.↩
- On December 19, Komer wrote a brief memorandum to Dungan that reads: “We are leaning on State on all of these Egyptian matters. Indeed, they and we are actively considering packaging them and other items in a major new policy initiative toward Egypt, culminating in a Nasser visit. I no longer have any reason to accuse State of being dilatory. As for Badeau, we have ironed out any differences on tactics on timing between him and the Department.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Series, United Arab Republic, 11/61–12/61) Ambassador Badeau was in the Department of State for consultations December 16–19. Documentation is in Department of State, Central File 123-Badeau, John S. See also Supplement, the compilation on the United Arab Republic.↩