Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962

163. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, January 15, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Action Program for the UAR

I recommend that you approve attached State proposals for a new initiative vis-à-vis Egypt. They are the end-product of a “reappraisal of relations with Nasser” begun with your blessing as a planning project last February.

In essence, State calls for a cautiously positive response to the recent UAR overtures for greater aid. It has been refined since attached was written to include: (a) telling UAR we agree to a multi-year PL-480 agreement; (b) then sending Ed Mason for a quick planning consultation (your personal intercession seems needed to get Ed); (c) sending Bowles to Cairo 13–15 February for a tour d’horizon designed to smell the air; and finally (d) depending largely on results of these preliminaries, an invite for a State visit in April or December. Instead of attached letter to Nasser on economic cooperation, State is now proposing a note from you announcing Bowles visit, partly in order to reassure Nasser that Bowles has your full confidence.¹

State argues that we’ve come to another crossroads in our relations with Nasser, similar to that over Aswan Dam. It proposes to seize the perhaps fleeting opportunity created by Egypt’s severe economic plight, Nasser’s apparent turning inward after Syrian debacle, and his desire not to become too dependent on the USSR, to open a new chapter in US relations with this key neutralist.

Our aim would be to encourage UAR turn inward toward economic development as its primary goal, and to provide Nasser with more of a Western alternative to excessive dependence on the Bloc. His current economic difficulties are such that if we don’t help him he may be forced to turn even more to Bloc. Greater reliance on the US would also have some restraining influence on UAR policies by creating a vested interest on Nasser’s part in good relations with the US.

All realize that there are as many risks as well as opportunities in this course. At best we can only expect to pull Nasser back toward a more neutral position, and deter him from leaning too far left again. This will only be assured if he thinks the stakes are high enough. Even so, he’ll still buy arms from Bloc because we can’t supply him, and our aid will indirectly help him to do so. Moreover, Nasser’s interests run athwart ours at so many points that periodic frictions are inevitable. But the new policy is based on long-term rather than short-run calculations—that, despite the inevitability of further ups and downs in US-Egyptian relations, it is in our long-term interest to encourage Egypt to steer a moderate neutralist course.

To protect ourselves, State favors a deliberately cautious and step-by-step approach, without too many commitments (at least in early stages) from which it would later be difficult to withdraw. Actually State would just use aid we’d probably give anyway as trade goods for a political approach.

There are three aspects of State proposals which you might wish to discuss with State:

1. Timing and Style. How we treat the volatile and sensitive Nasser will be just as important as what we give him. Our aim is to take advantage of advent of new Administration to get across to him that we want to let bygones be bygones and re-establish a relationship of mutual confidence more like that before 1955. State paper is weak on all-important niceties required to this end; it is based largely on giving more dough. Bowles visit will help (if staged right) but you will probably have to bear the main burden of another venture in personal diplomacy. This argues for a Nasser visit early rather than late, while Nasser still uncertain and impressionable in the aftermath of Syria. Also any number of things could happen between April and December to upset a later visit. On the other hand, Nasser is anxious for a visit and might be on his good behavior if we kept him dangling. State needs your decision on timing before Bowles visit.

2. Can we make this exercise more of a two-way street? State rightly emphasizes the longer-term potential in a gradual US/UAR rapprochement, but shies away from any short-term efforts to get some better behavior out of Nasser. While recognizing dangers of scaring him off prematurely, I hope both Bowles and state visits will be occasion for a frank effort to educate Nasser, and to get if possible some reciprocal gestures (e.g., moderation of anti-US propaganda) to which we can point as justifying new course.

3. Domestic US Reaction. Mike Feldman regards such gestures as quite important to enable us to defend what will appear to many as an endorsement of Nasser regime. April or December timing is to put Nasser visit either before or after 1962 campaign season. He also emphasizes the importance of parallel gestures toward Israel. You will want Mike’s own views, but he seems to regard domestic problem as manageable if above conditions are met. I’d argue that increased US leverage with Egypt would help over long term in resolving Arab-Israel dispute (indeed Israelis have hinted that it would help if we could turn Nasser inward).

But we have to worry about other reactions too. France will be most unhappy, and even UK and Turkey may need convincing. Such anti-Nasser clients as Jordanians and Saudis will also need a lot of reassuring as our plans become clearer.

Finally, let’s recognize that, even though we’re not giving UAR any more at the outset than some PL-480 and DLF projects we’ve planned to anyway, we’ll have to get in a lot deeper if the new approach bears fruit. State rightly prefers to avoid further commitments till we see UAR reaction, but the above will be far from satisfying UAR needs. Some $75 million might be needed to help out an IMF stabilization program, and to send a planner will confirm our interest in a development consortium of the sort UAR Ambassador has already discussed with Walt Rostow. It is just as well to let these goodies dangle in the background, however.

In sum, we should try this major experiment in the new Administration’s policy of being more sensible toward the neutralists—recognizing the many pitfalls (we must avoid another Aswan Dam fiasco) and aware that it will be quite expensive without many quick returns, but counting on long-range results.

Bob Komer

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Series, United Arab Republic, 1/62–2/62. Secret. A marginal notation reads: “(Removed from Pres. Week-end reading folder 1/20/62). Komer forwarded this memorandum to Bundy with a memorandum that reads: “Here are my comments, designed to be put on top of State’s ‘action program’ toward UAR [Document 159] (you have ribbon copy) and sent to JFK. I’ve incorporated latest changes State proposes (Bowles visit, etc.). State is sending over new letter to replace draft JFK letter to Nasser (but I suggest not holding up for this). This is a big thing, so I’ve taken the space needed to cover all the things State didn’t. But I’ve not repeated arguments in my 8 December memo [Document 149] you sent forward; did we ever get a reaction to it.” Komer added the following handwritten note: “Talbot tells me that, in light of Badeau’s ‘cordial’ talk with Nasser (Cairo 1074 [Document 161]), he now leans slightly to Spring visit rather than December. So do I, though let’s reserve final judgment (if JFK willing) till we see how Bowles visit goes.”
1. See Document 176.