160. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon0
518. Embtel 659.1 Nadim Dimechkie (protect source) saw Talbot ninth to express perturbation about cables from Foreign Ministry revealing Chehab, who “shaking like a rabbit,” virtually persuaded Western powers, including USG but particularly British, implicated in attempted coup.2 Dimechkie said he and Lebanese Ambassadors elsewhere instructed by GOL ascertain through contacts available to them nature of complicity, motivation, objectives and future plans of governments to which they accredited. He regards GOL’s mood as aberration demanding prompt treatment and urged Ambassador Meyer be instructed see Chehab immediately to “set him straight” regarding USG’s unwavering support of Lebanon and its legitimate government. While it would be useless for British attempt persuade Lebanon of UK’s non-involvement, Dimechkie said, would be helpful if we would inform Chehab we know British also interested in Lebanon’s security and confident they not involved in coup attempt. Talbot of course gave Dimechkie categorical assurance USG non-involvement.
[Page 396]Department appreciates you made clear to Takla (Embtel 651)3 almost exactly what Dimechkie now suggests you should undertake in formal démarche to Chehab. Accordingly, leave to your discretion whether further representations (Chehab, Takla, Karame, perhaps other selected non-Christians) might serve Western interests. Believe you should make decision with following inter alia in mind:
State of mind of Chehab and others seems particularly disturbing when considered in broader context present pervasive impression that Great Powers on move in Middle East. Every recent area disturbance attributed to one or more of them. Question is whether better move vigorously to quash canard at its birth or by our silence encourage morbid imaginations work beyond already serious proportions. Chehab and his government may need (1) be reminded who Lebanon’s traditional friends are, (2) be asked whether accusations Western complicity do not logically trace to those external forces or their local instruments interested in alienating Lebanon’s most steadfast allies, (3) be reminded forcefully that friends who have not failed Lebanon in past times of distress have every intention continuing support in future, and (4) USG which looked to Chehab since 1958 crisis for firm and statesmanlike leadership continues count on Chehab.
Foregoing discussed with Spears of UK Embassy here in thought might be useful for you inform Lebanese listeners US had consulted UK which associates itself fully with your remarks. Spears stated UK Ambassador had long relaxed talk with Chehab who appeared need no convincing of UK non-involvement and who showed no signs tension or unease. However, Spears could perceive no objection UK association with approaches and suggested since UK Ambassador had authority make such decision question be solved on spot. Message in this vein sent UK Embassy Beirut ninth. You may therefore wish concert with British colleague.
Department aware fact you have not yet presented credentials creates special problem.4
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/1–862. Top Secret; Roger Channel. Drafted by Strong and Hamilton (NEA/NE) on January 9, cleared by Talbot, and approved by Hilsman (INR) who initialed for Rusk. Repeated to London.↩
- Document 158.↩
- At dawn on December 31, members of the Syrian National Party (PPS) staged an attempted coup against the Lebanese Government. The Lebanese Army and security forces promptly suppressed it. Reports from the Embassy in Beirut and other posts in the region concerning the coup are in Department of State, Central File 783A.00.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 158.↩
- Ambassador Armin H. Meyer was appointed Ambassador to Lebanon on October 27, 1961, during a recess of the U.S. Senate, and did not present his credentials to the Lebanese Government until January 12.↩