Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962

161. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State⁰

Cairo, January 11, 1962, 9 p.m.

1074. Cordial unhurried conference with Nasser today¹ covered general range USA–UAR direct relations on basis that after first year new administration half year my own service here comprehensive review situation appropriate.

Led off my recapitulation USA policy as (1) cultivation mutual interests with sympathetic concern UAR development within framework USA national commitments and interests as witness AID program; (2) frank statement US viewpoint and use quiet diplomacy as witness US approach to Syrian recognition and French spy case inquiries; (3) continuation relations through vagaries current events as witness steady progress AID program through difficult events recent months.

Then reviewed current US aid under categories indicating that total aid FY 1962 nearly double last year and informing President status outstanding requests. Stated that probably unable meet cotton request and doubtful on rice request.

On my inquiry as to how President saw economic situation and relation US aid to it, Nasser took off on detailed exposition of lack of progress in rural economy and urgency accelerating agricultural productivity. He noted that IMF recommended twenty-five percent cutback development plan but claimed this impossible because predicted population increase necessitated expansion employment opportunities. Then stated that PL 480 type assistance essential some years to come and expressed appreciation for foreign currency saving US aid engenders. Failing spontaneous mention planning I reported tenor my conversation with Ambassador Kamel in Washington. Nasser responded by saying he thought Baghdadi² had taken planning needs up with Embassy and indicated he would like some planning help with subsequent involvement American business firms in developmental projects. These comments low toned confirming my earlier judgment that Washington enthusiasm generated more by Ambassador Kamel than by President. Neither Nasser nor I mentioned consortium or any other details US or international assistance. I indicated that future aid program being restudied and requested to see President again when appropriate.

On cultural affairs I reported current problems Port Said, Alexandria, Cairo as prelude to urging that cultural agreement negotiations be activated. Nasser’s response that such agreement mutually useful and appropriate and that he would direct Kamel Eddin Hussein³ to take up matter.

I then passed to general discussion current atmosphere in UAR expressing concern for apparent growing isolation of UAR from Arab world and idee fixe of Western imperialist plots. Nasser spiritedly responded that UAR indeed feeling isolated but this due intemperate attacks from Arab neighbors on regime and Arab socialism. He cited Saudi, Yemeni, Jordanian attacks and said that while UAR never begins attack, would always respond in kind. Seemed especially irritated by accusations Arab socialism anti-Islamic and economically unfeasible. On Western imperialist plots to encircle or overthrow regime, President cited French spy case stating that taped recordings completely proved French plot first to stir up commonality and failing this, to assassinate President. I recapitulated conversations with Muheddin⁴ on this topic emphasizing our concern for general principles diplomatic behavior and fear UAR would further strain Western relations to own hurt. This formed occasion to state role played by relations with our allies with emphasis that only under aegis effective Western power could non-alignment exist. Nasser acknowledged our attitude conveyed to him by Muheddin but re-emphasized certainty French guilt. In my judgment, Nasser sincerely believes his version affair probably on basis presentation made by own security subordinates. President then passed to Lebanon attempted coup for which he chiefly blames Jordan and British. He cited King Hussein’s continuing support of Syrian National Party through supplying funds, accusing Hussein of being involved in both Syrian separation and Lebanon coup. Much of this he blames on British as power behind Jordanian foreign policy. No mention made of US involvement except to note that some American support for Syrian nationalists through Nuri Said in 1957. I stated categorically that USA not involved in any plotting against Middle East regimes and had nothing to do with Lebanon event.

Re Arab socialism, I noted that US press reaction had been moderate on whole with criticism arising less from ideological distastes for system than from doubts as to economic viability and distaste for property seizures. On my inquiry as to government intention re sequestrated property, Nasser said that sequestration undertaken suddenly in response to success reactionary class in Syrian separation and no plan or decision yet taken as to return property or payment compensation. This confirms my earlier judgment that sequestration mainly pragmatic policy whose outcome as yet unpredictable. Nasser volunteered statement that no truth whatever in Alexandria Russian submarine base rumor which both contrary to UAR opposition foreign base in rest of Middle East and obviously launched by Israel to further Western distaste for UAR at critical time. To my reference to military costs in general and recent Soviet arms purchases in particular, Nasser said that current armed forces budget 117 million pounds annually and new arms did not cost very much. He did not indicate whether recent arms delivery were under a new arms deal or fulfilling existing agreement. He added that he did not believe arms expenditure would seriously affect UAR developmental ability.

In closing President stated that he thought relations with USA showed steady improvement and contrasted current mild newspaper treatment with hostility shown year ago.

Comment: Nasser showed obvious and continued sensitivity to Western and Arab criticism of Arab socialism to which he ascribed political motives rather than economic judgment. Impressed me as feeling hemmed in by unfriendly and hostile surrounding forces against which he is determined to fight back vigorously. While evincing enthusiasm for his economic program difficult to evoke diffusion of detailed economic problems except in context of outside political pressure and hostility. Apparent to me that Nasser’s basic concern is political survival of regime which he links indissolubly with Arab socialism with secondary attention to inherent economic problem.

Badeau

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86B/1–1162. Secret. Repeated to London, Paris, Damascus, Beirut, Amman, Jidda, and Moscow.
1. Telegram 831 to Cairo, January 10, transmitted suggestions for Ambassador Badeau’s forthcoming conversation with Nasser. (Ibid., 611.86B/1–862)
2. Abdel-Latif Mahmoud el-Baghdady, Vice President of the United Arab Republic, and Minister of Production, Treasury, and Planning.
3. Vice President of the United Arab Republic and Minister of Public Services and Local Administration.
4. Zakaria Muhieddin, Vice President of the United Arab Republic and Minister of the Interior.