Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

98. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State⁰

Bonn, August 21, 1962, 1 p.m.

530. Policy. Eyes only for the President and the Secretary. I called on Adenauer at my request late yesterday. He had just come from long meeting with party leaders (which in fact was still in session) and appeared despressed. After asking about my home leave, he remarked “we have problems, don’t we?”, and fetched from his desk telegram he had just received from Paris saying De Gaulle was calling special Cabinet session this week to consider political and military questions relating to European unity. He implied he was concerned about what De Gaulle might have in mind, saying that nothing could be done without America. I replied I thought America was still present. “But is it”, he countered. I said perhaps that was what I wanted to talk to him about.

I then recounted for Chancellor concern regarding his attitude which I had found in Washington—concern which I shared and was at loss to account for—and gave him the President’s letter,¹ together with German translation which I had prepared for him.

Adenauer read translation eagerly, and was amused re reference to poultry, saying “Senator Fulbright certainly keeps after the President and me, doesn’t he?”As he read further, his face brightened perceptibly, and at end he exclaimed, “This is a wonderful letter. It is just what I wanted from the President. I am so glad.” He then asked me if he might interrupt conversation to telephone Brentano, who was still at party meeting, saying he assumed it would be all right to say he had had word from the President. I assured him that it was.

When Adenauer returned to room, I referred to his fears, expressed in previous conversations, re influence on US opinion towards Germany of Shirer book,² etc., and said as result of my stay at home I could reassure him on this score. I went on to say, however, there was a development which was disturbing, and that was spate of reports out of Germany about his lack of confidence in US policy and of German doubts and suspicions generally, which was beginning to find counter-reaction re German attitudes both in Washington and in American opinion generally. I referred to the President’s conviction re necessity for preservation of unity in face of test on Berlin which we may face in coming months, and said this was mutual task. Adenauer agreed, but said recent stories I referred to had all come from American correspondents in Europe and Washington. I said this was not wholly correct, to which Chancellor rejoined by asking with innocent air what I thought could be done. I replied, equally straightfaced, that I thought best solution was to confine discussion of any divergence in views to official channels. He agreed, and commented that he had recently had very good talks with Eisenhower and Norstad,³ both of which had heartened him—although at same time he implied that what he had been waiting for was word from the President himself.

Adenauer then admitted that he had been disturbed by European interpretations of Taylor’s attitude towards nuclear defense as set out in his book.⁴ I replied that I would have thought Taylor’s statements before Senate committee,⁵ and more especially the President’s recent statements, as well as McNamara’s report to NATO meeting in Athens,⁶ would be most adequate reassurance for most doubtful of Europeans. I then argued again that voicing doubts re American policies to journalists, rather than official exchanges, could only result in eventual erosion of unity which he clearly wished.

Conversation concluded by Adenauer asking me to convey his special gratitude to the President for his “wonderful” letter; “and it came at just the right moment”, he remarked. He added he would reply to the President shortly.⁷

As I was leaving, Adenauer referred to the situation in Berlin, saying that hindsight showed both Western forces and West Berlin police should have made effort to aid refugee who was left to die on Eastern side of wall last week, and he urged that we take measures to meet any future situation of this kind. I replied that Western Commandants had been meeting during afternoon to determine what might be done in future, and I was hopeful we might find positive measures to recommend to our governments. “Do it soon”, he said; “and let the West Berliners know”, saying we must appreciate the emotional strain which the populace was under.

Dowling

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/8–2162. Secret; Priority. Received at 8:58 a.m.
1. In his letter, dated August 16, the President thanked Adenauer for his sympathetic attitude on the question of U.S. poultry exports to Germany, explained the rationale for recent U.S. military assignments, and reiterated U.S. determination to maintain adequate levels of nuclear weapons in Europe. (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204)
2. William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, New York, 1960.
3. A report on Adenauer’s conversation with Norstad on August 16 was transmitted in telegram 865 from Paris, August 17 (vol. 13, Document 151); no record of the meeting with Eisenhower, who visited Germany at the beginning of August, has been found.
4. The Uncertain Trumpet, New York, 1960.
5. For a summary of Taylor’s testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on August 9, see The New York Times, August 10, 1962, pp. 1–2.
6. Regarding McNamara’s report at Athens in May, see vol. XIII, Document 137.
7. In his reply of August 22, the Chancellor said that the President’s letter had relieved him of a great worry. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204)