Office of the Historian

97. Telegram From the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Norstad) to Secretary of Defense McNamara0

Paris, August 21, 1962.

PRS 2078. 1. Although escapees have been shot, injured and killed before, the particular characteristics of Friday’s incident have understandably caused a reaction not only in Berlin, but throughout the world. We must accept the fact that a solution to this problem, or at least some action on our part, is of a higher order of urgency than heretofore. The so-called “mobs” in West Berlin are a factor to be considered, but we cannot let mobs dictate actions in a time of such sensitivity and on a matter of such importance.

2. Circumstances make it necessary that we be prepared to deal with a recurrence of this type of incident, unlikely as an exact repetition [Page 275] may be, but our preparations must not in themselves raise the level of danger. I feel, therefore, that something along the following lines should be considered.

a.
We should make it known publicly that we consider Friday’s incident as having gone beyond the limits of the local military and political situation in Berlin and having constituted an offense against humanity without regard to political boundaries. We must make it clear that, while the responsibility of rendering medical aid in East Berlin is clearly that of the Soviet Union or its East German satellite, failure on the part of the appropriate authorities to take prompt and effective action in a case of this kind will compel Western Allies to do so.
b.
We should have available, but not prominently displayed, the U.S. Army medical personnel capable of dealing with a situation of this kind, and similar action should, if possible, be taken in the French and the British sectors.
c.
If medical attention is not made immediately available by the Soviets or the East Berlin authorities, a Western representative should notify the guards, or other Soviet or East German officials, actually on the spot, of our intention to render such aid. This announcement should be followed promptly by the movement of the medical personnel to the relief of the victim.
d.
Medical teams should give immediate attention and should move the victim to a West Berlin hospital facility, unless the Soviet East Berlin authorities announce their intention to promptly and effectively take charge of the case.
e.
We must be prepared, that is, the Berlin Commandant must be authorized, to use the military force necessary to protect the medical team in the performance of its mission, including gunfire, if necessary. Troops, tanks, or other military equipment which may be needed, should be positioned to give the support required, but the conduct of our personnel and the location of weapons should not be such as to constitute unnecessarily a challenge, a dare, to the Soviets.

3. By telephone call from Watson I have learned that an ambulance will be stationed at the Friedrichstrasse Gate and a statement will be issued this afternoon. I have no other information on these points, but I suggest that a statement saying we will deal with the situation, without being specific, may be far more effective and would not risk the mere presence of an ambulance suggesting the limits of our action in case of another incident, or serving as an invitation to escapees, or as an implicit condonation of the shooting of those attempting to leave East Berlin.1

  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Norstad Papers, Subject File, Dowling. Secret; By Special Means; Personal. Repeated to Bonn personal for Dowling, to CINCUSEUR personal for General Freeman, and to USCOB personal for General Watson. The source text indicates that it was delivered to Gilpatric in McNamara’s absence and passed to the Department of State.↩
  2. On August 21 Dowling transmitted his concurrence in the course of action laid out by Norstad. (Telegram 520 from Bonn; ibid.)↩